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My dissertation provides an account of the nature, value, and reasons arising out of 
close personal relationships. I begin by providing an analysis of the attitude of close personal 
love, which I construe as a response to the beloved’s system of values as expressed through 
the beloved’s character. My account emphasizes certain ways in which human beings are 
imperfect, and suggests that we love people in part for these imperfections. Relationships 
grounded in this love have value for their participants because they are useful, they can 
transform the character of experiences, they facilitate self-understanding, and enhance 
individual agency. Because of their distinctive value, relationships give rise to particular 
classes of reasons for their participants—reasons to favor loved ones, increase the potential 
range of shared experiences, and take good care of oneself. Because their value is basic and 
in part impersonal, certain relationship-specific goods give rise to reasons for us all not only 
to respect existing relationships but also to take steps towards becoming better potential 
participants in relationships. Finally, I consider the implications of my work for the larger 
conversation in ethics concerning the potential for conflict between reasons of partiality and 
those of impartiality. I consider several influential attempts to address this problem of 
conflict, but argue that each fails in its own way. I conclude that the value of relationships is 
such that it recommends partiality but also very likely serves impartial concerns. 
Relationships have a distinctive, genuine, and deep practical importance that is perhaps more 
in harmony with morality than may be obvious, but that nevertheless is liable to come into 
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For many of us, close relationships—like friendship and romantic partnership—are 
among the most valued parts of our lives. Our friendships help structure our day-to-day 
lives, and relationships are often among the most important factors influencing major life 
decisions, such as where to live and whether to have children. Our friends and loved ones 
are where we turn for solace when personal tragedies strike, and it is with them that we 
celebrate our happiest moments. The role of these close relationships is not always positive; 
our friends and loved ones can be sources of the worst emotional pain if we lose them, or in 
cases of disagreement and conflict. But the absence of such relationships is often keenly felt 
as a profound sort of loneliness that is not easily remedied. In this dissertation, I explore the 
value of these relationships, and the way that they give rise to reasons. I build an account 
that ascribes to close personal relationships a value that is distinctive and significant. My 
account pays particular attention to certain ways in which human beings are imperfect, and 
explains how relationships—and the love that grounds them—respond to human 
imperfections. I argue that we love people in part for their imperfections, not merely in spite 
of them. Further, relationships can be good for us in part because of our imperfections. 
While some of the claims I make in the chapters that follow apply to various types of 
relationships, including familial ones and those between colleagues, for example, my 
intended focus is only what I call close personal relationships. The paradigmatic examples of 
close personal relationships are life partnerships and close long-term friendships between 
adults. I focus on these relationships because they have certain interesting features that I 
think set them apart from other kinds (such as familial relationships). First, they are typically 
voluntary in a way that other relationships are not; to some extent at least, we choose who will 
be our friends and partners. Second, they are typically understood to be relationships 
between peers or equals in a way that many other relationships are not. Families, workplaces, 
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and other organizations or structures within which relationships are formed often impose 
particular hierarchies or power structures that will have an impact on the relationships 
formed within them. I am more interested in relationships between (more-or-less) equals, 
which are entered into (more-or-less) freely. Finally, I have chosen to focus on these sorts of 
relationships because they seem to be of a rather special importance in our lives—consider 
their ubiquity as a theme in art and popular culture—but also relatively under-explored in 
ethics, at least in a systematic way. 
Relationships are acknowledged and taken into consideration in ethical theory, 
especially in the last four decades following the attention drawn to them by critics of modern 
moral philosophy such as Bernard Williams. But they are typically treated together with other 
kinds of relationships at least, and often also together with personal interests and projects in 
general. There are more thorough treatments of particular kinds of relationship to be found 
in the work of the ancients—notably Plato and Aristotle—but among the problems with 
those accounts is the fact that our world, our societies, and our ideals have changed a good 
deal since they were written. A new comprehensive account of the ways that close personal 
relationships in particular have significance in our lives will be helpful, I believe, in answering 
more particular questions that may arise, such as whether they can ever legitimately take 
precedence over impartial values when the two values clash. Building and defending such a 
comprehensive account is my goal in the chapters that follow. 
I begin with an analysis of the sort of love that forms the basis of close personal 
relationships. Working up to my account via critiques of the influential views of J. David 
Velleman, Harry Frankfurt, and Niko Kolodny, I construe the attitude of close personal love 
as an attitude of endorsement toward the value system of a loved one, as expressed through 
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the loved one’s character. A person’s character, on my view, is a uniquely identifying, unifying 
structure that underlies a person’s behavioral tendencies and dispositions, and is informed by 
the person’s attitudes toward things as being valuable. I draw attention to three ways in 
which human value systems are imperfect: These systems are imperfectly systematic, they have 
imperfect elements, and they are often imperfectly manifested in the person’s character. 
When we appreciate certain imperfections in others, we recognize something that is similar 
to features of ourselves, and this enables trust. Recognizing that a loved one has a system of 
values that is imperfectly expressed in her character reminds one of one’s own comparable 
imperfection. This sort of honest awareness of the other is one of the features that 
distinguishes mature love from infatuation, which I characterize as a sort of blindness to 
imperfection. Warranted trust is what distinguishes reasonable from unreasonable risk in the 
emotional vulnerability of love. This means that we do and should love people in part for 
their imperfections. 
In my second chapter, I offer an explanation of why relationships grounded on close 
personal love are so important to us. The love that characterizes close friendships and 
romantic relationships often seems to be a genuine reason for certain actions and attitudes. 
The question of why this is the case would seem to be especially pressing for my account, 
since I construe love as a response to something that is imperfect, and that is recognized as 
such. I proceed on the assumption that what is of value should be valued as the valuable 
thing it is (following Joseph Raz). I argue that the value of relationships admits of the 
following fourfold classification: relationships are useful, they have a transformative capacity 
over the pleasure or displeasure of experiences, they can enhance an individual’s 
understanding of her own value system, and they enhance our individual agency. I use this 
analysis to defend the view that relationships give rise to reasons to favor loved ones in cases 
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of need, to favor loved ones in the absence of any particular need, to increase the range of 
potential shared pleasures, and to take care of oneself. In each case, the reason is generated 
by some combination of the types of value in my fourfold classification. 
In my third chapter, I turn from personal value and participant-relative reasons to 
the reasons relationships generate more generally. Do relationships bear value for, and 
generate reasons for, even non-participants? I argue both that existing relationships are 
valuable in such a way as to require respect from non-participants, and that relationship-
specific goods give rise to general reasons for people to take steps toward becoming better 
potential participants in relationships. A major claim of my third chapter is that close 
personal relationships are distinctively valuable because they are uniquely suited to facilitate 
development of character. Having one’s character in good shape is a basic good for human 
beings, no matter what particular preferences, values, or projects they may have. It is in this 
way that close personal relationships bear value that is general or impersonal in a way that 
someone’s project of climbing Mount Kilimanjaro might not be. (The example is Thomas 
Nagel’s.) That the value of relationships is in part impersonal extends their practical 
significance beyond the participant-relative significance explained in Chapter 2. 
Finally, in my fourth chapter, I turn to the possibility of conflict between close 
personal relationships and morality. I suggest that the reasons arising from the value of 
relationships that apply generally (i.e., those treated in Chapter 3) are not in conflict with 
morality in principle. In fact, they turn out to be reasons to develop one’s virtue in most 
cases. There is a more serious problem concerning the participant-relative reasons (i.e., those 
treated in Chapter 2), and as I see it, there is no satisfying solution to this problem. I 
consider strategies for dealing with the problem, exemplified by Peter Railton, David 
6 
 
Velleman, and Susan Wolf respectively, and argue that each falls short of solving the 
problem in its own way. I also examine an African ethical theory, sometimes called Ubuntu, 
according to which morality arises out of human relationships, but argue that such a theory 
likely faces similar problems when it comes to close, selective, loving relationships. I argue 
that the basic value of relationships depends on the very features of them that make them 
problematic when held up to the standard of impartial morality. I conclude that there is a 
deep, structural tension between the value of relationships and the concept of impartial 
morality, which explains the absence of a satisfying solution to the apparent conflict between 
these two kinds of reason. 
Before we get in to the real work of accounting for the value of relationships, a word 
on my choice of treating relationships of friendship and relationships of romantic love 
together. The reader may wonder about the lack of a distinction here, especially since I am 
careful to separate out close personal relationships from others, such as parent-child 
relationships. I do not, in fact, think that friendship and romantic partnership are deeply 
different in kind. A particular friendship may be very different indeed from a particular 
romantic relationship, but the same might be said about two particular friendships, or two 
particular romantic relationships. There are potentially endless possibilities for the details of 
close personal relationships—their characteristic patterns of interaction, origin stories, 
typical shared activities, and the expectations of one another that their participants may 
share. These details will be determined by the particular participants in each case, and the 
account I offer in what follows can help to explain how that happens. But what friendships 
and romantic relationships have in common, it seems to me, is that they are typically 
voluntary and between equals in the sense explained above. To the extent that other kinds of 
relationships share these features, they can be taken to be included, and to the extent that 
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In this chapter, I build my positive account of a certain kind of love that grounds 
and forms the basis of close personal relationships. The kind of love I have in mind is the 
sort we typically find between two partners in a close relationship—the sort we think of as a 
relationship of romantic love, or the relationship of friendship. I take it that there is no deep 
difference in kind between the sort of love that exists between romantic partners and the sort 
of love that exists between friends. The difference between the two is rather to be explained 
in terms of the particular relationships in question. My reasons for this should become clear in 
the course of my arguments throughout the chapter. It is worth noting at the outset, 
however, that the sort of relationship I have in mind and seek to elucidate is the 
phenomenon we currently recognize as friendship or romantic love—it is selective, and 
deeply personal, and is typically entered into voluntarily.1   
My project in this chapter is partly descriptive and partly normative. I intend both to 
be faithful to the phenomenology of love,2 and also to make some moves in the direction of 
normative claims about when close personal love and its corresponding relationships are 
appropriate or inappropriate. I begin in Section 1 with some general reflections on the 
desiderata for an account of this variety of love and its corresponding kind of relationship, 
before moving on in Sections 2, 3, and 4 to discuss some of the extant views of love in 
relation to these desiderata. This provides the framework for my positive account, which I 
build toward throughout these sections. Finally, in Section 5, I show what is distinctive about 
my account and why it better captures the desiderata than do its major competitors. 
                                                     
1 The sort of relationship I have in mind thus differs from ancient conceptions of friendship. My 
intention is that the sort of attitude and corresponding relationship under discussion in the present chapter 
should be a recognizable feature of most readers’ lives. 
2 Unless otherwise specified, when I speak of “love” in this chapter, I intend the sort of close personal 
love that typically exists between romantic partners and friends. 
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My positive view of close personal love has three key features that distinguish it from 
others. First, on my account, the object of close personal love is a person’s character, where 
this is understood to be a structure of dispositions and attitudes that are particularly 
distinctive of that person. I understand a person’s character to be very importantly related to 
her system of values, a system that is both a partial explanation of the person’s character, and 
the explanation of close personal love for the person where it exists. Finally, on my account, 
imperfection is extremely important. I take it that human imperfection is necessary for 
understanding the phenomenon of close personal love in a general way—it is because we are 
limited in certain respects that we need and value close personal relationships.3 Additionally, 
and perhaps more surprisingly, I will argue that we in fact love people in part for their 
imperfections. This feature of close personal love will be explained by seeing love as a 
response to a person’s character understood as an imperfect expression, or interpretation, of 
a particular value system, which itself is imperfect. Before I can spell out my account or offer 
criticisms of others, however, I should lay out what I take to be the conditions for an 




First, it seems to be necessary that the sort of close personal love with which I am 
concerned in this chapter should be selective, or discriminatory. We need an explanation for 
why it is that we love only some people in this way, and for why it seems to matter that we 
                                                     
3 I argue more fully for this point in the next chapter. 
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love the particular people we do rather than others. Our account of love should be able to 
account for the intuition that I have more reason to love my partner than to love someone 
else. When I love someone, it is essential that the person I love is the person in question, and 
our account should identify what it is about that person that is especially relevant to my love 
for him. My love for a particular person must be explained, at least in part, by features or 
qualities that are distinctive of that person. I call this the Selectivity Requirement. 
However, the object of close personal love should be the person that is loved. It should 
not be some quality or qualities of the beloved, since this would seem to lead to the 
substitution objection. Roughly, the idea of this objection is that if I love a person for her 
qualities such as beauty, wit, kindness, and so on, my love should be indifferent to the 
substitution of a different person with all of the same qualities that my beloved has, and this 
would seem to be an unattractive implication.4 A satisfactory account of close personal love 
must give content to the idea that when I love a person, what I love is precisely that person. The 
object of my love should turn out to be the person him- or herself rather than a bundle of 
qualities or an idealized version of that person. I call this the Correct Object Requirement. This 
requirement is related to the previous one, but it is different in that here the focus is on 
correctly identifying the object of love, whereas the focus of the Selectivity Requirement was 
on the discriminatory character of love.5 There are problems to untangle here. For example, 
it is not immediately clear whether the object of this sort of love should be the person who 
                                                     
4 Niko Kolodny explains the substitution objection to the Quality Theory in “Love as Valuing a 
Relationship,” The Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 135-189. I discuss this objection in more detail toward the end 
of this chapter, once my positive view is on the table. 
5 Whereas the concern of the previous point was to ensure that the account can explain why I love Joe 
rather than Jack, the concern of this point is to ensure that the account can explain why I love Joe rather than 
(e.g.) something that Joe represents, or some collection of properties that Joe instantiates. The previous point 
concerned the intuition that qualities do make a difference to love, whereas this point is intended to ensure that 
love is not characterized as responsive merely to qualities. 
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stands in the appropriate causal relationship with the lover, or the person who has the right 
character. More on this later. Despite these complexities, we can say that it is plausible that 
the object of personal love should be the specific person in some sense, and our account of 
love should elucidate that sense. 
Third, an adequate account of love should construe love as something that can be 
one-directional, or, to put it another way, unrequited. It should be possible for me to love 
someone in the close personal sense while he or she does not love me back in this way. 
When love is one-directional in this way, there is no relationship of the relevant kind based on 
love, which shows the need for a distinction between the attitude of love and relationships 
that are based on this attitude. Furthermore, it should be possible that two people both have 
the relevant love attitude towards one another, but that there is no relationship of the 
relevant kind between them. That is to say, a relationship of the kind in question is more 
than the sum of its participants’ love attitudes. I call this the Attitudinal Requirement. This 
requirement is more than a mere conceptual distinction—we should expect that 
relationships that are based on the kind of love under consideration give rise to reasons that 
do not arise out of love without the context of a relationship even though there may be 
(indeed, I think it is clear that there are) some reasons that arise simply out of the love itself, 
regardless of whether a close relationship is in place. 
Fourth, the sort of love under consideration must be specifically personal in the 
sense that it must be meaningfully distinguished from love of animals, objects, activities, 
abstract principles or anything else. Whatever is going on when I love my romantic partner 
or my friend, it is quite profoundly different from what is going on when I love my cat, a 
painting, performing on stage, or egalitarianism. An adequate account of close personal love 
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must capture and account for this difference, and the difference should presumably be 
explained in part by something that makes persons specially different from other things. I 
call this the Personal Requirement. 
Fifth, the sort of love that concerns us here must be different from infatuation or 
mere admiration. There is an important difference between an adolescent’s infatuation with a 
celebrity—or another adolescent, for that matter—and the sort of love that an adult typically 
feels towards a long-time partner, or the sort of love we feel for our close friends. The 
former lacks some maturity and depth that characterizes the latter. An adequate account of 
love must capture this maturity and depth, and must be able to distinguish it from mere 
infatuation or admiration. I call this the Maturity Requirement. One way of understanding this 
point is to think of close personal love as more reasonable or justified than mere infatuation 
or admiration. However, there is the risk of putting too much stress on justification. Love 
should not be subject to such rigorous standards of justification that it loses its character as 
love altogether. Love should be reasonable in that it is the sort of thing that we often 
recognize as a legitimate and even strong reason for action, but it need not be justified by 
abstract, universal principles. 
Finally, we should expect our account of love to be able to explain the genesis, 
sustenance, and decay of love for a person. We should have some sort of explanation of how 
it is that I come to love a person, why it is that I continue to love that person when I do, and 
what happens when I cease to love that person if I do. This account should not diverge too 
far from our actual experience, but it should be able to say something about when cases of 
“falling in love” or “falling out of love” are merely apparent rather than actual cases of 
genesis or decay of the sort of love under consideration. It should also ideally have 
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something to say about when the genesis, sustenance, and decay of close personal love is 
appropriate or inappropriate. I call this the Explanatory Requirement. 
We can sum up these desiderata as follows. Our account of close personal love 
should account for its selectivity; it should identify the object of love as a person; it should 
distinguish the attitude of love from relationships that typically embody it; it should 
distinguish personal love from love of anything else; it should imbue love with the appropriate 
maturity and depth; and it should provide an explanation of the genesis, sustenance, and decay of 
love. Having laid out these general criteria for a satisfactory account of close personal love, I 
consider next three major extant views to see how they measure up. I consider the views of 
J. David Velleman, Harry Frankfurt, and Niko Kolodny in turn. 
 
2. Love as “Really Seeing” a Deeper Something 
 
In an influential paper, J. David Velleman addresses the apparent tension between 
love and impartial morality by providing an account of love on which love is both selective 
(partial) and consistent with the impartiality requirement of morality.6 He suggests that the 
key to solving the problem of apparent conflict is to recognize that love is in fact not 
objectionably partial. In developing his account of love, Velleman draws on ideas from Iris 
Murdoch in The Sovereignty of Good in which she emphasizes the ethical value of attending to 
particulars, or “really looking.”7 Velleman argues that love is an arresting awareness of a value 
                                                     
6 J. David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109 (1999): 338-374. 
7 Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” 342. See also Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New 
York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). 
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inherent in the person that is its object—a value that becomes apparent when we really look at 
a person in this special sense. The essence of Velleman’s view is well summed up when he 
says: 
The Kantian view is that respect is a mode of valuation that the very capacity for valuation 
must pay to instances of itself.  My view is that love is a mode of valuation that this capacity 
may also pay to instances of itself.  I regard respect and love as the required minimum and 
optional maximum responses to one and the same value.8 
There are several aspects of Velleman’s account to which I am sympathetic, and 
which offer valuable insights into the nature of love. In the present chapter, I am not 
concerned with the merits of Velleman’s view insofar as it proposes a solution to the 
apparent problem of conflict between love and morality.9 My interest, rather, is in an 
adequate analysis of the phenomenon of love. In what follows, therefore, I consider the 
strengths and weaknesses of Velleman’s view as an account of close personal love of the 
kind that concerns me in this chapter.10 I will suggest that, despite the valuable insights 
Velleman elucidates—specifically, of love as a matter of ‘really looking’ and seeing 
something somehow deep, obscure, and valuable—the account has certain weaknesses. In 
particular, it seems that Velleman’s view does not adequately incorporate what I have called 
the Selectivity Requirement, the Correct Object Requirement, and the Maturity Requirement. 
Recall that love, on Velleman’s account, is an attitude toward another person that is 
the optional maximum corresponding to the attitude of Kantian respect as a required 
                                                     
8 Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” 366. 
9 I do, however reconsider Velleman’s account in this respect in Chapter 4 below. 
10 It is interesting that Velleman in fact says that he is interested in the sort of love between close adult 
friends and life-partners. See Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” 351. 
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minimum; it is essentially a response to a person’s rational nature, or better self.11 Once I 
become aware of this better nature of the person, I drop my emotional defenses against the 
person, rendering myself vulnerable to them.12 Velleman’s account is intended to be Kantian, 
and as such invokes some major metaphysical commitments. Specifically, on Velleman’s 
account, we come to love particular people because of their phenomenal natures (empirical 
personae), but love is properly a response to their noumenal selves (their true, or better, 
natures). 
There are serious questions about how well this picture could be reconciled with the 
rest of what Kant says about phenomena and noumena. For example, is it plausible, on a 
Kantian metaphysical account, that I could ever come to see another person’s noumenal 
self? Is it plausible that my love for my friend is a response to a noumenon? I suspect, 
though it is beyond the scope of my project to argue for it here, that the answer to both of 
these questions is negative on a faithful interpretation of Kant. Moreover, even if Velleman’s 
account of love were reconciled with a faithful interpretation of Kant, it strikes me as 
problematic to explain the very familiar and recognizable phenomenon of love by invoking 
an obscure and questionable metaphysics rife with interpretive and epistemic difficulties. I 
suggest, therefore, though it may be contrary to Velleman’s intentions, that the most fruitful 
reading of his use of Kantian notions is rather metaphorical. In what follows, therefore, I am 
adopting some of the elements of Velleman’s account while not intending them as Kantian. 
On my suggested metaphorical reading of Velleman’s picture, the most important 
elements of the account are as follows. Love is a response to something in a person that is 
                                                     
11 Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” 365-366. 
12 Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” 371. 
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perceived as valuable, and as somehow underlying the more superficial qualities of the 
person. The aspect of a person that is seen as especially valuable, and which is thus the 
object of love, is a capacity that all persons share—the capacity for rationality. This capacity 
is what makes persons valuable, and in this sense, it is the “better” nature of a person. That 
is, the capacity for rationality is the ground of my love for a person even if the person has 
some superficial characteristics that do not perfectly exhibit that capacity. When I get to 
know a person well enough—when I really look13—what I see is their extremely valuable 
rational nature (understood here simply as the capacity for rationality). Once I see this aspect 
of the person, I drop my emotional defenses against them, rendering myself vulnerable to 
them. This is the attitude of personal love, on the metaphorical interpretation of Velleman’s 
account. So understood, it seems that there is much in this view that is correct. 
First, the idea that loving someone renders me vulnerable to them—that I drop my 
emotional defenses because I no longer see them as necessary—seems characteristic of the 
experience of love. This is why in loving someone, it is often the case that I trust him or her, 
and indeed, it would seem that in ideal cases of love, I should trust my beloved. Second, there 
seems some truth to the idea that when I love someone, there is something of value in them 
that I am able to see but that others who do not love this person do not see, and that the 
reason for this seems to have something to do with some compatibility between us on a 
somewhat superficial level. This suggests both that love is aroused by the more superficial 
aspects of a person, but is more deeply a response to something of higher value, less 
superficial, and somehow more obscure. My love for my friend, Catherine, is aroused by the 
                                                     
13 As noted above, the phrase “really looking” comes from Murdoch’s The Sovereignty of Good, which 
Velleman repeatedly invokes to describe the phenomenon of love. What we see when we “really look” in the 
way characteristic of love, according to Velleman, is the person’s better self or rational nature. 
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fact that we have similar hobbies, for example, but once I truly love her, this is because I 
somehow know and appreciate something about her true self that others do not. This model 
seems to work for the sort of love that characterizes romantic relationships as well. 
A problem arises, however, when we think about what this somehow deeper, 
valuable aspect is that I come to know and appreciate when I love a person. Note that if it is 
a capacity that all persons share, it is in principle possible for me to come to love any person 
just as I love Catherine if only I were able to see through his or her superficial qualities to his 
or her better self—his or her rational nature. It is not practically possible, of course, both 
because there are limits to the number of people I can come to know well enough to see 
their “true selves” and because features of my particular personality might make it 
exceptionally difficult to see the underlying value beneath certain kinds of characteristics in 
others.14 But since the real ground of my love for Catherine is something she shares with all 
other persons, it is in principle possible for me to love anyone else just as I love her. I 
suspect that this is not the case for the kind of love that concerns me in this chapter.15 On 
Velleman’s account, my loving Catherine in particular rather than someone else does not 
have anything deeply to do with the differences between Catherine and the other person. 
But since my love for Catherine does seem to have something deeply to do with her 
uniquely identifying characteristics, Velleman’s construal of the object of love as a capacity 
that all persons share does not adequately account for the intuitions behind the Selectivity 
Requirement. Moreover, the particular capacity that he posits as the ground of love seems to 
                                                     
14 See Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” 372. 
15 There may be other kinds of love, to be investigated elsewhere, which are such that I could come to 
love any other person, given the opportunity. I merely doubt that this is the case for close personal love of the 
kind that characterizes close friendships and romantic relationships. 
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me an unlikely candidate. The first point to note in this regard is that this is not the way we 
would ordinarily think of love. If asked why I love Catherine, I would be unlikely to offer 
Catherine’s rationality as a reason. It is certainly not the case that we ordinarily take the 
object of our love to be a transcendentally free, noumenal self who legislates the moral law 
for itself. But even on the metaphorical interpretation of Velleman that I suggested above, 
the capacity for rationality strikes me as an implausible object or ground of close personal 
love. There are many aspects of Catherine’s character that I might cite as reasons for loving 
her that do not obviously indicate her rational nature.16 
Indeed, some of the reasons that I love my friends seem to be imperfections. This is an 
aspect of our common experience of love that would be ruled out or quite mysterious on 
Velleman’s view. There may be aspects of Catherine that I do not particularly admire, or 
aspire to, but that I nevertheless find endearing. I may think that she has too great a fear of 
inconveniencing others, for example. It may be that I think her concern is misplaced and 
that without it she would better be able to achieve certain goals and fulfilments—but insofar 
as I recognize that her commitment to not inconveniencing others is very much a part of 
who she is, I love her for it (in part). This can be the case even if I think the commitment in 
question is irrational. Velleman’s account would seem only to be able to account for the 
most admirable aspects of Catherine’s character to be appropriate triggers for love. I use the 
word “triggers” here because on Velleman’s account, Catherine’s commitments, or indeed 
her whole character, would presumably never be the appropriate object or ground of my 
                                                     
16 Of course, there is a sense in which any particularly human characteristic of Catherine’s will have 
something to do with her rational nature, if that if what differentiates persons from other beings and objects. 
My point is that there are some aspects of people for which I love them, that are not particularly good 
indicators of rational nature. I am grateful to Richard Bett for pressing me on this point. 
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love for her. The proper object and ground of my love for her would have to be her 
personhood—her capacity for rationality, according to Velleman. 
I suggest that the problem with construing love as a response to the capacity of 
rationality, or any bare capacity, is that it is a misidentification. As I have said, I think that 
Velleman’s account gets something right in that it posits something deeper, more obscure 
and more valuable than the qualities (or “quirks”) that superficially characterize a person. I 
think that Velleman errs, however, when he identifies this with a capacity that all persons 
share (or any bare capacity for that matter). I submit, therefore, that his account does not 
satisfy either the criterion of the Selectivity Requirement or the criterion of the Correct 
Object Requirement.   
What I mean when I say that I love my friend Catherine is not that I love her 
because I can really see and understand in a deep way that she is a person, but rather that I 
love her because she is the person that she is. It is this particular individual that is the object of my 
love. My appreciation of her is not the same as my appreciation of Julie, though I love Julie 
too, and just as much (to the extent that it makes sense to quantify such things). Rather, I 
love Julie because she is the person she is, and that is quite a different person from the 
person Catherine is. This point is seen particularly clearly when we consider the loss of a 
friend—when a close friend dies, the loss is irremediable because a specific friend has been 
lost. It may well be the case that I could find a new friend whom I would love just as much 
as Tricia—indeed, I might find several such friends. But no new friend, nor any number of 
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new friends, can fill the specific place of Tricia in my life because the object of my love was 
Tricia—the particular person.17 
Whatever it is that I have come to appreciate and love in Catherine, it is not a simple 
collection of qualities—a particular sense of humor, a certain level of intelligence, a degree of 
integrity, and so on. It does seem to have some connection to these qualities or 
characteristics, however—that was the point of the Selectivity Requirement. Rather than 
being a mere collection of qualities, the deeper something that I love in Catherine seems to 
be something that unifies these various qualities, or underlies them—some kind of structural 
feature. This suggests to me that what it is that I really love in Catherine is her character, 
understood as a complex and somewhat stable structure of dispositions and attitudes that 
notably distinguish her from everyone else that I know.18 My proposal, then, is that the real 
object of close personal love is the beloved person’s character. It is because Julie and 
Catherine have different characters that I love them differently (though perhaps to the same 
degree or extent), and it is because no-one else has Tricia’s character that her death is an 
absolutely irremediable loss for me. 
My final objection to the sort of view that Velleman advocates is that it risks not 
sufficiently incorporating the Maturity Requirement. To see why, it will be useful to say 
something about what I take to be the case when I am infatuated with someone. I think a 
clear and useful model here is the attitude that adolescents typically have toward celebrities, 
though infatuation is certainly not limited to this model. When my thirteen-year-old self 
                                                     
17 While Velleman could certainly accommodate this point, since he takes the value of an individual to 
be an incomparable dignity, I disagree with his explanation, or what I assume it would be. It seems to me that it 
is, in part, the particular characteristics of Tricia that make her irreplaceable. Her irreplaceability is not wholly 
explained by any valuable capacity that she shares with all other persons. 
18 I give a more explicit definition of what I take character to be, as well as a potential problem for this 
view, when I state my full view in section 5 of this chapter. 
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believed that Mick Jagger was meant for her, a large part of what was going on seems to 
have been a matter of blindness to imperfections. The object of my infatuation was not a 
real person at all, but an extremely idealized imaginary version of himself. An important part 
of what distinguishes my love for my partner, Joe, and my former infatuation with Mick 
Jagger, it seems to me, is that my love for Joe is open to seeing imperfections in his character 
and accepting them—indeed even loving him for them (in part) because they are part of 
what make him the unique human being with whom I have chosen to develop a relationship. 
My love for Joe is much more of a case of “really looking” than was my infatuation with 
Mick Jagger.19 Though I commend Velleman’s attempt to elevate love above a mere drive or 
urge, I think that this is a respect in which Velleman’s account in fact ends up looking more 
like infatuation than love—it seems to involve a (possibly willful) blindness to imperfection. 
If real love involves dropping one’s emotional defenses against a person, as Velleman 
thinks it does, and if it is also a response to an idealized, “better” version of the person, as 
Velleman seems to think it is, this would seem to make love problematically risky. I do not 
mean to deny that there are significant risks involved in loving a person. Indeed, this is one 
of the aspects of Velleman’s account that I think is correct. But we need to be able to 
distinguish between cases of reasonable and unreasonable risk. There are cases where we 
want to say that people render themselves vulnerable to the people they love in ways that 
they should not, while in other cases, rendering oneself vulnerable to the other is perfectly 
reasonable and even admirable because it enables the establishment of a very meaningful 
close relationship. This, I take it, is a key difference between infatuation and mature love. 
                                                     
19 In this connection, I find Elijah Millgram’s criticism of Velleman’s account especially useful. See 
Millgram, “Kantian Crystallization,” Ethics 114 (2004): 511-513 at 513. 
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It seems to me that it would be most appropriate to drop one’s emotional defenses 
and render oneself vulnerable to another when one has paid attention to the actual 
dispositions and attitudes of that person, and thereby come to believe that the emotional 
defenses are no longer necessary. It does seem that someone is being unreasonable if she 
renders herself vulnerable to a particular person who has repeatedly broken her trust and 
displayed an attitude of insufficient concern for her in the past. On Velleman’s account, 
what we see when we “really look,” and what justifies our disarming our emotional defenses, 
is a capacity that all persons share—indeed, a capacity to be better than they in fact are. For 
this reason, his account can seemingly not distinguish inappropriate cases from appropriate 
cases of dropping one’s emotional defenses.20 For this reason, I think incorporating honest 
awareness of imperfections into our account of love is very important. The best way to do 
this, I suggest, is by understanding the object of close personal love to be a person’s 
character. More needs to be said, however, about what a person’s character is, and why it can 
be the object of love in this way. I think there are some clues to be found in the sort of 
account Frankfurt espouses, which I discuss next. 
 
3. Love as Endorsement of a System of Values 
 
In this section, I respond to the account of love that Harry Frankfurt gives in The 
Reasons of Love.21 I will suggest that his account fails to adequately satisfy the criteria that I 
                                                     
20 I should note that I do not think Velleman’s account of love amounts to infatuation—his 
characterization of it as not essentially involving desires prevents that. But I do think it might have something 
unattractive in common with infatuation insofar as it involves a kind of blindness to imperfections. 
21 Harry Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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have called the Maturity Requirement, the Personal Requirement, and the Correct Object 
Requirement. Loving something, for Frankfurt, is a matter of having final ends with which 
we identify, and is in fact what ensures the right connection between us and our final ends.22 
On Frankfurt’s account, we can love a great many kinds of things—objects, activities, 
pursuits, principles, and people. Frankfurt rejects the notion that love is a response to 
perceived value; rather, love can arise in any number of ways.23 One can come to love 
something or someone that she does not see as valuable, at least initially. She will come to 
see the object of her love as valuable, but that is because she loves it. Once one loves 
something, she views that thing as valuable for its own sake, regardless of any use it may 
have for her. The object of love is not substitutable. Love is not under our direct voluntary 
control. Finally, for Frankfurt, loving something entails identifying with its interests, which 
in the case of a person will most importantly be what the person loves—the person’s final 
ends.24 
It should already be clear that my view is significantly at odds with Frankfurt’s, since 
I am inclined to see love—or at least, the close personal love under discussion here—as a 
response to something in a person that is perceived as valuable (specifically, the person’s 
character). Another way of putting this point is to say that whereas Frankfurt does not see 
love as necessarily being responsive to a certain kind of reason, I do. I think that Frankfurt is 
correct that we often come to love things (even people) for all kinds of reasons and perhaps 
for no reason at all in some cases, but I think he is wrong to identify this coming to love with 
                                                     
22 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 55. 
23 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 38. 




love itself. Recall my description of how I ended up in the state of loving my friend, 
Catherine. It all began with our having similar hobbies. My love for Julie began with us being 
enrolled in an interesting and challenging course together, and discussing the material with 
one another. My love for each of my friends plausibly arose in very different ways. But, 
importantly, it would not have been true to say that I loved Catherine when we were simply 
enjoying similar activities together, nor would it have been true to say that I loved Julie while 
we were simply discussing course material together. These were the enabling conditions of 
me coming to love them, but in both cases, the love itself came later. It was only true to say 
that I loved Catherine and Julie once I had come to know each of them better—once I had a 
much better idea of what each of their characters was like.25   
It seems to me that once the relationship is firmly established, and it is true to say 
that I love Catherine or Julie, this love is responsive to a certain kind of reason. I love Julie 
because she is the person that she is, and if her character were to change dramatically, it may well 
be that my love for her would decay or disappear. Frankfurt would deny that there are 
reasons for love even in this case—my perception of Julie as valuable depends on my loving 
her, on Frankfurt’s account. This seems false to me. When I ask myself why I love Julie, it 
seems to me that there are all sorts of reasons I can give—descriptions of her attitudes and 
dispositions which seem quite essential to my loving her. If everything I currently know and 
love about Julie were to suddenly change, yet my attitude of love towards her remained, I 
imagine I would be extremely confused and upset. I do not mean to deny that this could 
happen, but I think that it would be very strange if it were to happen; it would seem that 
                                                     
25 Niko Kolodny makes a similar point about the way we come to love, and concludes that love arises 
because we develop a certain attitude toward the relationship. I think this is interesting, and may be true in 
some cases, but I think it can also happen the other way around—that love arises first, and the relationship 
develops later (though this may be rare). I return to this point later. 
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something had gone wrong, and would require explanation. I disagree, therefore, with 
Frankfurt’s assertion that love is not subject to reasons. 
This is one respect in which I think Frankfurt’s account is deficient, and in which I 
hope to do better. Given that I take the object of close personal love to be the beloved’s 
character, I would argue that it is only possible to love someone if one knows that person 
pretty well.26 Frankfurt’s account would have it that I could love someone without any 
knowledge of their character at all, for love can arise for just about any reason, or even for 
no reason at all. I think my view, which I continue to develop throughout this chapter, 
makes love not only less mysterious in its workings—it seems easier to see how my loved 
one appears to me as being especially valuable if my love is a response to something that I 
have paid special attention to—but also deeper, more admirable, and more mature than the 
sort of attachment Frankfurt describes.27 I think that Frankfurt’s account, therefore, remains 
open to the charge that he has not satisfied the Maturity Requirement. If love must arise in 
response to a person’s character, as I would have it, it is at least necessary that one has 
actually paid attention to and recognized something as valuable in the beloved. It is possible, 
of course, that mistakes in attributing value, or even in identifying dispositions and attitudes, 
                                                     
26 While this point seems to suggest that love presupposes a close personal relationship, I do not in fact 
think this is the case. Most of the time, we only know people well enough to love them in the sense under 
discussion when we do have an established relationship of some kind. But it is possible that I could come to love 
someone in the relevant sense after reading their autobiography, or perhaps even a biography written by a third 
party. It seems to me that what is required for me to know the person well enough to love them would be to 
have some detailed knowledge of their value system, and how it is typically manifested in their actions and 
decisions—this is to know someone’s character. I discuss this in some more detail later this chapter. 
27 Frankfurt does wish to distinguish “true and intelligent” love from indulgence or gratification, and 
he does this by adding the condition that when one loves, one’s concern for the beloved is disinterested, or 
concerned with the interests of the beloved for the beloved’s own sake. (See The Reasons of Love, 79.) This may 




could be made, and mistakes presumably often are made. Nevertheless, we have an ideal case 
here that makes sense. 
The second serious problem with Frankfurt’s account, as I see it, is that it does not 
adequately distinguish between love of objects, activities, or principles on the one hand, and 
persons on the other. It does not satisfy what I have called the Personal Requirement. For 
Frankfurt, when I love a person, I love whatever is in that person’s true interests. There 
certainly seems to be something to the idea that my close personal love for a person has 
something to do with my attitude to the things she cares most about. I think, however, that 
there is a missing category in Frankfurt’s account. It seems to make an immensely important 
difference that persons, unlike objects, activities, or principles, are themselves capable of 
love.28 
Consider the difference between my love for my cat, Cole, and my love for my 
partner, Joe. In loving Cole, I take him to be valuable for his own sake, and moreover, I take 
the satisfaction of his best interests to be valuable for its own sake. I love Cole in such a way 
that he is not substitutable—it is Cole that I love, and I would not be satisfied if he were 
replaced with another cat. My love for Cole is not under my direct voluntary control—there 
is a sense in which I am helpless to love him. In loving Cole, the furtherance of his best 
interests comes to be an important end for me—in this sense, I come to identify with Cole’s 
best interests.29 Frankfurt’s account seems to work pretty well as an account of my love for 
Cole. But there are important differences between my love for Cole and my love for Joe that 
                                                     
28 This is a respect in which I find Velleman’s account to be much stronger than Frankfurt’s. I depart 
from Velleman, however, in that I do not think the capacity for rationality can be the whole story, or the 
ultimate story. 
29 All of these features of my love for Cole are included in Frankfurt’s general account of love. See The 
Reasons of Love, 35-68. 
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I do not think can be adequately captured by Frankfurt’s account, and these differences have 
to do with a crucial difference between persons and non-persons. Persons alone can love, in 
the sense that they have final ends. When we love persons, therefore, part of what is 
involved in loving them is taking a certain attitude toward the beloved person’s final ends.30 
Frankfurt takes this attitude to be one of identification. In what follows, however, I argue 
that the attitude of close personal love is not one of simple identification with the beloved’s 
final ends. It makes an important difference that a person’s true interests include final ends 
of his or her own. To see this point, it will be useful to compare love for an animal with love 
for a person in more detail. 
Cole has certain characteristics and tendencies that make him particularly lovable to 
me: he is affectionate, playful, and vocal. This might suggest that Cole has a character, and 
indeed may explain why Cole is irreplaceable as the object of my love for him. But Cole’s 
character, insofar as he has one, is not an expression of commitment to final ends—it is not 
because Cole is committed to the good of cuddling that he is affectionate towards me, and it 
is not because Cole holds conversation to be highly valuable that he is vocal. Cole’s tendency 
to bask in the late afternoon sun does not reveal that he values relaxation in the sense in 
which a person might value relaxation. These characteristics of his are much more 
superficial, or simply quirky. Joe, on the other hand, has characteristics and dispositions that 
do seem to be importantly related to certain final ends that he holds. Joe’s tendency to read a 
great deal of non-fiction reveals that he is studious, and values learning. Joe’s tendency to 
talk with me about subjects of mutual interest indicates that he values stimulating 
                                                     
30 This is assuming, with Frankfurt, that loving something entails having an interest in what is in that 
thing’s true interests. A person’s final ends are going to be relevant to her true interests, and so if I love a 
person, I will have some interest in her final ends. 
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conversation with an intellectual equal. My love for Joe may include many of the same 
components as my love for Cole—I perceive them both as valuable for their own sakes, they 
are both irreplaceable as objects of my love, and loving each of them provides me with 
important respective final ends. But my love for Joe is more complex, because my attitude 
toward his best interests is more complex, and this is not merely because his interests are 
more complex (although that is certainly part of the story). 
Unlike Cole, Joe has final ends—things he values very highly, for their own sake, and 
which give his other ends and pursuits a sense of purpose.31 What is in Joe’s best interests, 
then, includes having these sorts of final ends—something that he cares very deeply about, 
and which make his life meaningful for him. On this point, Frankfurt and I are in agreement. 
Where I depart from Frankfurt’s proposal is in terms of the attitude that I take towards Joe’s 
final ends when I love him. For Frankfurt, to love something is to identify with its true 
interests. This would mean that for me to love Joe would be for me to identify with his final 
ends. I do not think that this is accurate, however. In loving Cole, as I suggested before, I do 
indeed seem to identify with his true interests. If it is in Cole’s interests to go to the vet, 
taking Cole to the vet becomes an important interest of mine. If Cole’s true interests require 
that he eat a particular type and amount of food, his eating this type and amount of food 
becomes an important interest of mine. The attitude that I take towards Joe’s final ends, in 
contrast, is not one of simple identification.32 
                                                     
31 On the capacity to have final ends as being the basis of the value of human beings, see L. Nandi 
Theunissen, “On the Value of Human Beings,” (manuscript). Though the value of human beings as such is not 
my central concern here, I find Theunissen’s account quite plausible, and in particular, I think it is the capacity 
to have final ends that distinguishes persons from non-persons as potential objects of close personal love. 
32 I think that “incorporation” might be a better term than “identification” for the way Frankfurt 
understands me to react to my beloved’s final ends. “Identification” seems better suited to an ancient 
conception of friendship, which relies heavily on the notion of shared ends, choices, and actions. Since this is 
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It is true that in loving Joe, I do take a positive attitude towards his final ends—I do 
endorse them. But I endorse them as his final ends, not as my own. We may (indeed we likely 
do) have some final ends in common, and we may have some joint final ends, but because 
we are in fact two different people, we do not wholly identify with one another’s final ends. It 
seems perfectly possible that I could fully love Joe while not identifying with all of his final 
ends. A point that makes this somewhat clearer, I think, is to note that my various friends 
have rather different final ends—rather different value systems—and yet I love them all. 
Since their value systems differ from one another, I cannot possibly identify with all of their 
value systems, yet I love them all. Indeed, in some cases, what I take to be special about a 
particular loved one may be some element of her value system that is not part of my own, 
but that I recognize as valuable for my friend. Even though part of what I love about a 
person might be something that is in no way part of my own value system for myself, a kind 
of value pluralism can allow this result. This is what it means to endorse someone’s value 
system as a good value system for her. 
It is notable that Frankfurt’s model for genuine love is the sort of love that parents 
have for their young children.33 It seems to me that such a model is not at all appropriate for 
the kind of love between adults that characterizes close friendships and romantic 
partnerships. The relationship that parents have toward their young children is, among other 
things, one of guardianship and necessary care. This explains why it is appropriate that a 
parent should identify with the true interests of his child—he should make the ends of the 
child his own. But the relationship that exists between friends and romantic partners is not 
                                                     
not my concern in the present chapter, and since I would reject either candidate as the appropriate way to 
respond to a loved one’s final ends in the case of close personal love, I say no more about it here. 
33 Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, 43. 
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typically—and, indeed, in ordinary cases should not be—one of guardianship. It is rather 
one of two persons with equal status and personal differences relating to one another in 
various ways. It seems to me that the full appreciation of one another, and concern for one 
another, that we would want in a relationship of this kind based on genuine love does not 
require complete identification of values. Indeed, it might benefit from, or be enriched by, 
some differences in values. 
I suggest that the attitudes and dispositions of a person that are informed by his or 
her final ends are in fact evidence of a system of values.34 The final ends with which I identify 
most deeply are my most deeply held values. A person’s character is an imperfect expression 
of a system of values which itself may be imperfect. A person’s system of values is likely to 
be imperfect because most (perhaps all) people’s systems of values are likely to be less than 
fully worked out. They likely include some areas of uncertainty, and even conflicts. The 
reason why a person’s character is likely to be an imperfect expression of his or her value 
system is that most (perhaps all) people can realize their most deeply held values in their 
characters only to a certain degree. 
  When a person loves another person, then, I suggest that the lover endorses the 
value system of the beloved in a deep and profound way. But this endorsement is not 
identification, or simply taking on the beloved’s value system as one’s own. If the 
endorsement were a matter of taking on the beloved’s value system as one’s own, the value 
                                                     
34 I find Samuel Scheffler’s account of what it is to value something to be quite plausible, but note that 
when I speak about a “system of values,” I mean a system of actual, particular values that an individual holds, 
rather than the mere capacity for valuing that human beings have. This is why I sometimes speak of a person’s 
final ends and use this phrase as interchangeable with the phrase system of values. See Scheffler, “Valuing,” in 
Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
15-40. Though there may be difficulties in equating final ends with values, for the sake of simplicity, I assume 
that the terms are co-extensive for an individual. 
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system itself rather than the person whose value system it is would in fact be the object of 
love.35 If we reject the idea that loving someone entails taking on their value system as one’s 
own (and I anyway think we should reject it), we will be able to draw a meaningful 
distinction between the person’s character and their system of values in such a way that we 
can say that the person’s character is the object of love. This in turn allows the view to satisfy 
the criterion that I have called the Correct Object Thesis.36 
To sum up where we are, let us recall what we have taken from and adapted from 
Velleman’s and Frankfurt’s respective accounts. What Velleman seems to get right is that 
love is a response to something rather deep and somehow obscure in a person, and that true 
love is not merely conative (i.e., it is not simply a drive or an urge)—it is admirable and 
mature in a way that infatuation is not. Where he goes wrong, I have suggested, is in 
identifying the object of love as bare rational personhood, or the capacity for rationality. 
Instead, I have suggested that it is a person’s character, where this is understood as 
something structural (and therefore deep) and distinctive (and therefore obscure to those 
who don’t know the person very well) about the particular individual that is loved. What 
Frankfurt seems to get right is that love involves a certain positive attitude towards what a 
person cares about most deeply; he has drawn attention to the importance of final ends. 
Once again, however, I have suggested that the object of personal love, rather than being the 
beloved’s final ends, is the beloved’s character, understood as an imperfect expression of the 
beloved’s final ends or value system, a system which itself may be imperfect. Where 
Frankfurt goes wrong, I have suggested, is in his claim that love requires identification with 
                                                     
35 This, it seems to me, is the difference between loving ‘what someone stands for’ and loving the 
person him- or herself. 
36 There may be a worry about identifying a person with her character, but I do not think it is very 
troubling. I return to this point later. 
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the final ends of the beloved. Moreover, I have suggested that this error is due to Frankfurt’s 
failure to adequately distinguish love for a person from love for a non-person. Specifically, 
love for a person (understood as an adult with equal status) does not require full 
identification of value systems. It requires a different positive attitude towards the other’s 
value system—endorsement understood as something other than full identification or 
incorporation. What exactly is involved in this kind of endorsement will, I think, become 
clearer when we consider some more details of what happens when we come to love, 
continue to love, or stop loving a person—the final component of my positive account of 
close personal love. 
 
4. Love as Separable from Relationships 
 
From what I have said so far, it should be clear that I take the beginning of love for a 
person to essentially involve a kind of appreciation of the beloved’s character, understood as 
an expression of a system of values. My love for my friend, Monique, initially came about 
because of an alignment of my value system with hers. It is not that we have identical value 
systems; rather, we each endorse the value system of the other, specifically as a value system 
for the other. Our friendship has lasted many years, and a quick gloss of the explanation for 
this on the account offered thus far would be that our mutual love has been sustained by the 
continued alignment of, and our continued mutual endorsement of, our respective value 
systems. But this is too quick. Throughout the many years that Monique and I have been 
friends, our characters and value systems have both undergone significant changes, growth, 
and revision. Moreover, these changes occurred in each of us independently. Yet we have 
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remained friends, and indeed, our friendship itself has changed and developed. Rather than 
saying simply that our mutual love has been sustained by the continued alignment of and 
mutual endorsement of one another’s value systems, we can say that it has been sustained in 
part by the fact that there have been no detrimental changes to these features of each of us. We 
need now to ask what would constitute detrimental changes. This will deepen our 
understanding of what is essential to the attitude of love. 
We can get clearer on the details here if we consider some familiar descriptions of 
cases when relationships of love founder. Though I think (and will soon argue) that the 
attitude of love and relationships can come apart, looking at failed relationships is a useful 
place to start looking for significant features of decaying love. Here, I take over Niko 
Kolodny’s extremely helpful summary of some common cases of failed relationships and 
loss of love.37 Kolodny defends a view according to which relationships can be reasons for 
love of various kinds; they give us reason to value certain individuals in particular ways. This 
involves having certain feelings and beliefs, and it also involves being disposed to act in 
certain ways with regard to those individuals and one’s relationships with them. As will 
become clear in the remainder of this section, while Kolodny’s view and mine differ in some 
crucial ways, he has what I take to be some crucial insights into relationships of love. The 
three primary differences between Kolodny’s account and the one I am developing are that 
(1) I take it that character is both the reason for and the object of close personal love, whereas 
Kolodny holds that the relationship is the reason for love, (2) I think the attitude of close 
personal love is not necessarily dependent on the context of a relationship, and (3) I think 
                                                     
37 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 164-166. 
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that while Kolodny’s diagnosis in some cases is correct, it is but one instance of a more 
general phenomenon that my account will be able to capture. 
Kolodny and I agree on several points. We agree that relationships tie me to my 
particular loved ones historically, through repeated interactions of relevant kinds.38 Kolodny 
correctly points out that his account thus successfully avoids a particular version of the 
substitution problem.39 We also agree that relationships, so understood, are often responsible 
for the sustenance of love between people, and that they can explain the differences between 
some kinds of love.40 The difference between my love for my partner, Joe, and my love for 
my friends is explained by the fact that Joe and I have entered into a particular kind of 
relationship that includes exclusivity as an important component, for example. The 
observation that my relationship with Joe renders certain acts and attitudes with respect to 
him appropriate whereas the same sorts of acts and attitudes with respect to my friends 
would not be appropriate is very useful, and, I think, correct. But I think that my emerging 
account can capture these features of Kolodny’s account, and a lot more besides. In 
particular, I think my account can do better in terms of what I have called the Attitudinal 
Requirement and the Explanatory Requirement.41 To show this, I turn now to discuss 
Kolodny’s own examples of loss of love. 
                                                     
38 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 171. 
39 See Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 146. I return to this point when I discuss the 
substitution problem in section 5 of this chapter. 
40 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 155. 
41 I note that Kolodny would presumably simply deny that what I have called the Attitudinal 
Requirement is in fact a criterion for an adequate account of love. My argumentative task here can therefore be 
seen as in part providing a motivation for the Attitudinal Requirement rather than as showing that my account 
captures it better than Kolodny’s does. 
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Kolodny isolates five ways that one’s love could decay: (1) one realizes that one’s 
friend/partner has insufficient concern for one; (2) one’s friend/partner fails to act on 
reasons provided by the relationship; (3) one loses respect for one’s friend/partner; (4) one 
feels that one’s friend/partner is ‘no longer the person she once was’; and (5) one is no 
longer attracted to one’s friend/partner.42 I am largely in agreement with Kolodny about all 
of these points. However, I think that he has missed something more fundamental—
something that seems to underlie, explain and unify a lot of the observations he makes about 
love, and this is the importance of the participants’ respective attitudes toward one another’s 
values. Indeed, I think that this element of love can solve some of the puzzles that Kolodny 
himself raises for his own account. 
I think that Kolodny is correct that a lot of the sustaining and justifying work of love 
is done by the relationship, but I think we still need a satisfactory explanation and 
justification for the establishment and sustenance of the relationship. Once the relationship 
is in place, it itself is a major source of reasons, but that cannot be the whole story. It must 
be possible for love and relationships to come apart. In the remainder of this section, I 
explain how the participants’ respective attitudes to one another’s value systems can do 
better at explaining the decay of love than Kolodny’s account does, with a view to drawing a 
clearer distinction between love and relationships than I have thus far. 
The reason for the decay of love in Kolodny’s first two cases is explained by just 
what he says it is. Part of valuing a relationship is to have concern for one’s friend or 
partner, and to recognize and act on reasons generated by one’s valuing that relationship. In 
the context of an established close relationship, part of the reason why I continue to love my 
                                                     
42 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 164-166. 
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partner is that we both value that relationship. If my partner seems no longer to have 
concern for me, or if he fails to act on reasons generated by the relationship, it is reasonable 
that my love for him will weaken. The reason for this, I suggest, is that his lack of concern 
for me, or failure to act on the reasons generated by the relationship, is an indication that he 
values the relationship less than he previously did, less than I do, or less than I think he 
should. Part of what is involved in being in a close relationship with another person is that 
both of us value the relationship to a similar degree. In these first two cases, one party values 
that relationship much less than the other does. To this extent, there is a divergence in our 
respective value systems that is somewhat damaging to love.  
Consider next the case where one loses respect for one’s partner or friend—
Kolodny’s third case. The sort of case Kolodny has in mind here is a case where one begins 
to feel contempt or indignation towards one’s friend or partner.43 He suggests that the 
explanation for the connection between this loss of respect and loss of love is that one no 
longer sees one’s friend or partner as an equal: 
I have only a speculative suggestion to offer. The reason why friendship and romantic love, 
in particular, are vulnerable to the loss of respect has something to do with the fact that 
friendship and romantic love have something to do with viewing one’s friend or lover as 
someone with equal standing. There must be symmetry in the partners’ attitudes to each 
other, as a kind of background condition on friendship and romantic love.44 
I do not deny that mutual respect is a background condition of friendship and romantic love; 
however, it seems to me that this is no more a background condition of close personal love 
                                                     
43 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 164. 
44 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 165. 
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than it is of any other decent interpersonal interaction between adults. That is to say, while I 
recognize it as a background condition, it is such a minimal background condition so as not 
to be distinctive of close personal love at all.45 Moreover, when I begin to feel contempt or 
indignation toward my partner, this is not, it seems to me, a matter of no longer seeing him 
as a person with equal standing. That seems to be much too strong a description of the 
change in attitude. Rather, what seems to be the case is that I revoke my endorsement of 
certain commitments to values that I see in my partner, and this weakens (and in some cases 
may destroy) my love for him. If close personal love is particularly vulnerable to this sort of 
change in attitude, it is not because close personal love requires the background condition of 
mutual respect more than any other kind of love or interpersonal relation; it is because close 
personal love, more than any other kind, is characterized by mutual endorsement of value 
systems.46 
Next, consider Kolodny’s fourth case—where one’s friend or partner seems no 
longer to be the person she once was. Kolodny’s response to this case is the following: “You 
have reason to love the man with whom you had a relationship. If the man before you is no 
longer that man, then you have no special reason to love him.”47 The problem with this 
response is that it requires an explanation—which Kolodny admits is “metaphysically 
vexed”48—of how exactly it is possible that the person I love is no longer the person he once 
                                                     
45 It is worth noting that Kolodny’s inclusion of this condition does represent an advantage over 
Frankfurt’s view, at least insofar as the latter is considered as an account of close personal love. 
46 Kolodny’s example here involves a particularly reprehensible value statement on behalf of the 
imagined object of contempt or indignation—the case he describes is one in which a wife’s attitude towards her 
husband changes because he begins denying the holocaust. I think that cases where the value statement is not 
so obviously reprehensible, but still represents a markedly different commitment to values, could fit just as well. 
Imagine, for example that after many years of sharing political views, one partner changes her mind about 
which political party she supports. 
47 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 166. 
48 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 165. 
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was, and in such a way that this change is relevant to love. It seems to me there is a much 
simpler explanation, which is plausible in its own right. What I mean when I say to my 
friend, “you are no longer the person you once were,” is not literally that the person with 
whom I began a friendship no longer exists, but rather that her character has changed so 
drastically that the love she once inspired in me seems now to have no object. It seems to 
me that the reason for this is that her values have changed substantially, so that there is no 
longer the right sort of fit between her values and mine to ground my love for her as a 
friend. This response has the advantage over Kolodny’s response that it can allow for love 
being enhanced by these sorts of changes in a person—it is possible that I come to love 
Monique even more than I once did precisely because she is ‘no longer the person she once 
was.’ My love can be strengthened by development of her character, and by changes in her 
value system that I regard as positive. 
Finally, let us consider Kolodny’s fifth case—where my love for a person decays 
because I am no longer attracted to them. Kolodny notes that loss of attraction can have a 
weakening effect on love when “the relationship is partly constituted by participating in 
activities that are marked by attraction.”49 This sort of case seems particularly relevant to 
relationships of romantic love. It may seem that attraction is one aspect of love that simply 
occurs, and has no connection to value systems. Perhaps attraction is a sort of initial 
enabling condition that allows us to get to know other people, and so come to appreciate 
their characters and value systems.50 It is no doubt the case that attraction is a very complex, 
and somewhat mysterious, phenomenon. I cannot hope to give a complete account of it 
                                                     
49 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 166. 
50 Something like this seems to be part of the account of love Plato gives in Phaedrus. 
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here. It does seem, however, that there is one plausible way in which attraction can be 
relevant to love on the account I am proposing. 
Sometimes, attraction—even seemingly superficial physical attraction—indeed does 
have a connection with, and is in part explained by, our attitudes to others’ value systems. I 
may have initially been attracted to Joe because of the ease and apparent authenticity of his 
smile, for example, because I took it to be evidence of a disposition or attitude, which I in 
turn take as evidence for a commitment to a certain sort of value. Of course, I am not 
claiming that this is a conscious thought process when we find ourselves attracted to other 
people. But I think it does adequately explain some phenomena of attraction. Consider, for 
example, how certain people tend to find a disheveled look attractive, while others tend to 
be attracted to impeccably groomed people. It seems to me that this could be explained by 
attraction being some sort of rough, initial assessment of a person’s character and value 
system.51 
So, where does this leave us with regard to the distinction between love and a 
relationship grounded on that love? The first two cases of loss of love that Kolodny 
describes essentially involve an established relationship. It is because the sustenance of love 
in the context of a close relationship is in part grounded by the two parties’ recognition of 
                                                     
51 This may be oversimplified. I am grateful to Nandi Theunissen for pointing out that people often 
claim to be attracted to other people that they do not even like or approve of. Though, as I have said, I cannot 
hope to give a complete account of attraction here, this phenomenon is not necessarily incompatible with the 
rough analysis I have given here. It is plausibly the case that what we value is not always entirely transparent to 
us, and can be revealed through our actions and emotional vulnerabilities. (See Scheffler, “Valuing,” 15-40.) 
Perhaps when I seem to be attracted to someone that I don’t like, or of whom I disapprove, part of the 
explanation is some element of my value system of which I am not fully aware. Of course, the phenomenon 
could also be explained along the lines of a sort of pathological response, like masochism, but it seems to me 
that even that could be compatible with what I have said about attraction here. An interesting source in this 
regard, though I will not get into the details, is Sigmund Freud’s writings on love and attraction. See Sigmund 
Freud, “Contributions to the Psychology of Erotic Life,” collected in The Psychology of Love Translated by Shaun 
Whiteside (London: Penguin Classics, 2006) 239-278. 
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and commitment to the value of the relationship that changes of these first two sorts can 
damage or weaken that love. The way I have characterized the loss of love in Kolodny’s 
third case, in contrast, does not seem to presuppose a close relationship.   
It seems that I can deeply endorse commitment to certain values in a person when 
that person is neither my romantic partner nor my friend. Indeed, it seems that I could 
choose to end a relationship with someone even though I endorse his value system—as a 
value system specifically for him. I can recognize that it is so divergent from my own value 
system so as to make a continued relationship between us untenable, but nevertheless 
recognize that it is a good value system for him to have. A simple example of this sort of 
case would be if my partner decides to commit to Buddhism, and no longer recognizes the 
value of close relationships as being central to his good. I might recognize that his new 
commitment is good for him—it provides him with deep and profound fulfillment that was 
previously lacking in his life—but it should be clear that attempting to maintain my close 
relationship with him in this example would be misguided. This, I suggest, is a case of 
continued love in the absence of a relationship. 
The connection between Kolodny’s fourth case and the presence of a relationship is 
more complicated. It seems possible that I could wish to continue a relationship with 
someone even though she is ‘no longer the person she once was’—this is precisely the sort 
of case I described where I take Monique’s character development to be positive, and it in 
fact enhances my love for her.52 Our relationship may even be strengthened, if the fit 
between our respective value systems is enhanced by her development (or mine, for that 
                                                     




matter). But it seems equally possible that coming to see someone as ‘no longer the person 
she once was’ could be a reason for me to wish to end the relationship. This seems to be 
what is going on in the example I described where my partner loses his commitment to the 
value of close personal relationships. So, there is no simple connection between changes of 
character and the continuance or severance of a close relationship. Rather, the central issue 
seems to be whether the two parties’ value systems are sufficiently well aligned so as to make 
a close relationship between them appropriate. The details here might vary according to the 
type of relationship—there presumably needs to be a closer alignment of value systems in 
the case of a long-term romantic relationship than in the case of a friendship.53   
The question remains whether it is possible to love someone with whom one has 
never had a relationship. Perhaps considering Kolodny’s fifth case—that of attraction—can 
shed light on this matter. It seems to me that bare attraction can never amount to love. This 
is because attraction is at most a very rough and uncertain attribution of attitudes and 
dispositions, or value commitments, to another person. Love requires clearer perception, so 
to speak, of a person’s character and value system. This is the point of love being a response 
to something deeper and more obscure that I made in relation to Velleman’s account earlier 
in this chapter. But it is possible to have a clearer perception in this respect without being in 
a relationship of romantic love or friendship. For example, I might have a pretty clear idea of 
a teacher’s character and value system without him being my friend or romantic partner. I 
may deeply admire and endorse this value system as a value system for him. This, I suggest, 
is a case of love (specifically of the close personal variety) without the context of a close 
                                                     
53 The degree of closeness of alignment between value systems that is required for a relationship may 
itself be dependent on the two parties’ respective value systems. 
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personal relationship.54 In fact, I think it is even conceptually possible that I could love a 
person whom I have never met, if I had perhaps read a very well written and revealing 
autobiography of the person. If I became well enough ‘acquainted’ with the person’s 
character and value system through reading their biography, I could come to love them in 
the sense under discussion in this chapter.5556 
Instances of this sort of phenomenon may be rare, and are likely often less deep and 
profound than instances of love in the context of a close personal relationship, but I think it 
would be a mistake to categorically rule them out, as Kolodny seems to do.57 In sum, I think 
that Kolodny is correct that valuing a relationship is an important ground of love (certainly 
in the context of close relationships), but it is only one instance of a broader kind of ground 
for love: the appreciation and endorsement of a beloved’s system of values, as expressed 
through her character. Close personal relationships have as two crucial features (1) a shared 
history of repeated interaction of a relevant kind between the two parties, and (2) a shared 
commitment to the value of the relationship of roughly equal strength. But it is possible to 
                                                     
54 Of course, for this to actually be a case of love rather than simply a case of admiration, there would 
have to be some accompanying affection, and emotional vulnerability involved. But still, it seems to me this is 
possible without the context of a relationship. I am grateful to Richard Bett for pressing me on this distinction. 
55 Perhaps an even more surprising consequence of my view is that it renders close personal love for 
fictional characters possible, provided that they are sufficiently well written and developed. I in fact take this to 
be a strength rather than a weakness of my view. It explains how the death of a fictional character can be quite 
heartbreaking. 
56 Kolodny and I would certainly disagree on this point. He in fact considers an imaginary case 
involving a biography writer and the subject of the biography (“Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 141-142). In 
discussing the case, he denies that love could exist between the two characters prior to their establishing a 
relationship, and that the change that occurs with the establishment of a relationship is categorical. I disagree—
I think that in this case, there might indeed have been love prior to the relationship, but the relationship would 
of course deepen and intensify that love. 
57 See Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 171: “Usually, when we speak of unrequited love or 




have the attitude of close personal love toward someone without either of these features 
holding—in other words, without the context of a relationship. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I give a fuller statement of my positive view. I 
provide a more detailed account than I have thus far of what I take character to be, as well as 
its connection with a system of values. This leads me to give a fuller account of the role I take 
imperfection to play in close personal love. Finally, I consider and respond to a potential 
objection to my view—a version of the substitution objection.58 
 
5. Character, Imperfection, and the Substitution Problem 
 
I have defined character as a somewhat stable structure of attitudes that underlie and 
unify a person’s behavioral dispositions and tendencies.59 Specifically, character is a structure 
of attitudes toward things as being valuable, or a system of values. Since I take character to be a 
structural feature of a person, character is not a simple collection, or set, of characteristics. 
Rather, it is the underlying, unifying, and uniquely identifying structure that might explain the 
actions and decisions of a person. But the reader may wonder what this structural feature 
                                                     
58 The inspiration for the subsection on the substitution objection came about largely as a result of 
discussion surrounding my commentary on Aaron Mead’s paper “Qualities as the Proper Grounds of Love,” at 
the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting in Baltimore on December 28, 2013. I am 
grateful to Aaron Mead and the audience of that discussion for getting me thinking along these lines. 
59 Note that I make no reference to character traits as explaining human behavior. My view should 
therefore sidestep the familiar situationist objections to character. For the situationist critique of robust 
character traits as predictive of behavior, see Gilbert Harman “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: 
Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 315-331 
and John Doris Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
For contemporary work on how the notions of character and dispositions can be useful and worth keeping 
around even if there are no robust character traits, see Mark Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). I am grateful to Jon Hricko for helpful conversations on this issue. 
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ultimately is—is it a network of beliefs, or emotional predispositions, perhaps? It is 
important to distinguish my understanding of character from either of these possible 
conceptions; rather, I take character to involve both beliefs and emotions. 
First, a system of values is not merely a network of beliefs. It does, no doubt, involve 
some beliefs—my system of values includes the belief that friendship is valuable—but that is 
not all it is. My system of values also includes a disposition to feel joy when things go well 
for my friends, and a tendency to feel rather ill at the sight of gratuitous violence in 
entertainment.60 This feature of a system of values is part of what I think makes it apt to call 
a person’s system of values their character—the notion of character is often thought to 
involve dispositions to feel in certain ways in particular circumstances. But, as already noted, 
there is also some cognitive content to a system of values. Part of what distinguishes persons 
from non-persons is that the former have systems of values—commitments to values, 
understood as final ends.61 So, a person’s character is a structure of commitments to values 
that involves beliefs and predispositions to feel and behave in particular ways in various 
circumstances. 
Character, understood as this kind of complex structure, can explain why it is that a 
person may seem to have somewhat surprising quirks, given the overall background of their 
character.62 For example, Jeané seems generally to be excitable, romantic, and imaginative, 
                                                     
60 Once again, I am indebted here to Scheffler’s account of what it is to value something. See 
especially “Valuing,” 29, where Scheffler lists the four elements involved in valuing something, viz. belief, 
susceptibility to emotions, seeing the relevant emotions as appropriate, and seeing the valued thing as 
deliberatively significant. 
61 Recall my discussion of the differences between my cat, Cole, and my partner, Joe, from earlier in 
this chapter. Cole may seem to have a character, in that he has certain characteristic likes and dislikes, and 
behavioral tendencies. But unlike Joe, Cole’s “character” is not revelatory of commitments to values. 
62 I am grateful to Nandi Theunissen for getting me to think about these sorts of examples and their 
implications for the nature of character. 
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but she loves to relax by ironing clothes—a seemingly mundane and homely task. The 
explanation of these features of Jeané is to be found in her system of values—her attitudes 
toward certain things as valuable, and toward certain other things as disvaluable. Knowing 
Jeané well as I do, I know that she sees great value in passionate mental engagement with 
abstract ideas, and also sees disvalue in disorder, for example. It is noteworthy that only 
those of us who are well acquainted with Jeané can see these sorts of explanations; for those 
who do not know her very well, the combination of these features may be puzzling. This is 
as it should be—it strikes me as plausible that to really have an idea of someone’s character, 
it is necessary to be rather well acquainted with them.63 
I think that understanding character in terms of  structures of attitudes, or value 
systems, enables us, to some extent, to predict our loved ones’ behavior, suggesting that this 
way of viewing character is germane to close personal love. Consider a familiar experience of 
feeling the loss of a loved one. When I lose a close friend, some of the times when this loss 
is felt most keenly is when I imagine what that friend might say in a particular situation, or 
when something happens that I imagine would delight that friend’s particular sense of 
humor.64 In such a situation, I am overwhelmed with bittersweet affection for Tricia, as I am 
reminded of a particular aspect of her character for which I loved her. It seems that the 
explanation for this is that I am reminded of a particular attitude that Tricia held. It is not just 
that she was witty, but that she had particular ways of seeing things—and this is what 
explains why I imagine this particular scenario delighting her.65 When I imagine Tricia 
                                                     
63 It would not be sufficient, for example, to be given a list of characteristics that Jeané has. 
64 I am grateful to Julie Reid for bringing this point to my attention. 
65 This idea of a particular way of seeing things is reminiscent of John McDowell’s perceptual account 
of practical wisdom. I find this a very useful way to think about attitudes and values—as distinctive ways of 
seeing things—but I should be clear that I do not intend to relate this specifically to virtue. See McDowell, 
“Virtue and Reason,” Monist 62 (1979): 331-350. 
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reacting in a certain way in particular circumstances, I am calling to mind an attitude of hers 
toward some feature of the situation—an attitude that represents an element of her value 
system, and which is part of what uniquely identifies her. 
An interesting and important point to note here is that the attitude I imagine Tricia 
exhibiting when she makes this comment may not be one that I find to be particularly 
admirable—it may be decidedly unkind. Nevertheless, it can be an attitude for which I loved 
her.66 This leads us naturally to look more deeply into the idea that we love people in part for 
their imperfections. There are three major ways of understanding the point that we love people 
in part for their imperfections. I will discuss each of them in turn, in relation to the example 
of Tricia’s unkind comment. First, though, it will be useful to briefly restate my view of the 
nature of character, attitudes and value systems. A person’s character, I have said, is a 
unifying structure that underlies and can explain a person’s behavioral tendencies and 
dispositions. This structure is a structure of attitudes toward things as being valuable. These 
attitudes taken together form a person’s system of values. So, character is a structure of 
attitudes understood as commitments to values.67 
The first respect in which a person may incorporate imperfections is in terms of the 
system of values she holds. It is no doubt often, or even always, the case that our 
commitments to values form an imperfect system. There can be conflicts between particular 
values, or areas of uncertainty, for example. One’s values constitute a system in that they, for 
                                                     
66 Recall that as I described the example, I am overwhelmed with affection at this moment. I 
emphasize this point to avoid confusion: while the comment I imagine may indeed strike me as being an 
imperfection, it still represents something about Tricia for which I loved her and this is why at moments like this, 
her absence is felt most keenly. If this example (of an unkind comment) strikes the reader as an implausible 
example of the phenomenon I am intending to describe, perhaps the example of imperfection I used in Section 
2 of this chapter will be preferable. The example there was of a person with too great a concern for not 
inconveniencing others. 
67 The commitments to values should not be understood as absolute; they can be of varying strengths. 
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the most part, usually form a somewhat stable structure that enables us to predict some 
general behavioral tendencies of the people we know well. But the system is unlikely to be 
perfect in the sense of being perfectly systematic. Perhaps Tricia’s attitude, which I imagine 
giving rise to a certain unkind comment, represents an imperfection in that it is inconsistent 
with certain other attitudes she holds about the right way to treat other people. So 
understood, the imperfection would be an imperfection in the overall system of values that 
she holds. 
It might be, instead, that Tricia’s comment represents an imperfection in the sense 
that it is an imperfect expression of a particular value commitment. Perhaps she saw a great 
deal of value in making a timely and witty comment to lift the general mood whenever the 
opportunity presented itself, but she sometimes missed the mark, rendering her comment 
more spiteful than she might have wished. In this case, the imperfection is not necessarily in 
the system of values itself—there need not be any inconsistency or conflict between 
values—rather, the imperfection would be in her ability to properly express them, or live up 
to them. We can surely all identify with the feeling of not being able to fully live up our own 
ideals for ourselves. 
Finally, the imperfection exhibited in Tricia’s unkind comment may be in the content 
of the values themselves. It may be that some of the elements of Tricia’s value system are 
imperfect in the sense that she values things that she ideally should not—enjoyment at the 
expense of others’ misfortunes, perhaps. Here, the imperfection in question is not a matter 
of inconsistency within a system, or the inability to fully live up to one’s own ideals, but 
rather a matter of having imperfect values. Now, I do not think we need to choose between 
these three explanations of the imperfection; I think they all describe real phenomena, and 
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that any one of them could be true in this particular case. The pertinent question, though, is 
why imperfections understood in any of these ways could be partial grounds of love for a 
person. If I view this attitude of Tricia’s as somehow representing an imperfection, but I 
nevertheless am keenly aware that it is one of the aspects of her for which I loved her, we need 
an explanation for this fact. 
Indeed, I think that the primary explanation of how imperfections can be partial 
grounds of love in all three of the ways I have described is the same. Simply put, it is that I 
recognize something in Tricia that is similar to something in myself in each of these kinds of 
imperfection. Recognizing imperfection in another person that one knows well enables trust 
of that person, and close personal love presupposes some amount of trust. Recall Velleman’s 
insightful point that when we love another person, we drop our emotional defenses and 
render ourselves vulnerable to them. Love is risky, and emotionally (sometimes even 
physically) dangerous, because we are dealing with imperfect persons. This is why when we 
love someone, we should feel that we are able to trust that person. Trust, if it is warranted, 
requires honest awareness of the person’s character and attitudes.68 In my view, mature and 
reasonable love can truly be possible only if we recognize and embrace some imperfections 
that we see in the other person.69 
                                                     
68 The point is not that a person is more trustworthy with her imperfections than she would be 
without them; the point is rather that trust requires seeing people (more or less) as they really are, and people 
really do have imperfections. This means that being able to see some of a person’s imperfections is a necessary 
(though admittedly a minimally necessary) condition for seeing them as they are. Thanks to Richard Bett for 
pressing me on this. 
69 I am not claiming that love requires that we embrace all of what we take to be imperfections in our 
loved ones. Love should be compatible with believing that one’s loved ones can and should do better. My point 




It need not be the case that I share the specific imperfections I see and embrace in my 
loved ones. I may not share the particular attitude that I imagine giving rise to Tricia’s 
comment. But the important point is that whichever of the above three ways of 
understanding the imperfection we choose, I can find analogous imperfections in myself. I 
am aware that there are apparent conflicts and areas of uncertainty in my own value system. 
For example, I see great disvalue in what I believe to be unethical food production practices, 
but I also see great value in experiencing the authentic local cuisine when traveling, and I 
realize that there may be a real conflict here—or at least that I don’t have these things fully 
worked out for myself. I am also aware that I don’t always properly live up to my own value 
commitments—all else being equal, I believe it is better to order the veggie burger than the 
cheeseburger, but I sometimes order the cheeseburger anyway. And I recognize that some of 
my values themselves may not be very good ones. I know that I probably have some 
unjustified prejudices that affect some of my particular judgments. 
So, recognizing these imperfections in others, that are of kinds that we ourselves 
share, is comforting. It is not merely that they are comforting in the sense that they make us 
feel better about our own failings, and enable us to make (probably poor) excuses for them, 
however. The point is deeper than that. These sorts of imperfections are deep features of human 
nature, and honest recognition and acceptance of them is essential to close personal love. If I 
imagine a person who has a perfectly consistent, thoroughly worked out value system, with 
which she always acts in perfect accordance, and which consists of only the most admirable 
value commitments, I find it very difficult to imagine what it would be like to love such a 
person in a close personal sense. Indeed, I find it hard to think of such a being as a human 
being. If I do try to imagine viewing a human being as perfect in this way, I am thinking of 
being in a state of infatuation—which I earlier suggested was a matter of blindness to 
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imperfections. My point here is that overlooking or ignoring the very real imperfections of 
individual human beings renders actual, mature, close personal love for them impossible. I 
believe, and have been trying to show, that my account of close personal love is best suited 
to avoid this problem, because it can provide an explanation of what these imperfections are, 
and why they can play a role in our love. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I wish to respond to a potential objection to my 
view—specifically, to my identification of a person with their character. I have been arguing 
throughout this chapter that the proper object of close personal love is a particular person, 
where I understand particular persons to be identical with, and individuated by, their 
characters. But, someone may ask, are characters (understood as structures of attitudes, or 
commitments to values) uniquely identifying in this way? This is the substitution problem 
that I mentioned earlier in the chapter. It is more familiar in the context of a theory 
according to which the sole grounds of love are a person’s qualities. Kolodny expresses the 
problem in that context well: 
If Jane’s qualities are my reasons for loving her, then they are equally reasons for me loving 
anyone else with the same qualities. Insofar as my love for Jane is responsive to its reasons, 
therefore, it ought to accept anyone with the same qualities as a substitute. But an attitude 
that would accept just as well any Doppelgänger or swamp-Jane that happened along would 
scarcely count as love.7071 
                                                     
70 Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” 140-141. 
71 The idea here is reminiscent of the debate between the descriptive and causal theories of reference 
in the philosophy of language. For some interesting empirical work on people’s intuitions about the 
irreplaceability of a loved one and their connections with this issue in the philosophy of language, see 
Christopher Grau and Cynthia L. S. Pury, “Attitudes Towards Reference and Replaceability,” Review of 
Philosophical Psychology published online September 2013. I am grateful to Jon Hricko for drawing my attention 
to this connection. 
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Well, perhaps I need to be worried about being replaced by a doppelgänger with the same set 
of dispositions, attitudes and commitments as me.72 Perhaps in identifying a person with her 
character, I have in fact left my account vulnerable to the charge of not properly incorporating 
the Correct Object Requirement. 
In fact, I think I can deal with the substitution objection, because there is an 
important difference between my view, which identifies a person with her character, and the 
quality theory, which allegedly identifies a person with a set of non-relational properties.73 
First, it seems to me that (even though the qualitatively identical doppelgänger scenario itself is 
rather unlikely), the possibility of finding someone with the same combination of 
dispositions, attitudes and commitments is extremely slim. But suppose, my objector may 
push, that there were such a person. Suppose someone were brainwashed by some 
malevolent genius to have precisely the same dispositions, attitudes and commitments as me. 
Why should I rather than this other person continue to be the object of my partner’s love? 
The correct answer to this question, I think, appeals to how it is that persons come to have 
the particular characters (involving, essentially, commitments to values) that they do. If a 
person’s character is an interpretation of, or expression of, a system of values, and if 
character is understood to be non-static (as, indeed, I think it should be) and in particular is 
open to changes brought about by relationships, it turns out to be strictly impossible for two 
people to have precisely the same character. The changes that occur in my partner’s value 
                                                     
72 I am grateful to Josh McBee for pressing me on this point. 
73 I think that my view on this matter is quite similar to Neil Delaney’s. See Delaney, “Romantic Love 
and Loving Commitment: Articulating a Modern Ideal,” American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1996): 339-356. 
Though Delaney describes his view as a version of the quality theory, he sees relational properties as being an 
important aspect of the ground of love. My view differs from Delaney’s in that I think the structural notion of 
character, understood as a somewhat stable network of commitments to values, has more explanatory power 
than qualities. I think this is the case even if the qualities in question are understood to include relational 
properties, and even if we single out the properties that “individuals take to be at the core of their identity” as 
the properties that matter most for love (Delaney, “Romantic Love and Loving Commitment,” 343). 
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system as a result of his relationship with me are particular to his relationship with me—he 
comes to value this very relationship very highly, for example. 
The point here is that my understanding of character, specifically as a means of 
individuating or uniquely identifying persons, is not merely qualitative. Character is not 
simply a bundle of qualities or traits. It is a more unified structure with a particular causal 
history. What is missing in the doppelgänger scenario is the right causal connection between the 
lover and the beloved’s substitute. My account effectively blocks the doppelgänger scenario 
because character—being an expression of a system of value commitments—presupposes a 
particular causal history.74 The fact that the feeling of performing on stage is an element of 
my value system, for example, presupposes that I have had actual experiences in which I 
have had this feeling. It’s worth returning briefly to Kolodny’s view here, to compare his way 
of blocking the problematic scenario with mine. 
For Kolodny, the objection cannot take hold because love is reduced to the valuing 
of a relationship, and so has the causal connection built in to it in an absolutely central way. 
My love for Joe is fixed to Joe in particular because only he shares the relevant causal history 
with me that amounts to our relationship. But I think that this reductive move comes at a 
high price—specifically, Kolodny is forced to explain everything about love in terms of 
relationships. My view, in contrast, can block the doppelgänger scenario while also 
incorporating the Attitudinal Requirement. It has the advantage of incorporating the causal 
point that Kolodny realizes is very useful, while at the same time construing love as 
responsive to the particularities of individuals. As I argued in section 4 of this chapter, I 
                                                     
74 I should note that this point about causal history is particular to the notion of character that I am 
working with; it may not be an obvious part of an ordinary understanding of the notion of character. 
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think that understanding love as a response to a person’s system of values as expressed 
through her character better explains common phenomena of love than does Kolodny’s 
reductive account. And as I am now trying to show, it can do so while not succumbing to 
problems that Kolodny thinks only his view can avoid. This is because my view can explain 
the difference that relationships make to love without reducing love to the valuing of 
relationships. 
On my view, love is grounded by a perception (though obviously not in a literal 
sense) of a person’s value system as expressed through their character. Love then consists in 
a profound endorsement of that person’s value system (as expressed through their character) 
specifically as a value system for that person. Relationships can make an immensely important 
difference here, since relationships—their growth, transformation, decay, and severance—
significantly alter one’s value system. Part of what is essential to a close relationship would 
seem to be a shared commitment, of roughly equal strength, to the value of the relationship. 
This is why love for a person with whom one is in a close relationship would not be 
indifferent to a substitution of a qualitatively similar doppelgänger. 
The reader may wonder whether my inclusion of this historical element in my 
account is ad-hoc, given that I think love need not depend on the context of a relationship. 
Have I built into my own account an element of Kolodny’s sort of view simply to avoid an 
objection?75 I should explain how, on the contrary, I take this element to fit quite naturally 
into my account. On my view, the sort of account we give of the grounds of love will be the 
same, whether we are talking about the difference a relationship makes or not. The account 
                                                     
75 Essentially, my concern here is to show that my view is more unified than the sort of “hybrid view” 
Kolodny mentions in “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” footnote 10, 183-184. 
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will always be that love is an attitude we take toward the other person’s system of values as 
expressed through his character. The fact that historical facts about particular relationships 
can have an impact on an individual’s system of values means that my view can account for 
the difference a relationship makes quite naturally. Since my view of the grounds of love 
includes non-relational properties of a person as well as relational commitments (or facts 
about causal history) as different elements of a system of values, it provides a unified 
account that can block the substitution objection with its own resources. 
One final point regarding the way my account recognizes the difference a 
relationship can make to love is worth mentioning. On my view, there is no deep difference 
between the attitude of friendship-type love, and the attitude of romantic love. Rather, the 
(very real) difference between friendship and romantic love is to be explained in terms of the 
relationships in question. When I choose to enter into a romantic relationship with someone, 
there are certain activities, attitudes and commitments that I take to be appropriate with 
respect to this person in virtue of the fact that we have entered into a relationship of this 
kind, or description. I expect, for example, sexual exclusivity, and the good of the 
relationship taking particularly high priority in our respective value systems.76 While the 
relationship is not necessary for love to be in place, the relationship can make a significant 
difference to that love when it is in place. An implication of this is that when there is a close 
relationship in place, the nature of the relationship, along with the two parties’ respective 
                                                     
76 People can and do, of course, differ in their expectations of romantic relationships—and 
friendships, for that matter. These differences are plausibly to be explained in terms of variations in people’s 
value systems. This is one especially clear case in which value systems that are not too divergent from one 




value systems, will determine which additional attitudes, actions, and commitments are 




To sum up, my account of close personal love is as follows. Close personal love is a 
response to a person’s character, understood as an imperfect expression of an imperfect 
system of values. Character is a somewhat stable, but non-static structure of attitudes to 
things as being valuable. In order for love to be properly established, one must recognize 
patterns in the other’s behavior and come to have some fairly good knowledge of what 
informs the other’s tendencies and dispositions (specifically, the person’s system of values). 
Loving a person does not require full identification of values; rather, it requires endorsement 
of the other’s value system as one that is good for that person. In the context of a close 
personal relationship, there needs to be some alignment of, or fit between, the two parties’ 
respective value systems, and one important aspect of this seems to be a shared commitment 
of roughly equal strength to the value of the relationship. It is possible, however, to love 
someone without the context of a close personal relationship—whether there was once such 
a close relationship or not. Examining what happens when we come to love, continue to 
love, and stop loving other people led us to see that we love people in part for their 
imperfections. When we appreciate certain imperfections in others, we recognize something 
that is similar to features of ourselves, and this enables trust. Warranted trust is what 
distinguishes reasonable from unreasonable risk in the emotional vulnerability of love. This 
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means that embracing our beloveds’ imperfections is essential to admirable, mature close 
personal love. 
I think that my account does better than the alternatives at satisfying the six 
desiderata I listed at the beginning of this chapter. Because love for a person is responsive to 
her particular character, it is appropriately selective. Characterizing love as responsive to a 
person’s character, understood as an imperfect expression of an imperfect system of values, 
enables us to say that the object of love is the person rather than a collection of qualities or a 
bare capacity. I have shown how the attitude of love is distinct from relationships, and how 
some relationships are connected with it. In drawing attention to the importance of a value 
system—a set of final ends—in the object of love, I have distinguished close personal love 
from love of non-persons and have also, I think, imbued it with appropriate maturity and depth. 











THE VALUE AND REASONS OF CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 




In the previous chapter, I gave the following analysis of close personal love. This 
love is a response to a person’s particular character, understood as an imperfect expression 
of an imperfect system of values. Relationships grounded in close personal love involve a 
fair degree of alignment, and mutual endorsement, of the two parties’ respective value 
systems. In the present chapter, I address the question of why relationships grounded on 
close personal love are so important to us. The love that characterizes close friendships and 
romantic relationships often seems to be a genuine reason for certain actions and attitudes. 
The question of why this is the case would seem to be especially pressing for my account, 
since I have construed love as a response to something that is imperfect, and that is recognized 
as such. To put it slightly differently, relationships of close personal love are often sources of 
agent-relative reasons, but there is an apparent puzzle as to why, especially given the central 
role of imperfection in the account. Further, the sorts of relationships under consideration 
(close friendships and romantic relationships) are typically entered into voluntarily, i.e. they 
are selective. But they nevertheless seem to give rise to reasons that are somehow binding, or 
no longer up to us. So, we now need an account of how it is that close personal relationships 
give rise to the reasons that they do. This is the task I take up in the present chapter.77  
To arrive at my account of the reasons generated by close personal relationships, I 
proceed in three stages. In the first section, I give a somewhat stipulative explication of my 
understanding of reasons and values. I survey some of the relevant terminology, and indicate 
my position in relation to those of Thomas Nagel, Joseph Raz, Richard Kraut, and T. M. 
                                                     
77 It is worth noting that in the present chapter, I am concerned with the reasons that are generated by 
relationships of close personal love rather than reasons generated by the attitude of close personal love. While 
these will likely often coincide, since I take the attitude of close personal love and close personal relationships 
to be separable, there will be some differences. Again, my focus in the present chapter is primarily on the 
reasons generated by relationships of close personal love. 
60 
 
Scanlon. The view of reasons and values that emerges is, briefly, as follows. It is often true to 
say that something is good for some subject. This, I claim, is what it most obviously means 
for something to be valuable.78 When something is valuable (so understood), it gives rise to 
reasons (at least for the subject for whom it is good) to respond to it appropriately. To 
respond appropriately to something that bears value for one is to appropriately value it. 
What is involved in appropriately valuing a thing will be informed by the sort of value that 
thing bears for the subject.79 Given that this is my view, the structure of the rest of the 
chapter follows fairly naturally. 
In the second section, I give an account of why close personal relationships are good 
for their participants. I give a fourfold classification of the value relationships bear for 
human beings: they are useful, they enable a distinctive kind of pleasure, they can enhance an 
individual’s understanding of her own value system, and they enhance our individual agency. 
I then draw on this account, in the third section, to outline four classes of agent-relative 
reasons that are generated by relationships. Relationships give rise to reasons to favor loved 
ones in cases of need, to favor loved ones in the absence of any particular need, to increase 
the range of potential shared pleasures, and to take care of oneself. In each case, the reason 
is generated by some combination of the types of value discussed in the second section. 
 
 
                                                     
78 I acknowledge that this understanding of the term ‘valuable’ is controversial. I offer some brief 
support for the claim below, with reference to Richard Kraut. 
79 So far, it can be assumed that I am referring only to agent-relative reasons. While I do give a brief 
explication of the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons below, I do not fully engage with 
the issues raised by the distinction until a later chapter. 
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1. Value, Reasons, and the Relation Between Them 
 
The first point of clarification that needs to be made concerns the sense of reasons 
under discussion here. Sometimes, we speak of ‘reasons’ in the sense of causal explanations 
for actions and events more generally. This is the notion of reasons at play if someone asks, 
“why did John slam the door?” and the ‘reason’ given for this behavior is that “he was in a 
fit of temper.”80 Here, John’s emotional state is the ‘reason’ for his slamming the door in the 
sense that it provides some sort of causal story as to what led to John’s slamming of the 
door. These sorts of explanatory ‘reasons’ are to be contrasted with normative reasons, or 
reasons which purport to justify intentional actions and attitudes.81 It is with reasons in this 
second, normative sense that I am concerned in the present chapter.  
As an example of a normative reason, suppose the answer to the question of why 
John slammed the door were instead “because he was being chased by a dangerous wild 
animal, and wanted a barrier between it and himself.” While this would still give an 
explanation of the event in question, it would do something more. Implicit in this answer is 
an answer to the question of why John thought it was a good idea to slam the door. The fact 
that he thought it would be bad for him if the vicious beast caught him, and that safety as 
soon as possible would be good for him, both explains the event (in part anyway) and goes 
some way toward justifying it.82 Ideally, for rational agents, explanatory and normative reasons 
                                                     
80 Joseph Raz describes these explanatory reasons as “reasons why”—they explain why a state of 
affairs obtains, for example. See Raz, “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative,” in From Normativity to 
Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 16. 
81 For a detailed treatment of the distinction between these two sorts of reasons, see Joseph Raz, 
“Reasons: Explanatory and Normative,” especially 16-20.   
82 As already noted, Raz describes explanatory reasons as “reasons why”—see “Reasons: Explanatory 
and Normative,” 16. But as he notes, this point is not a grammatical one. I think it is illuminating to consider 
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will coincide.83 But the conceptual distinction between them is important—it is because 
normative reasons purport to justify, rather than to merely explain, actions and attitudes that 
they feature in our evaluation of a person’s intentional behavior. 
So far, I have spoken somewhat loosely of reasons as ‘facts,’ ‘considerations,’ or 
‘explanations.’ To give a more precise statement of what I take reasons to be, I need to take 
a detour via the concept of value. This is because I take it that reasons refer implicitly to 
values. Indeed, I think it is impossible to explain what reasons (in the normative sense) are 
without the concept of value. In this respect, my view differs from Scanlon’s, according to 
which reasons are primary, and value statements are a kind of short-hand for saying there are 
reasons of certain kinds.84 Indeed, the view I take of the relation between these two concepts 
may be seen to be the reverse of Scanlon’s, in this particular respect. I take it that talk of 
reasons is a useful way to make concise statements about value. If something is a genuine 
reason for a particular action, it counts in favor of that action.85 I take this to mean, roughly, 
that it is to some extent and in general a good thing for the considerations that constitute the 
reason to be produced, realized, satisfied, or otherwise appropriately responded to. Of 
course, there is a great deal more that might be said about the sense in which appropriately 
responding to reasons is ‘a good thing’—but the point here is that I take the concept of a 
normative reason to involve some notion of value. Indeed, I take it that this is where a 
normative reason gets its normative character. 
                                                     
different interests we may have in asking “why”—this helps us to see the distinction between explanatory and 
normative reasons. 
83 As Raz says, all normative reasons must also be explanatory reasons. (“Reasons: Explanatory and 
Normative,” 18.) 
84 See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998), 17-107. 
85 In this wording, Scanlon and I agree. I disagree with him in that I do not think this is the primary 
way to explain what is going on; as I see it, the primary explanation is expressed in the sentence that follows. 
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By way of (very brief) argument for my view of the relation between reasons and 
values over Scanlon’s, consider the following. At the very beginning of his chapter on 
reasons, Scanlon says: 
I will take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason 
for something seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in 
favor of it. “Counts in favor how?” one might ask. “By providing a reason for it” seems to 
be the only answer. So I will presuppose the idea of a reason, and presuppose that my 
readers are rational in the minimal but fundamental sense that I will presently explain.86 
Contrary to what Scanlon says here, it seems clear to me that a better answer to the question 
he mentions is defended by L. Nandi Theunissen. According to Theunissen’s account, 
reasons have their ground in the relational property of being good for some subject.87 
Following this line of thought, a better answer to Scanlon’s question of how a reason counts 
in favor of something might be “by being good for the agent.” For example, if the question 
is how health might be a reason for eating broccoli, the answer would be because health is 
good for the agent. There is of course a further explanation to be given of why health is 
good for the agent, but it seems to me that this further explanation will make reference to 
other values rather than leading back to the concept of a reason. (Health enables the agent to 
reach his goals, to be fairly comfortable, to live a long life, and so on—and all of these things 
might constitute reasons for various actions or attitudes because they are good for the agent.) 
Note that being good for the agent is not the only way that reasons might implicitly refer to 
values. To take another example, if the question is how a stranger’s appointment could be a 
                                                     
86 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 17. 
87 Theunissen, “The Normativity of Good For,” (manuscript.) 
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reason for me to give her directions as accurately and quickly as possible, the answer would 
be because it is good for the stranger to get to her appointment on time.88 
  For now, I leave it open as to whether it might ever be true to say that something is 
absolutely good, or good simpliciter.89 I do not think I need to take a stand on this issue for 
the purposes of the present issue; all I need is for it sometimes to be true that something is 
good for some subject. This is because my concern in the present chapter is only with the 
ways in which relationships can be good, and reason-giving, for their participants. I take it to 
be true that sometimes things are in fact good for subjects, and that this often explains the 
reasons we have. Despite my not taking a stand on whether or not there is such a property 
as absolute goodness, I believe I am largely in agreement with both Thomas Nagel and 
Richard Kraut on the way that value for a subject gives rise to reasons (and indeed explains 
reasons). Though there are substantial differences between the views of Kraut and Nagel, a 
point of convergence between their two views and mine is this: some things are good (or 
bad) for some subjects. Innocent pleasure and unnecessary pain might be helpful examples. 
The fact that these things are sometimes good (or bad) for some subjects makes it the case 
that some agents have reasons to do certain things.90 This, it seems to me, is an explanation 
                                                     
88 For a compelling argument in defense of the view that reasons are explicable only with reference to 
values, see Joseph Raz, “Agency, Reason, and the Good,” in Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 22-45. As he puts it: “The difficulty in explaining the eligibility of 
actions in ways other than by making reference to good-making qualities may make one doubt the objection. 
But is it just failure of imagination which makes the classical approach seem the only coherent account to have? 
I do not think so. The problem is of finding conceptual room for an alternative” (“Agency, Reason, and the 
Good,” 28.) 
89 For an argument that there is no such thing as absolute goodness, or goodness simpliciter, see 
Richard Kraut, Against Absolute Goodness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
90 See, for example, Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
154 and Kraut, Against Absolute Goodness, 7: “…that something is good for you, or for someone else, is, of course, 
often an excellent reason for you to value it.” 
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of how reasons ‘count in favor’ of actions or attitudes that does not itself refer to the 
concept of a reason. 
I am now in a position to state more precisely what I take normative reasons to be. 
In this, I follow Raz in construing reasons as facts.91 Normative reasons in particular are facts 
about value. An example of such a fact is that it is good for my cat to drink water every day. 
This fact is a reason (in the normative sense) for me to give him fresh water every day. The 
reason is normative because it accounts for the fact that complying with it is favored, or 
recommended.92 That is, certain reasons (the normative ones) can function as explanations 
(and so can also be explanatory reasons) only because they have normative force. I have 
been suggesting that this normative force comes from values. It is because normative reasons 
are facts about values that they purport to justify intentional actions and attitudes. The 
notion that facts can be about values should not be taken as alarming. I think Nagel makes 
the point quite well when he says: 
The view that values are real is not the view that they are real occult entities or properties, 
but that they are real values: that our claims about values and about what people have reason 
to do may be true or false independently of our beliefs and inclinations.93 
It seems to me that being good for some subject is an obvious and not too 
controversial way for something to be valuable. As already stated, I leave it open whether 
there is another, non-relational way for something to be valuable. I do wish to point out, 
however, that relational goodness, or goodness for some subject, is not limited to 
                                                     
91 Raz, “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative,” 18. 
92 In “Agency, Reason, and the Good,” Raz describes the normative force of reasons as “the fact that 
failure to conform to them is a fault” (28). 
93 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 144. 
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instrumental value. Kraut makes this point convincingly in relation to the example that 
smoking is bad for some people: as he explains it, smoking is presumably bad for some 
people because of its effects. Therefore, it is instrumentally bad. But for this to be the case, 
one of those effects (not necessarily immediate) must be non-instrumentally bad. But it still 
seems plausible to construe this badness as badness for the people for whom smoking is 
(instrumentally) bad.94 Additionally, something can be partly constitutive of a good life for an 
individual, and so good for that individual, while not leading to something else that is 
valuable. 
To sum up my view of reasons, values, and the relation between them, I take reasons 
to be fact about values. I assume that it is sometimes true that some things are good for 
some subjects, and this is what I mean by saying that there can be facts about values. These 
facts make it the case that agents have normative reasons to do things, to refrain from doing 
things, to hold attitudes, to revise attitudes, and so on. There is one final terminological 
distinction to note before I can move on to the next section. I have said that I am concerned 
only with agent-relative reasons in the present chapter. The distinction between agent-relative 
and agent-neutral reasons is familiar from detailed discussions by Thomas Nagel and Derek 
Parfit.95 Nagel characterizes agent-neutral reasons as having “a general form which does not 
include an essential reference to the person who has it.”96 In contrast, Nagel says that an 
agent-relative reason will have a general form that does essentially include a reference to the 
agent.97 An example of an agent-neutral reason might be the reason to promote overall 
                                                     
94 Kraut, Against Absolute Goodness, 34. 
95 See Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 152-188 and Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), especially 140-148. 
96 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 152. 
97 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 153. 
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utility, if utilitarianism is true. Under this assumption, there is reason to perform actions that promote 
utility. This reason makes no essential reference to any particular agent. In contrast, I have a 
reason to make sure my cat, Cole, has fresh water every day. This reason does make an 
essential reference to me (two, in fact)—I rather than anyone else have reason to give my cat 
fresh water every day. 
I take up the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons, and the 
implications the value of relationships might have for it, in the next chapter. In the present 
chapter, I investigate only the latter class. I therefore say no more about the distinction here. 
I turn now to considering the nature of the value that close personal relationships have for 
their participants—why are they good for us? 
 
2. The Value of Close Personal Relationships 
 
One way in which relationships are good for us is that they are, of course, useful. We 
are all better off if we have friends we can call on to help us move, to take care of our cats 
when we are away, to introduce us to people that might be good to meet, and so on. A very 
important part of the usefulness of relationships is that they are a great source of pleasure, 
and probably could not be substituted with anything else for the same effect. The thought of 
a life without friends is positively miserable, while even quite unpleasant experiences can be 
rendered less unpleasant by the company of friends. This is to say, close personal 
relationships can be causes of pleasure (or the lessening of pain). But relationships that are 
based entirely on their aptness for producing pleasure or reducing pain would likely be rather 
superficial. If this were the nature of the relationship, it would in fact seem to be reduced to 
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a relationship based on usefulness—the relationship would be useful for producing or 
maintaining a certain level of subjective well-being. In other words, the production or 
maintenance of pleasure might be one species of the usefulness of relationships. 
While we certainly should not overlook the value of friendships and other 
relationships as useful (and I take this to include their role in the production or maintenance 
of pleasure), usefulness on its own would seem to be a rather shallow reason for imbuing 
personal relationships with the importance that we do. Note, for example, that it seems 
antithetical to the spirit of friendship to speak of using one’s friends.98 Aristotle was surely 
right to distinguish friendships based on usefulness from friendships based on the pleasant 
and friendships based on the good.99 The first point to note is that close personal 
relationships have a rather special role in the pleasantness of one’s life that could not be 
easily filled by something else, and this role is not a simply causal, or productive one.100 For 
example, the pleasantness of spending time with a friend with a sense of humor is 
importantly different from the pleasantness of watching a comedian. Or, to take another 
example, the pleasantness of conversation with a loved one over dinner is quite different 
from reading over dinner, even if the reading material and its author are quite fascinating. If 
                                                     
98 Raz, in a somewhat different context, makes the point that taking an instrumental attitude towards 
one’s friends would be self-defeating. (“The Amoralist,” in Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 273-302.) I am grateful to Nandi Theunissen for drawing my 
attention to the relevance of the point to the present context. 
99 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk VIII, for his distinction between the three types and 
corresponding bases of friendship: the useful, the pleasant, and the good. At 1156a14-21, he says that among 
these three types, both of the first two are only friendships “incidentally,” suggesting that only the third meets 
the mark of true friendship. However, some of what he says about the pleasant in relation to the good later on 
in this book and the next suggests that he sees the pleasant (and its corresponding friendship) as more 
genuinely important to a good life. I return to this point below. 
100 This is why I treat the causal role of relationships in relation to pleasure along with usefulness. I 
think there is a deeper point to be made about relationships and pleasure than the causal one. I think that this 
may have been behind Aristotle’s distinguishing friendships based on the pleasant from friendships based on 
the useful as well. 
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the role of the relationship is to be understood as simply productive of pleasure, this should 
be surprising. Supposing the comedian is much wittier than my friend, and the author of my 
book has much more engrossing stories to tell than my partner, surely the comedian’s show 
and the book should be preferable (simply in terms of pleasantness) to the company of my 
loved ones. 
That this is not how things in fact are is explained by the fact that the role of close 
personal relationships in relation to pleasure is not simply, or entirely, one of cause to effect. 
Rather, the company of a friend or loved one is partly constitutive of the pleasantness of an 
experience. I take this to be a kernel of truth in what Robert Nozick says about relationships 
(and friendship in particular) in The Examined Life: that the essence of friendship is sharing.101 
As he puts it, “a relationship is a friendship to the extent that it shares activities for no 
further purpose than the sharing of them.”102 Often, what makes a meal, a drink, or an 
evening of entertainment most pleasant is that it is shared. That the pleasantness of a shared 
meal depends in large part on its being shared explains why the meal spent in the “company” 
of a good book would be a poor substitute, in terms of pleasantness, for the shared meal, no 
matter how good the book is.   
The point here is that the pleasantness of a shared experience is of a different order 
than the pleasantness of some other experience, not that shared experiences always trump 
good books. It is also worth noting that it is not simply the fact that the experience is shared 
that is important, but that it is shared with the particular person with whom you have a 
relationship. To put the point another way, the (pleasure) value of the shared meal is not 
                                                     
101 Robert Nozick, “Love’s Bond,” in The Examined Life (New York: Touchstone, 1990) 68-86, 
especially 82-3. 
102 Nozick, “Love’s Bond,” 83. 
70 
 
equal to the sum of the value of the meal itself and the value of the stories my dinner partner 
tells, for example.103 The difference in the pleasantness is not one of degree; the sharing of a 
meal, for example, makes the meal take on a quite different character as an experience. The 
sharedness of the experience changes the nature of the experience, and the character of its 
pleasantness.104 
These reflections shed light, I believe, on Aristotle’s initially somewhat puzzling 
remarks to the effect that even though friendships that have the pleasant as their basis are 
friendships only incidentally (just like friendships based on the useful), pleasantness will be 
an important part of friendships that are based on the good (or true friendships).105 The 
point is that there is a difference between friendships that are valued merely for the sake of 
the pleasure they produce or maintain, and friendships that are valued in part for the sake of 
the pleasantness of the shared experiences they facilitate. One of the respects in which 
Aristotle distinguishes “incidental” from “complete” friendships is that in the latter case, the 
friends are loved because of themselves, whereas in the former case, the friends are loved 
because of the pleasure or usefulness they bring.106 As I see it, this parallels the distinction 
between valuing a friend because of the pleasure she produces and valuing the special 
                                                     
103 The altered character of the experience that results from its being shared might thus be compared 
to G. E. Moore’s notion of an “organic unity.” See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (New York: Barnes & Noble 
Publishing, 2005), especially 27-37. 
104 I should note that Nozick would no doubt take issue with what may look like a reduction of the 
value of sharing to pleasure. In response, I note that the point I am making does not depend on a reduction of 
this sort (nor would I want to perform one). The point that an important part of the value of sharing is its 
distinctive variety of pleasantness is compatible with the value of sharing not being wholly explained in terms of 
pleasantness. Indeed, part of the value of the sharing seems to lie in its capacity to significantly alter the 
character of a pleasant (or, for that matter, painful) experience. 
105 See, for example, 1158a22-25: “…and while the blessedly happy have no need of useful friends, 
they do need pleasant ones; for on the one hand they wish to have people with whom to share their lives, and 
on the other the painful is something that people tolerate for a short time, but no one would put up with it on a 
continuing basis—no one would put up even with the good itself, if it were painful to him.” 
106 See 1156a14-21 and 1156b7-14, for example. 
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pleasantness that is partly constituted by, and indeed transformed by, the sharing of 
experiences with a particular person. 
So, we have seen that close personal relationships are valuable in two ways so far. 
First, they are useful (and I take this to include their aptness for the production or 
maintenance of pleasure). Second, given that they are often marked by shared experiences, 
they are distinctively pleasant—pleasant in a way that is plausibly partly constitutive of 
personal well-being. More carefully, they have the capacity to transform the character of 
pleasant experiences in virtue of the sharedness of the experiences they facilitate. These on 
their own are significant ways for something to be valuable. I say this to forestall a potential 
objection—the objection that relationships, as I have so far construed them, are of merely 
instrumental value. Even if something is only instrumentally valuable, it is still genuinely and 
importantly valuable if it is instrumental in bringing about something which itself is 
genuinely valuable. Consider water, which may be said to be “merely” instrumentally 
valuable, but without which there would be no life as we know it.107 If something is 
instrumental in serving an end that lacks genuine value, then it is merely instrumental, rather 
than being instrumentally valuable. That is to say, the qualifier “merely” is misleading when 
attached to the phrase “instrumentally valuable.” To the extent that the end is genuinely 
valuable, instrumentally valuable goods are genuinely valuable. It is surely clear that some 
ends which are served by relationships are genuinely valuable, so even if the value of 
relationships were only instrumental, their value would be significant and genuine. 
Moreover, it is not the case that instrumental value is the only sort of value that 
relationships have. As we have seen, there is a distinction between the (pleasure) value of 
                                                     
107 I am indebted and grateful to Nandi Theunissen for this example. 
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relationships as sources or producers of pleasure and the distinctive pleasantness that 
relationships and their associated activities can be partly constitutive of. But beyond the 
usefulness and pleasantness of relationships, they have value as irreducible components of 
good lives for human beings. Our close relationships with others are not always marked by 
usefulness or pleasantness, but they remain valuable. To put it another way, our relationships 
often remain valuable even when they do not lead to a greater balance of utility over 
disutility or pleasure over pain. One plausible way to explain the non-instrumental value of 
relationships, as I have been suggesting, is to see them as important components of a good 
life for a human being. It remains, then, to explain why relationships constitute valuable 
components of a good life for a human being. What would be amiss without them? 
Consider what is lacking from a seemingly self-sufficient person’s life—let’s call him 
Scrooge.108 Scrooge is self-sufficient in the sense that he certainly has enough wealth to last 
the rest of his life and to secure any services or goods he may desire. His health is good, and 
if that changes, he is sure to be able to receive adequate medical care. If there are any tasks 
he may have reason to perform but is unable to perform on his own, he has robots to take 
care of them for him. The only thing he doesn’t have is close personal relationships. One 
thing that seems to be missing from Scrooge’s life is someone with intimate knowledge of 
his value system; someone with whom he might talk through personal dilemmas, for 
example. Perhaps a situation arises in which he has to choose between attending a boxing 
match he is particularly excited about and his favorite annual derby that is happening at the 
                                                     
108 The Scrooge example is intentionally somewhat ridiculous and caricature-like for the sake of clarity 




same time. He feels genuinely torn between these two events and doesn’t know what to 
do.109 
If Scrooge had a friend with whom he could talk through his dilemma, his decision 
may be made easier in several ways. A friend might, for example, tell Scrooge that he himself 
will be attending the derby, thus providing Scrooge with an additional reason to attend the 
derby, but not the boxing match. (As explained above, the sharedness of the experience 
would alter its character.) Or his friend, with the intimate knowledge of Scrooge’s value 
system that he would have, might be able to point out some nuances in some of Scrooge’s 
values that he himself had been blind to. Perhaps, on careful reflection, Scrooge would really 
prefer to support an institution that leads to brain injuries in human beings rather than one 
that does not, and so would really prefer to attend the boxing match. His friend may be able 
to help him see this. Scrooge’s (imagined) friend might be able to help him make discoveries 
about the relations between his various value commitments, and so facilitate his 
understanding of his own value system.110 
But another way in which Scrooge’s imagined friend might be able to help in this 
situation would be to point out a problem in Scrooge’s value system, and help Scrooge to 
improve on it. For example, if Scrooge had a friend, the friend might point out that there is 
an inconsistency between Scrooge’s enjoyment of the brain injuries of others (perhaps they 
                                                     
109 I intend this example to be understood as a case in which the agent is uncertain about the 
relationships between values that he holds. It is not merely that he is unsure how to reach a decision about 
what he should do given his values; rather, it is that he is not sure which of two values is more important to him. 
It is in trying to reach a decision about what to do that the issue arises for him, but the real problem is that he 
doesn’t know how to balance two elements of his value system. In other words, the problem is intended to be 
one about reasoning about ends. 
110 Something like this is probably what Aristotle meant by describing a friend as a second self. See for 
example NE Bk IX:4 1166a30-33. 
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are interesting and amusing to him) and his belief that intelligence is a good thing.111 Once 
this was pointed out to him, perhaps Scrooge would realize that since he in fact values 
intelligence more than small amusements, he should not after all attend the boxing match. 
He may even realize that because he values intelligence so much, he should spend his evening 
doing something entirely different from either of the two activities he was initially struggling 
to choose between. A friend could offer a different perspective on the situation that Scrooge 
confronts—a perspective that is well informed about, or familiar with, Scrooge’s own 
particular values. And it could even be that this fresh perspective could help Scrooge to hone 
or perfect his own value system. Simply put, the presence of a friend could facilitate 
enhanced practical reasoning. 
Of course, the example as I have presented it is rather like a caricature. I have made 
it so in order to hopefully give a clear illustration of the point I am trying to make; I do not 
think my argument depends on this caricature-like example. The point is that friendship (as 
well as other close personal relationships) is valuable in part because it can facilitate 
enhanced practical reasoning. It is especially suited to doing this because our friends, 
knowing us as they do, can help us achieve better understanding of our own values, and may 
be able to help us develop and improve our value systems. To see that this is the case even 
for much less obviously imperfect individuals, consider the following parallel example. 
                                                     
111 The particular flaw that is pointed out here is simply one of inconsistency between particular 
attitudes that Scrooge in fact holds. Of course, it is likely the case that some of the attitudes Scrooge holds are 
ones that he should not hold. I think that our friends’ intimate knowledge of our value systems puts them in 
especially good positions to help us better understand our ‘internal’ values, but they may also be able to help us 
internalize better values than the ones we currently hold. Indeed, the presence of a co-deliberator would seem 
to be especially suited to helping one become aware of new reasons one was previously blind to. I address this 
point more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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Gillian is a reasonably happy and comfortable loner who has, among her interests, a 
passion for a particular rock band and a commitment to environmentalism. Gillian might be 
trying to decide whether to attend a concert by the rock band or a protest organized by her 
environmentalist organization. Something that a friend might contribute to Gillian’s situation 
might be to point out that the rock band’s performance involves elements that are 
antithetical to the environmentalist cause. Suppose that Gillian’s passion for the rock band 
constitutes a sort of ‘blind spot’ in her deliberation. It seems that this is just the sort of case 
in which it is good to have a friend to offer a different perspective on one’s value system—
specifically a different perspective that is nevertheless well acquainted with, and sensitive to, 
the particularities of one’s system of values. Gillian’s friend could help her to see that 
attending the environmentalist protest would be more in line with Gillian’s own values and 
so facilitate her enhanced practical reasoning.112 
In addition to enhanced practical reasoning, there is another important good that I 
think friendship might add to Scrooge’s, or Gillian’s, life. I believe Aristotle gives us a clue 
here, in the opening lines of NE Bk VIII: 
After these subjects, it will be appropriate to discuss friendship, since friendship is a kind of 
excellence, or goes along with excellence, and furthermore is very necessary for living. For 
no one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all the other good things; for 
even the wealthy or those who rule over or dominate others are thought to need friends 
                                                     
112 As in the case of Scrooge, this is an example of Gillian’s friend helping her to better understand 
her own internal values. But note that Gillian’s friend is also especially well positioned, knowing Gillian as she 
does, to help Gillian to become aware of reasons or values of which she was previously unaware. In both the 
case of Scrooge and the case of Gillian, the focus of the example has been on better understanding internal 
nuances of one’s value system. But it should be clear that in both cases, the friend stands to help the agent 
significantly develop and expand his or her own value system beyond its present constitution. 
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more than anything—since what use would such prosperity be if they were deprived of the possibility of 
beneficence, which occurs most, and is most to be praised, in relation to friends?113 
Perhaps Aristotle is making reference to some virtue which we no longer recognize as 
especially important—such as magnificence. But I think there is an important insight in the 
part of the quote I have italicized above: the opportunity to practice beneficence is a great 
good that our friends afford us. At times, Aristotle makes some initially confusing remarks 
about how even the blessedly happy or self-sufficient are in great need of friends. This is 
puzzling, because surely the very meaning of ‘self-sufficient’ is to not need anything. Aristotle 
seems to think that friendship, especially in its capacity to afford an agent opportunities for a 
special kind of beneficence, is a great good even for those who would seem to be in need of 
nothing.114 The opportunity for beneficence is the gift for the person who has everything, we 
might say. Something that would be missing from a life devoid of close personal 
relationships would be the opportunity to practice a particular kind of beneficence, and this 
opportunity is a great gift we receive from our friends and loved ones. This gift facilitates the 
living of a good life for a human being in a unique and important way. 
Without close personal relationships, Scrooge’s life lacks many opportunities to be in 
a position to offer a certain kind of help or beneficence. One such opportunity that is closed 
off to Scrooge is the opportunity to be the friend who facilitates enhanced practical reasoning 
in the way we imagined a friend might have helped him in the previous example. Being able to 
offer help or favors is a great good that is in large part facilitated by the context of close 
personal relationships. Without such relationships, whole avenues of opportunity for 
                                                     
113 Aristotle, NE VIII.1 1155a3-10. Emphasis added. 
114 See NE IX.9 1169b10-14: “And if it is more characteristic of a friend to do good than to receive it, 
and characteristic of the good person, and of excellence, to bestow benefits on others, and if it is finer to do 
good to friends than to strangers, the person of excellence will need people to receive benefits from him.” Emphasis added. 
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beneficence are closed off to Scrooge. To the extent that Gillian’s life lacks close personal 
relationships, the same point applies to her. 
One may wonder why the context of a relationship is important here, even if it is 
granted that the opportunity to act beneficently is a good for the agent. There are plenty of 
strangers towards whom we could be beneficent; why does Scrooge need friends when there 
are so many potential beneficiaries of his charity? One reason for this is that there seems to 
be something special about the combination of beneficence and reciprocity. It is of course 
good to be beneficent toward strangers, to make donations to charity organizations, to offer 
anonymous assistance, and so on. I do not mean to detract from the value of such actions. 
But there nevertheless seems to be something special about the possibility of reciprocal 
beneficence in the context of a close personal relationship. It is a special sort of good when 
one’s friend asks one for a favor after offering favors in the past—this opportunity to 
reciprocate is something that Scrooge is not afforded. Similarly, without close personal 
relationships, the opportunity for this particular kind of beneficence is missing from Gillian’s 
life even if she is quite active in charity organizations. The point Aristotle is making, I 
believe, is that even if we were self-sufficient (as we might imagine Scrooge is), we would still 
need friends—to be the recipients of our beneficence. Moreover, I suggest, it is important 
that these beneficiaries are friends (or other loved ones) because it is only then that we get the 
special opportunity of reciprocal beneficence. Even a generous, charity-supporting Scrooge 
would need friends, or he would be missing out on the good of reciprocity together with 
beneficence. 
There is a subtle, but, I think, interesting and important point in the above argument. 
As I understand it, Aristotle’s view is basically that even if a person were self-sufficient, he 
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would have need of friends as recipients of his beneficence. But, as I think the hypothetical 
case of an anonymously charitable Scrooge suggests, the fact that we are not self-sufficient is 
itself an important part of why we need friends in particular as recipients of our beneficence. I 
have suggested that the explanation of this is that the context of a relationship allows for 
reciprocity together with beneficence. But notice that reciprocity would seem to imply non-self-
sufficiency. What would Scrooge be able to reciprocate if no one had ever done him any 
favors, self-sufficient as we are imagining him to be? It looks, then, as if a more accurate 
statement than the one I have attributed to Aristotle would be that because we are not and can 
never be self-sufficient, we need friends and other close relationships.115 To put it differently, 
and perhaps in a way that better exhibits why I take this point to be interesting and subtle, it 
is because our friends and loved ones are not self-sufficient that we need them. 
A situation Scrooge will never find himself in is one in which another person has 
shown him some particular vulnerability and asked for help that they think he is particularly 
well-suited to give. The help in question need not be of the kind described in the previous 
example, where Scrooge’s friend helps him deliberate about how to resolve a dilemma. But 
in general, our friends are particularly well positioned to help us in ways that no one else can, 
and this is because we show them vulnerabilities that we do not show to others.116 The point 
is that mutual help and beneficence is a great good. Having a relationship with someone who 
is always ready and willing to help one is of course good, but without the possibility of 
returning the favor, the relationship would be somewhat limited. The good of being able to 
offer help or favors that one is especially well positioned to offer is unattainable without the 
                                                     
115 This is my view, not Aristotle’s. 
116 Recall, also, Gillian’s ‘blind spot’ due to her passion for the rock band. Only a friend, or someone 
intimately acquainted with Gillian’s values would be able to help her see that she had this blind spot. 
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context of a close personal relationship. This is because it requires the cooperation of a 
beneficiary in the specific sense of showing vulnerability. The context of a close personal 
relationship, we might say, therefore expands the potential area of our agency—it allows us 
to practice a certain kind of beneficence. This in turn affords us a unique opportunity to 
develop an important capacity in ourselves. 
This point about non-self-sufficiency, or vulnerability, and its importance for close 
personal relationships recalls one of my central claims in the previous chapter—namely, that 
we love people in part for their imperfections. On the one hand, these imperfections (lack of 
self-sufficiency or vulnerability, for example) are part of what it is to be human, and so 
loving a fellow human being must involve at least a recognition and acceptance of their 
imperfections. But, on the other hand, the loved one’s imperfections are in fact a part of the 
ground of our love; a willing admission of non-self-sufficiency or vulnerability opens up a 
whole new avenue of opportunities for the lover. A properly good life for a human being 
seems to require close personal relationships because such relationships create a framework 
within which we are able to help one another, or do good things for another, in a particularly 
meaningful way. So, part of the explanation for why personal relationships are valuable is 
that I, as one participant am imperfect and vulnerable. But equally, and perhaps more 
interestingly, another part of the explanation is that the relationship is good for me because 
the other participant is imperfect and vulnerable. Only within a relationship with such a being 
is a certain kind of good—the good of reciprocal beneficence—attainable for me. 
When you ask me for help—whether it be practical or more abstract (such as 
advice), you willingly admit some kind of vulnerability, and present me with the opportunity 
to mitigate it. You present me with the opportunity to actively contribute to our relationship, or 
80 
 
to put my feelings of love for you into practice. You allow me the opportunity to actually 
relate with you. A friend who never asks one for help, or who never allows her friend to help 
her, does her friend and their relationship a disservice. The friendship is thereby prevented 
from blossoming or bearing fruit; it is stifled. The opportunity to actively engage with, and 
reciprocally contribute to the good of, another human being explains in large part why close 
personal relationships are so valuable. 
To sum up the results of this section, we have a fourfold explanation of the value of 
close personal relationships. First, relationships are valuable because they have utility. This 
includes, but is not limited to, the fact that relationships can often be sources of pleasure or 
reducers of pain. Second, relationships have the capacity to enable a distinctive and unique 
sort of pleasantness that we take to be an important good—the distinctive pleasantness of 
shared experiences. Third, one’s close personal relationships can facilitate a deeper self-
understanding and so enhance one’s practical reasoning. Fourth, close personal relationships 
are responsible for special opportunities for reciprocal beneficence, and so expand the scope 
of our agency. Now that we have this explanation on hand, we can consider some of the 
particular reasons that are generated by these valuable relationships. In the section that 
follows, I explore what it means to properly value a close personal relationship that has the 
sort of fourfold value I have been discussing.117 
 
 
                                                     
117 I should note that although there are four kinds of value in the present section, and four classes of 
reasons in the following section, this is coincidental. That is, the reader should not expect a one-to-one 
mapping of values on to reasons. As I see it, each of the classes of reasons is explained by some combination 
of the kinds of value just discussed.  
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3. The Reasons Relationships Generate for Their Participants 
 
In this section, I outline what I take to be four important classes of reasons that are 
generated by valuable relationships. I take these reasons to be so generated because they are 
in fact what it is to properly value such relationships, or to treat bearers of the sort of value 
in question appropriately. Before I get to the four classes I think are most important, I want 
to mention and set aside two relatively uninteresting senses in which relationships may give 
rise to reasons. First, the partners in a marriage or other long-term explicitly monogamous 
relationship have reasons to be faithful to one another for as long as the relationship exists. 
The most general reason for this, however, has to do with the reasons there are for keeping 
promises or honoring commitments. There is a promise, either explicit or implicit, involved 
in this kind of relationship, which provides the partners with some reason to be faithful even 
if the relationship itself ceases to be valuable.118119 In other words, the reason here is not directly 
generated by the value of the relationship. My interest is in the reasons that are generated by 
the relationships as bearers of a distinctive sort of value. I mention this case merely to set 
                                                     
118 The sort of case I have in mind is one where the relationship is still in place, but is no longer 
valuable for the participants in the way it once was. We can imagine a couple who live together, and who spend 
a great deal of time together, and who perhaps even depend on one another in some ways. But whereas their 
interactions were once marked by a deep appreciation of one another and a mutual endorsement of one 
another’s value systems, their interactions are now marked by annoyance, resentment, and perhaps disdain. 
They no longer appreciate one another, and neither endorses the other’s value system (perhaps one or both of 
them has changed substantially over the years). It seems to me that the way to describe this situation is as one 
in which there is a relationship—including a pattern of typical interactions and shared history—but it may have 
lost its value. In such a case, there may be no reasons that are generated by the value of the relationship (since, 
by hypothesis, it has none) but given that the partners made a commitment to be monogamous with one 
another, there is some reason for them each to honor the commitment until the relationship in its current form 
comes to an end.  
119 For some very interesting points about the best reasons for fidelity in a committed, monogamous 
relationship, see Neil Delaney, “What Romance Could Not Be,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 
(2010): 589-598. Delaney suggests (though he doesn’t put it in precisely these terms) that the value of the 
relationship provides the strongest reason for honoring one’s commitment, though there is a distinct reason 
(generated by the commitment itself) that holds independently. 
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aside the reasons that are generated by promises, contracts, commitments, and the like; these 
reasons are not interestingly unique to, or distinctive of, relationships of close personal love. 
Second, given that we typically spend more time with our friends and loved ones 
than we do with other people, we generally have more opportunities to be beneficent or kind 
to our friends and loved ones than we do to others. The mere fact that I am more likely to 
witness Rachel’s need than that of a person I rarely see means that I will have more reasons 
to help her rather than many other people. But the reason as described here need have 
nothing to do with the value of our relationship. It is rather a matter of being conveniently 
situated to direct my kindness toward Rachel rather than toward someone with whom I 
rarely interact. Like the previous example, I mention this case simply to set it aside. The 
reasons that arise from the value of a close personal relationship are different from reasons of 
convenient situation.120 I can now turn to the reasons that do seem to be generated by the 
value of relationships of close personal love. 
The first sort of reason that does seem to arise from the value of a relationship is a 
reason to favor one’s loved ones over others in cases of need. Suppose my friend Rachel and a stranger 
are both in mortal peril, and I am the only one around to help them. Moreover, the situation 
is such that I can only help one of them. Although there is surely a case to be made that I 
have some (probably strong) reason to help each of them, I am of course going to rush to 
Rachel’s aid rather than the stranger’s. While this may be justifiable in relation to the reasons 
I have to help each of them by the fact that I can only help one of them, to attempt this sort 
                                                     
120 Compare the reasons you may have to do your grocery shopping at the nearest grocery store with 
the reasons you have to do your shopping at a grocery store of which you are particularly fond, whether or not 
it is conveniently close by. 
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of justification misses an important point.121 That point is that there are genuine reasons for me 
to favor Rachel in this situation over and above the more general reasons that I have to help 
anyone in such a situation (and so to help each of them in this situation). It is not merely that 
it is acceptable for me to choose Rachel; I should choose Rachel, and the reason is simply that 
she is my friend. Our relationship of friendship constitutes sufficient reason for me to choose 
Rachel. More carefully, the value of our friendship makes it the case that I should choose 
Rachel.122 Any attempt to justify this choice by appealing to considerations other than our 
friendship would be misguided; it would indicate that I improperly valued the relationship.123 
Considering this case shows that part of what it is to properly value one’s close 
personal relationships is to have a disposition to favor one’s loved ones over others, and to 
be guided in one’s actions by this disposition. This can be explained in part by reference to 
the utility and distinctive pleasantness of sharing that comes with such relationships. Part of 
the explanation is also that I am responding to the particular value that I see in Rachel as the 
person she is—the person I have come to love. But it seems that the bulk of the explanatory 
work here is done by considerations of reciprocity, and in particular, the value of reciprocal 
beneficence. Were someone to ask me to justify my choosing Rachel in the case described, a 
                                                     
121 This case is meant to mirror what I take to be the salient features of the example Bernard Williams 
made famous in “Persons, Character and Morality,” in Moral Luck, 1-19 at 17. I have changed the presentation 
of the case somewhat, however, to avoid what seem to me to be common confusions that arise in discussion of 
this case. I have also decided to change the presentation of the case in order to distance myself from Williams, 
since I do not think the point I am making is identical to the one he intended, though it is similar. At any rate, 
disagreement about how to understand Williams’s case is rampant in the literature. Rather than delving into 
that can of worms, I have chosen to present a different, though similar, example to be considered 
independently. I return to Williams’s own case and responses to it in Chapter 4 below. 
122 This is not to say, of course, that there could not be some other reason to choose the other person, 
nor is it to say that the value of my friendship will always constitute the most salient reason in such cases. It is 
merely to say that, all else being equal, our friendship generates a genuine reason for me to choose Rachel, and 
if I failed to do so, criticism of me would be appropriate. 
123 As Samuel Scheffler says, “To value one’s relationships is to treat them as reason-giving.” 
(Scheffler, “Morality and Reasonable Partiality,” in Equality & Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 41-75 at 48.) 
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natural answer would seem to be, “she would have done the same for me.” I do not mean to 
suggest that the reason I have to choose Rachel is explained by, and dependent on, some 
kind of quid pro quo consideration. Rather, what I think the “she would have done the same 
for me” response really signals is the deep goodness of reciprocity and beneficence that our 
relationship allows and facilitates. Rather than it being a sort of contractual expectation that 
Rachel would do the same for me, what I think the “she would have done the same for me” 
response really refers to is the value of the reciprocity that is a large part of our relationship, 
and the recognition that there are certain actions that are appropriate ways to honor that 
reciprocity. In extreme cases, laying down one’s life for a friend might be the most 
appropriate way to honor the value of the friendship, and this does not depend on the belief 
that one’s friend would do the same if the situation were reversed. 
Beyond beneficence in the case of need, a second class of reasons that are generated 
by the value of close personal relationships can also be described as reasons to favor loved 
ones over others. In this second class, however, the favoring takes the form of beneficence 
in the absence of any particular need.124 The model for this class of reasons, I think, is the 
giving of gifts.125 Gifts are typically given as pleasing “extras”—they are not expected, or a 
matter of due course. Rescuing a friend in mortal peril, by contrast, might reasonably be 
expected. To put it another way, there is independent reason to offer help in the rescue case. 
Gift-giving is essentially an act that expresses favoritism for no further reason than that 
                                                     
124 One might think again here of Aristotle’s claim that even the self-sufficient need friends. Since I 
think that it is impossible for a human being to be self-sufficient, I limit the absence of need to absence of any 
particular need. 
125 I take the relation between this class of reasons and the previous one to be similar to the relation 
between the categories of the obligatory and the supererogatory in normative ethics. 
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favoritism itself.126 I think that it will be instructive, therefore, to consider what constitutes a 
good gift for a friend. This should help to clarify some of the content of this second class of 
reasons. 
Should an ideal gift further the ends of a loved one? Sometimes it seems appropriate 
to further the ends of our loved ones, but sometimes it does not. Recall that on my account 
of close personal love, the attitude of love does not entail that the lover fully identifies with 
the ends of the beloved; instead, love is an endorsement of a system of values specifically as 
values for the beloved. But even though love on my understanding is not a matter of making 
my beloved’s ends my own, it seems that a certain kind of gift-giving is best understood as 
furthering the ends of another. Still, this is a case of furthering one’s friend’s ends rather than 
one’s own, and it is important that it is done for the sake of one’s friend. An example of this sort 
of gift might be if I give Jeané a painting by a particular artist whose work she collects. 
Establishing this collection is an end that Jeané has set for herself, and by contributing to the 
collection, I further this end of hers. 
It strikes me as interesting, however, that many examples of especially good gifts 
seem to involve facilitating the loved one’s furthering of her own ends. Giving Jeané some 
painting supplies for her art would seem to be a pretty good gift precisely because she would 
use them in pursuit of one of her own final ends. In contrast, if it were one of her goals to 
save up the money she would have spent on cigarettes (had she not quit smoking) and use it 
to buy a particular work of art, my giving her that work of art would not be such a good gift. 
It may even come across as insulting if I were to do that, since it would appear as if I were 
                                                     
126 A birthday or anniversary may provide an appropriate occasion for the giving of a gift, but itself is 
not the reason for the gift. 
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undermining the value of an important end that she had set for herself. These reflections 
suggest that what is best about gift-giving in the context of a close personal relationship is an 
attitude of endorsement of the beloved’s ends specifically as his or her own. Moreover, it is an 
endorsement of the beloved’s furthering of her own ends. What explains the difference between 
the case where I give Jeané painting supplies and the case where I give her a painting that 
she had wanted to work to acquire for herself is that in the former, I affirm her pursuit of 
her ends within the wider context of her system of values, whereas in the latter case, I (at 
best) merely affirm one of her ends. 
What is it about the giving of a gift that facilitates the beloved’s furthering of her 
own ends that makes it such a good gift? It goes beyond a gift that simply furthers an end of 
the beloved’s because it affirms and endorses the beloved’s agency. It goes beyond the 
endorsement of the beloved’s value system, and celebrates the beloved’s capacity to realize 
(or go some way to realizing) those ends. Gifts of this kind will be especially good gifts when 
they combine a celebration of the other’s agency together with an intimate knowledge of the 
particular values that the beloved holds dear. These gifts will not meet needs; rather, they will 
be pleasing surprises—acts of beneficence in the absence of any particular need. This 
suggests that among the reasons generated by close personal relationships are reasons to 
favor loved ones in the sense of acting beneficently towards them even when there is no 
obvious need. In particular, one especially good way of doing this, it seems to me, involves 
celebrating the beloved’s agency. Close relationships afford us special opportunities to be 
beneficent in just this way. Given the good of reciprocal beneficence, we have reason to 
make use of these opportunities. Part of properly valuing a close personal relationship is to 
take these opportunities and make the most of them. 
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It is worth noting that part of acting on the reasons just described would necessarily 
involve sometimes cultivating an interest in what interests the beloved. If my partner, Joe, 
comes across a new book that he finds absolutely enthralling, and which he claims may be 
coloring his entire outlook on life, it seems clear that I now have a reason to read the book. 
It may be that there are independent reasons for me to read the book, or it may be that there 
are not; that is beside the point. The point is that the value of the relationship gives me 
reasons to care about, or take an interest in, the things he values. While this sort of reason would 
seem to be entailed by the previous class, I think that it constitutes its own class, because of 
an independent explanatory root. Relationships generate reasons to cultivate an interest in 
what interests the other because of the good of sharing. To return to the idea of gift-giving, 
notice that a different kind of very good gift would be one that can be shared between the 
giver and the recipient. Concert tickets to a favorite musician of Joe’s might be such a gift. 
Part of properly valuing a relationship, then, is to attempt to widen the scope of potential 
shared pleasure by cultivating an interest in the interests of the beloved. 
Finally, the value of close personal relationships seems to give rise to a class of 
reasons to take certain attitudes and actions toward ourselves. One of the reasons why 
someone who is very depressed should seek help, or why we should in general take good 
care of ourselves, is generated by the value of our relationships of friendship and love. This 
case may perhaps not be as clear as some of the others, but it seems to me that neglecting to 
take care of oneself can be indicative of improperly valuing close relationships.127 As I see it, 
                                                     
127 The problems here are thorny and complicated. Of course, depression could be the cause of 
someone’s improperly valuing their relationships, which in turn makes it more likely that the depressed person 
will fail to take care of herself. My intention is not to claim that someone is blameworthy for their depression and 
resultant under-valuing of relationships. Rather, the point is that this in one way that depression can prevent 
someone from responding appropriately to the reasons that there are. 
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there are two primary explanations for the class of reasons of self-care being generated by 
the value of relationships. One is that taking care of oneself is presumably necessary for the 
pleasantness of shared experiences. But this may seem a rather flippant and unattractive 
reason for self-care being generated by relationships.  
The other way that relationships generate reasons for self-care is in virtue of the 
good of reciprocity; reciprocity requires both parties to be in a position to be both 
beneficent and receptive to beneficence. Part of properly valuing a relationship is to take 
measures to protect and even enhance those aspects of oneself that contribute to the 
relationship’s value. This includes protecting, and exercising, one’s agency as well as one’s 
physical health. It also involves some development of the characteristics for which one is 
loved. If my friends love me (in part) for my passion for literature, the value of my 
friendships gives me additional reasons for increasing my knowledge of literature, for 
example. While there are surely independent reasons for self-care, the value of close 
relationships generates additional reasons of this class. Finally, relationships give rise to 
reasons to work on improving our value systems. While we are loved in part for our 
imperfections, these imperfections should be seen by them as small flaws—evidence of 





To briefly restate the results of this chapter, the value of close personal relationships 
gives rise to the following four classes of reasons. (1) Reasons to favor loved ones over 
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others in case of need; (2) reasons to favor loved ones over others in case of no particular 
need; (3) reasons to increase the range of potential shared pleasures; (4) reasons to take good 
care of ourselves. Responding to these reasons is what it is to properly value close personal 
relationships that are useful, distinctively pleasant, facilitating of self-understanding, and 











THE IMPERSONAL VALUE AND PARTICIPANT-NEUTRAL 




We have now established that close personal relationships bear significant value for 
their participants, and as such, provide their participants with genuine agent-relative reasons. 
The ultimate question of the present chapter is whether it is possible to extend these results 
to people in general. The reasons discussed in the previous chapter might be referred to as 
participant-relative reasons, as they apply specifically to participants in a relationship because of 
some facts about that relationship. In this chapter, I will argue that relationships and the 
goods specific to them also give rise to participant-neutral reasons, or reasons that apply to one 
whether or not one is a participant in a particular relationship, or any relationship. 
Participant-relative reasons will always be agent-relative, in Thomas Nagel’s sense,128 but 
participant-neutral reasons can be either agent-relative or agent-neutral. 
Given that I understand reasons to be grounded in values, I begin in Section 1 with 
an examination of the value relationships may have beyond their value as optional, or 
personal projects. In particular, I argue that the value of relationships is partly impersonal in 
Nagel’s sense.129 The argument turns on the observation that human beings are imperfect 
valuers, and that relationships are uniquely suited to respond to these imperfections. I pursue 
the idea that our friends and loved ones can help us to improve and develop our value 
systems, and to better express our values in our behavior to show how relationships have a 
deeper, more general and impersonal significance than other optional, personal projects. 
This leads fairly naturally, I think, to the claim that there are agent-neutral reasons to respect 
existing relationships. In Section 2, I take my claim about the impersonal value of 
relationships further to suggest that their value is significant enough to give us all some 
                                                     
128 See the definition of agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons in Section 1 of the previous chapter. 
129 See Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 138-154. 
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reason to prepare ourselves to be able participants in relationships. Specifically, I argue that 
the relationship-specific goods of reciprocity and shared experiences gives each of us (even 
non-participants) reasons to take care of our capacity for reciprocity, and to cultivate broader 
interests. By taking such steps, I suggest that we can be better prepared to enjoy some of the 
goods that relationships make possible, and that the very wide range of possible relationships 
means that we can enjoy some of these goods even in the absence of very close 
relationships. These reasons may be described as agent-relative, but participant-neutral.  
Before beginning the arguments of this chapter, a quick reminder of the relevant 
results from the previous chapter and some theoretical background will be helpful. I have 
argued that close personal relationships give rise to four classes of agent-relative reasons for 
their participants. They generate reasons (1) to favor loved ones in cases of need; (2) to favor 
loved ones in cases of no particular need; (3) to increase the range of potential shared 
experiences; and (4) to take certain actions and attitudes towards ourselves. Each of these 
reasons was generated by some combination of the following ways that relationships are 
valuable for their participants: (A) relationships are useful; (B) relationships have a 
transformative capacity over the character of experience; (C) relationships facilitate deeper 
self-understanding; and (D) relationships expand the scope of our agency. Each of these 
ways that relationships are valuable refers to a value that is most obviously thought of as 
personal—valuable from a particular person’s perspective. 
The idea that the value of relationships is personal in this way is a familiar treatment 
that the value of relationships receives in contemporary ethics. On this model, exemplified 
by Nagel, the value of relationships is essentially connected with the perspective of an 
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individual.130 The value of a relationship does not detach from the perspective of the person 
whose relationship it is. One of Nagel’s main examples of something that is personally 
valuable is the goal an individual may have of climbing Mount Kilimanjaro, and the idea is 
that this is something that matters only if an agent occupies the relevant perspective.131 To 
put it another way, the only reason one has to care about getting to the top of Mount 
Kilimanjaro is that one has in fact already come to care about this achievement, or adopted it 
as an end. Friendship, on this model, is important because we have come to care about our 
friends and loved ones. The value of my relationships on this view is personal because it 
depends on my particular perspective.  
A second model is given by Shelley Kagan for whom relationships figure as “agent-
centered options.”132 Kagan’s options include such things as going to the movies, pursuing 
activities of personal interest, and relationships with family and friends. Relationships are 
optional in the sense that we may choose to devote our attentions to them, but we need not 
do so. Kagan himself, as a consequentialist, denies the existence of options, but he accurately 
describes a common-sense view of morality as including them. If we so choose, on this type 
of view, we may invest time and energy in our friendships even if doing so would lead to less 
than optimal outcomes, all things considered. But the important point about seeing 
relationships this way is that whether or not we do so is up to us—it is a function of 
particular individual preferences. In this respect, there is no great difference between 
relationships and other ways we may choose to spend our free time, such as going to the 
movies, stamp collecting, making origami birds, or playing Solitaire. In sum, according to the 
                                                     
130 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 165. 
131 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 167. 
132 Shelley Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3. 
94 
 
Nagel-type view, relationships are valuable to particular agents, contingent on those agents’ 
perspectives, and according to the Kagan-type view, relationships are aspects of life that we 
may choose to pursue, dependent on our particular interests. On both views, the value and 
practical importance of relationships is somewhat limited. 
For Nagel, the category of personal values finds its point in contrast with impersonal 
values, paradigm examples of which are pleasure and the absence of pain, and “liberty, 
general opportunities, and the basic resources of life.”133 For Nagel, these values do not 
require us to occupy the perspective of the person for whom they are valuable to be seen as 
such. Rather, their importance detaches in thought from the personal perspective and they 
can be seen to have a fully general importance. Impersonal values therefore make a claim on 
us all. Nagel’s (plausible) proposal is that we all have some reason to reduce suffering, no 
matter whose it is, and we all have reason to support institutions that protect liberty, no 
matter whose liberty is at stake. The value of these goods is not contingent on personal 
perspectives, unlike the value of one’s goal of climbing Mount Kilimanjaro. Considering 
these values in Kagan’s framework, we might say that the basic resources of life, for 
example, are important in a non-optional way. Common-sense morality permits me to go to 
the movies on a Sunday afternoon if I so choose, but does not permit me to destroy a 
village’s clean water supply to see if I can turn it a pretty shade of green. These examples 
make the contrast between personal and impersonal value rather clear. But I am not so sure 
that relationships fall so clearly on the side of personal value, or agent-centered options; their 
value seems importantly different. 
                                                     
133 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 171. 
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Of course, many would agree that a good life for a human being should include the 
ability to pursue optional projects of their own choosing, and some of these will be 
relationships. But to me this does not exhaust their practical significance. Consider the sense 
in which, while friendship is voluntary, relationships of friendship nevertheless give rise to 
reasons that are no longer ‘up to us.’ If I discover that climbing mountains turns out to be 
much more terrifying than rewarding for me, I can give it up in favor of some other pursuit. 
Not so with friendship—at least, not so simply. Moreover, the phenomenon of loneliness, or 
yearning for close relationships, so ubiquitous in art and popular culture, suggests that there 
is something non-optional about our interest in them. As I will argue in this chapter, 
relationships constitute a deep, basic, and versatile good. As such, their value is partly 
impersonal in a way that is analogous to the impersonal value of liberty and the basic resources 
of life. And because their value is impersonal in this way, relationships give us all reasons to 
take certain actions and attitudes, whether we are participants in particular relationships or 
not. 
 
1. Relationships as Impersonally Valuable 
 
Relationships are a central good for human beings because relationships respond to a 
deep feature of being human: vulnerability and imperfection. This is a view that I continue 
to develop in what immediately follows. It is because we are not self-sufficient that we need 
relationships with others. Our friends and loved ones can help us scratch an itch, offer a 
distinct opinion on a matter of personal importance, or feed our cats when we travel. But 
relationships answer to human vulnerabilities in a less obvious and more interesting way. In 
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the present chapter, I continue to develop my account of a general type of human 
imperfection to which I think relationships are especially apt to respond: individual human 
beings are imperfect valuers. 
In what follows, I work with some assumptions about love for which I have argued 
in previous chapters. First, I assume that love is a response to a person’s individual character, 
where character is understood to be a structure of dispositions that are expressive of the 
individual’s commitment to values. In other words, an individual’s character is a manifestation 
of that person’s system of values, a system that may include, for example, a passionate 
commitment to environmentalism, a love of classical music, and a ceteris paribus preference 
for peace over confrontation in interpersonal relations. I understand a system of values to be 
the set of things an individual values in the sense of the term Samuel Scheffler has argued 
for.134 When we get to know another person well, what we become better acquainted with is 
that person’s system of values as expressed through her character. So, I assume that a large 
part of why we love the people we do has to do with the way that we perceive our loved 
ones as valuers. Relationships, I will suggest, are especially apt to respond to the fact that as 
human beings we are imperfect valuers. Relationships enable us to better understand our value 
systems, they help us to develop our value systems for the better, and they allow us the 
opportunity to practice our values in such a way that we can become better agents. It is in 
these ways that the value of relationships is shown to be basic and versatile and accordingly 
impersonal. 
 
                                                     
134 See Scheffler, “Valuing,” 15-40. 
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1.1. Imperfectly Systematic Value Systems 
 
One way that a relationship like friendship is responsive to human imperfection is 
that our friends are well-positioned to see inconsistencies in our value systems. In this 
respect, our friends and other participants in close relationships occupy a doubly privileged 
perspective on our value systems. On the one hand, a friend knows my value system very 
well. But, because she is a distinct person, and so has some distance from my value system, 
her perspective is in some ways privileged even in comparison with mine. A friend can have 
an even clearer perception of some particular part of my value system than I do myself. For 
example, a friend can point out an apparent inconsistency, or tension, between my valuing a 
particular artist and my commitment to a social concern that this artist is well known to have 
flouted. Suppose that until my friend points this tension out to me, it had not bothered me. I 
have had a sort of ‘blind spot’ due to my strong emotional attachment to his art. My friend’s 
observation can lead me to question whether I am comfortable holding both values, and I 
may decide that while I still value the artist’s art, I now recognize a need to speak out against 
his behavior when discussing my appreciation of him. A close relationship allows for a 
perspective which is fresh and distinct, but also intimately acquainted with my value system. 
No one but our fellow participants in close relationships occupies this doubly privileged 
perspective of our value systems.135 
                                                     
135 Perhaps something other than a close friend can occupy the doubly privileged perspective I 
mention to some extent. The most convincing potential counterexample is, I think, a therapist who would 
presumably be closely acquainted with one’s value system while maintaining a different perspective on it that 
one’s own. But something that a close relationship provides that is presumably missing in the therapist case is 
affection for the other person, which makes her perspective especially salient to one. We care about how our 
friends see us in a way that typically does not characterize our interactions with mere acquaintances. Because 




1.2. Less Than Perfect Values 
 
Second, our friends can help us recognize values of which we were previously 
unaware, and in this way can help us to develop and improve the contents, so to speak, of 
our value systems. One reason why our friends are especially well suited to help us in this 
regard is that, given their intimate acquaintance with our particular value systems, they are 
able to present considerations in favor of a particular value in a way that will be especially 
salient to us. Because our friends are well acquainted with our particular values, they know 
how to appeal to them in order to make us more receptive to new potential elements for our 
value systems. They know, better than most, how to ‘translate’ values that are presently 
external to our value systems so that we may internalize them. 
Once again here, to make the point clear, I resort to caricature. Recall Scrooge, who 
is inclined to attend a boxing match rather than engage in some other activity in part because 
the sport of boxing tends often to lead to brain injuries, and Scrooge finds this somewhat 
amusing. Now, if Scrooge had a friend, his friend may be able to bring intelligence in general 
within the sphere of things Scrooge values in the following way.136 First Scrooge’s friend 
might tell Scrooge an amusing story about a cunning and witty scoundrel who succeeds in 
some mischievous endeavor. In response, Scrooge chuckles in delight. Scrooge’s friend 
                                                     
perspectives of others. To the extent that one does care about the perspective of one’s therapist in this way, I 
suggest there is a relationship of the relevant kind in place. 
136 I am assuming here that intelligence in general is not already among the elements of Scrooge’s 
value system. The example differs in this respect from the previous one in which Scrooge featured. We might 
see this example as a hypothetical precursor to the previous one. 
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might then ask him why he enjoys the story so. We can then imagine a conversation that 
proceeds in stages, drawing attention to the features of the scoundrel in the story (cunning, 
wittiness) that might be understood as particular aspects of intelligence—a general 
phenomenon with broad potential uses and value. By the end of the conversation, lo and 
behold, Scrooge has come to recognize the value of intelligence—he has incorporated 
intelligence in general into his system of values. 
Admittedly, once again, this example is exaggerated and somewhat ridiculous. But I 
believe its point is easily applicable (though perhaps not so easily illustrated) in the case of 
normal human beings with lesser imperfections. The point I hope it illustrates is this: 
Scrooge’s friend recognizes the value of something that he knows Scrooge does not himself 
recognize as valuable. Given that he believes it to be genuinely valuable and important, he 
thinks it would be good for Scrooge to recognize its value. Knowing Scrooge as he does, he 
knows that pointing out the great achievements of human intelligence in the sciences or 
literature, for example, would not much appeal to Scrooge. Instead, he uses an aspect of 
intelligence that he knows Scrooge is likely to appreciate—cunning mischief. In this way, 
Scrooge’s friend is better able than most to effectively help Scrooge develop and improve his 
value system.  
In addition to sometimes deliberately showing us the value of something new, our 
friends help us to develop our value systems by themselves valuing things that we do not 
value. The extent to which our friends’ valuing affects our own value systems varies widely. 
In some cases, our friends’ valuing something can lead us to value it in a full sense—in 
something like Scheffler’s rich sense of valuing. In such as case, we would believe it is 
valuable, be emotionally vulnerable to considerations regarding it, see those emotional reactions 
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as appropriate, and see it as reason-giving.137 But there is a subtler way that a friend’s valuing can 
affect one’s value system. In what follows, I suggest that relationships play a significant role 
in expanding the boundaries of our system of values, beginning with a minimal case in which 
a new element becomes available to my value system, without being actually incorporated in 
it.138 I work up from this minimal case to what I call the full Schefflerian sense of valuing, 
which is when a new element is fully incorporated into my system of values. 
Imagine that a friend of mine has a great passion for impressionist painting. Initially, 
suppose impressionist painting has no appeal for me, but since it is my friend’s birthday, I 
agree to accompany her to a special exhibition of Monet’s work. The art itself doesn’t excite 
me much, but I am having a good time catching up with my friend, and remembering what it 
is I so love about her—her particular turns of phrase, her quirky disliking of butterflies, 
perhaps. And I find I am quite enjoying hearing her talk about what she likes in the paintings 
we see. Though it still doesn’t have much of an aesthetic appeal for me, I am beginning to 
appreciate why she is so passionate about this art—how if one stands at a certain distance 
from the painting, one can almost see the rain combining with the dappled sunlight in a way 
that is not apparent when one moves closer to the painting. 
This sort of experience can have a significant effect on my attitude toward 
impressionist painting. Suppose I remain unmoved by the art in terms of its aesthetic value; 
it still does not appeal to me. Nevertheless, witnessing my dear friend’s profound valuing of 
                                                     
137 These are the four components of valuing that Scheffler lists in “Valuing,” 29. 
138 In this, I am developing a line of thought that Scheffler suggests in footnote 39 of “Valuing,” 38. 
He describes a view according to which “a belief that X is valuable, when accompanied by a disposition to 
experience (say) mild X-related regret if X is destroyed, may not itself constitute an instance of valuing, but it 
may differ only in degree from a case of valuing in which the level of emotional vulnerability is attenuated. The 
two cases may still be distinguished from one another by reference to the degrees of emotional vulnerability 
involved and the kinds of reasons for action that the people in question recognize, but the difference may not 
be as stark as in some other pairs of cases.” 
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the art affects me. Whereas before this experience, I may have had a rather weak belief that 
impressionist art must be valuable, given that it is in fact valued by many, my understanding of 
its value is now rather more solidified. I have now seen how the art affects a person with 
whose value system I am fairly well acquainted. My acquaintance with, and general 
endorsement of, my friend’s value system sensitizes me to elements of her value system 
which I do not share. In this particular case, I may be emotionally moved by witnessing that 
she is emotionally moved by the paintings. It is not that I myself am emotionally affected by 
the paintings, but I am moved by the fact that my friend is so emotionally affected, and this 
means that the paintings have taken on a new role in my emotional life, albeit a minimal one. 
This case certainly falls short of my coming to value impressionist art in the full Schefflerian 
sense, but it seems to involve a bit more than merely believing that such art is valuable. Seeing 
my friend so moved can enable me to understand that these paintings really are worth 
valuing; the fact that someone I love values them demonstrates this to me in a way that the 
mere knowledge that someone values them does not. My loved one’s valuing of the paintings 
makes their value come alive for me, arguably a necessary precondition for actually valuing 
them myself.139 Perhaps we can describe this case as one in which my belief in the value of 
impressionist art has been strengthened and minimally emotionally charged. Impressionist art 
has therefore taken on a role in my emotional life, albeit an indirect and minimal one. 
The experience with my friend may have a more significant effect on me. Some 
months after our visit to the Monet exhibit, I may come across an impressionist painting 
while on my own, and notice that it has features that my friend helped me to see. I find that 
I am able to feel somewhat moved by the painting, and spend some time appreciating it. It is 
                                                     
139 Thanks to Nandi Theunissen for suggesting this description of the case to me. 
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still not the case that the art has much of an aesthetic appeal for me, but I begin to spend a 
little more time in front of impressionist paintings than I had before. In fact, I may even take 
a detour through the impressionist wing of a gallery I am visiting if it is not too far out of my 
way. In this case, my attitude toward impressionist art would seem to be one of valuing, 
though perhaps not a very strong form of valuing. We might think of this as a weaker form 
of valuing than Scheffler’s strong form of valuing. The art has, in this case, taken on a more 
significant and direct role in my emotional and deliberative life, but it is still a small one. 
The cases I’ve so far described capture a rather familiar experience, I think—the 
experience of being sensitive to the interests and values of our friends. But sometimes, our 
friends’ valuing can have a much more profound effect on our own values. Sometimes, I 
come to value something in a fully rich sense as a result of my friend’s valuing it. The visit 
with my friend to the Monet exhibit may eventually result in this art becoming something 
that I believe is valuable, something that moves me emotionally, and something toward 
which I believe such an emotional response is appropriate. Indeed, I am now somewhat 
disposed to attend exhibits of impressionist paintings, and to support their preservation; I 
am disposed to see them as reason-giving. That is to say, it is possible that my friend’s 
valuing something can lead to my valuing it in the full Schefflerian sense. 
It is important that the change in my attitude toward impressionist paintings, in each 
of the three cases I have described, would not have happened had it not been for my close 
relationship with and love for my friend. It is because of my intimate knowledge of and 
affection for my friend that I came to see impressionist art as genuinely valuable in the first 
case, that I came to value it in a weak sense in the second case, and that I came to value it in 
the full Schefflerian sense in the third case. Even if our loved ones’ valuing does not lead to 
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our strong valuing of impressionist art, for example, it likely does go some way toward 
bringing it within reach of our value systems. In this way, our friends help us to develop our 
value systems. Our value systems are able to include new elements, which were not formerly to 
our taste, elements that would likely never have been included if it had not been for the ‘way 
in,’ so to speak, provided by our loved ones’ valuing of them. 
I have suggested that our friends can help us expand the boundaries of our value 
systems, but this does not necessarily mean that they will help us improve our value systems. A 
value system with more contents is not necessarily an improved value system. Sometimes, 
quite the opposite is true. Our friends’ facilitation of the expanding of our value systems is 
therefore not always a good thing. But note the value of the kind of change in the first case I 
described above—the one where my belief in the value of impressionist art is strengthened 
and slightly emotionally charged. The ability to actually see something as valuable, as opposed 
to merely believing in a rather abstract way that it must be (or is probably) valuable is 
significant. I suggest that this is a necessary intermediate step on the way to valuing. Whereas 
I know that there are many people who value bird-watching, and so assume that there is value 
in the activity, I have seen the value of impressionist art in my loved one’s valuing of it. This 
brings impressionist art within the sphere of things I am potentially able to value—a sphere 
that does not presently include the activity of bird-watching.140 My suggestion is that this 
minimal emotional charge attached to a belief in something’s value is a necessary pre-
condition for valuing.141 That relationships can facilitate this sort of change is important 
because it means we can be more open-minded about what is valuable. 
                                                     
140 The bird-watching example is Scheffler’s in “Valuing,” 21. 
141 I am not claiming that it is only through our loved ones’ valuing that new elements can be brought 
within reach of our value systems. This can presumably be achieved by other experiences and realizations, too. 
Perhaps I can begin to see the value of bird-watching after learning a particularly interesting fact about birds’ 
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But what of cases where I fully incorporate a new element into my value system—
the kind of case described in the third case above? Is it a good thing for me to incorporate 
impressionist art into my value system in the full Schefflerian sense? As Scheffler notes, 
there are significant limits to what any one person can value, and so it cannot be that this is 
always a good thing, even if the element in question is genuinely valuable.142 Nevertheless, it 
is often the case that coming to value something new is experienced as an enrichment of our 
lives. And the route in to our value systems via our loved ones’ value systems is significant 
because it is conducive to valuable shared experiences.143 For these reasons, I find it plausible 
that it is a good thing that our friends have the capacity to help us expand the boundaries of 
our value systems, though that is by no means the only way they can help us improve them. 
 
1.3. Imperfectly Expressing Our Values 
 
A third way that relationships answer to our imperfections is that our friends and 
loved ones are uniquely well suited to help us better manifest our own values in our 
characters. One aspect of this is that, given their knowledge of our values, they are especially 
well positioned to hold us to our own values. Strangers who do not know that I am trying to 
convert to vegetarianism will not care (absent their own commitments) if I order a 
cheeseburger, but someone with whom I have spoken about my decision and my reasons for 
it may justifiably be disappointed in me if I renege. A friend would know that in this 
                                                     
migration patterns, for example. But my suggestion is that relationships are a significant facilitator of this sort 
of process. 
142 See Scheffler, “Valuing,” 21 and 27. 
143 I return to the good of shared experiences in Section 2 below. 
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moment I was putting momentary pleasure ahead of a considered and personally important 
ethical commitment. The knowledge of this fact can help me keep my resolve. 
Relationships further help us to better express our values because of the unique 
opportunity our friends and loved ones afford us for exploring our values in practice, 
something that is essential to character development. Engaging with fiction might go some 
way toward helping us develop our characters, insofar as it encourages us to think about 
different sorts of people with different value systems, and the nature of good and bad 
actions with respect to them. But relationships offer something that engaging with fiction 
cannot, and that is the opportunity for actually practicing—the opportunity to exercise our 
agency in relevant ways. Aristotle was right in thinking that virtue is something that needs to 
be learned through practice, rather than merely through study, and our friends and loved 
ones are invaluable to us for this reason. Our relationships with others enable us to habituate 
ourselves to ways of behaving that will have consequences far beyond our close 
relationships. 
For example, our friends and loved ones are especially apt beneficiaries of our 
generosity, our aid, our kindness, and other similar virtues. They therefore provide us with 
opportunities to practice these virtues, and so in effect to practice being better people. This 
is exceptionally valuable if putting one’s values into practice is necessary to hone them, 
entrench them, and so to solidify one’s integrity, as I think is plausible.144 The point here is 
that our friends, in being especially apt recipients of our other-directed actions, are crucial to 
                                                     
144 I focus here on the practice and expression of values that are virtuous (e.g. kindness, beneficence, 
etc.), but the point is not limited to these values. I do in fact think that close relationships are especially well 
suited to help us learn about virtues, for reasons that should become clear in the discussion that follows. But 
the point I am making is also more general: close relationships provide us with the opportunity to practice 
expressing our values whatever they may be. This means that the character ‘development’ they facilitate need not 
be in the direction of virtue. (See also footnote 148 below, and the paragraph to which it attaches.) 
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helping us take care of, or develop, our characters. In particular, relationships allow us to 
refine, in a practical way, those of our values that affect interpersonal interaction. 
Take the example of a commitment to being beneficent. Relationships are uniquely 
suited to facilitate the expression of this value because they provide a unique backdrop for 
reciprocal beneficence. Given that I am intimately acquainted with my loved ones’ value systems, 
I am especially likely to do well in exercising my beneficence in relation to my close friends 
and loved ones. I am likely to know just what sorts of things would count as beneficent 
actions toward them. The same is true of generous actions, or kind actions. For example, I 
know that while washing the dishes for one friend might be a suitable act of kindness when 
she is feeling low, for another friend, washing the dishes may be taken as somewhat intrusive 
or insulting. In other words, my intimate acquaintance with my various close relatives 
enables me to explore, in practice, the nature of beneficence, kindness, or generosity. This 
means that our relationships provide us with a uniquely valuable space in which to practice 
being beneficent (for example), but our beneficence need not (indeed it hopefully will not) 
end there. 
It is worth noting that because we like our friends and loved ones, we are quite likely 
to be interested in being good to them. This is why beneficence, kindness, and generosity are 
apt examples of values that are practically explored in relationships. But the exploration of 
other-directed actions and gestures that is facilitated by close personal relationships should 
lead to a deeper understanding of what it is to be a good person and to do good things in 
general. Understanding that a particular action is kind when done for one friend rather than 
another sheds light on the nature of kindness, and so hopefully helps me recognize what 
might count as kindness in novel situations, and with people I know less well. In other 
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words, my close personal relationships provide an extremely valuable arena within which I 
can develop my phronēsis, or practical wisdom. My view, then, is that being good to our loved 
ones provides us with an invaluable opportunity to develop our virtue—to practice, and 
learn about being good in general.145 Nothing but close personal relationships provides us 
with the opportunity to develop and take care of our characters in this way. 
It is not my claim that this is an importance we are ordinarily aware of, or feel 
particularly compelled by. On the contrary, I think we are often more relaxed about the way 
we treat our friends and loved ones, since we know that there is often some leeway and 
room for forgiveness in relation to them that may not be there in relation to others.146 But 
this is why it is in fact so important to aim to do well in relation to our close friends and loved 
ones. It is in this relatively relaxed arena that our habits form. Of course, it is a good thing if 
our friends and loved ones are able and inclined to be forgiving of our mistakes and 
shortcomings; this means that we have a relatively ‘safe’ space in which to practice human 
interaction (and also simply to relax). But the combination of the fact that our friends are 
likely to be inclined to forgive us and the fact that they are the people we love most makes the 
arena of close personal relationships immensely important as an area of our lives to which 
we should pay careful attention. In particular, we should take special care to aim for 
goodness in our close personal relationships. 
 
                                                     
145 I am grateful to Nandi Theunissen for getting me to think about this aspect of personal 
relationships. 
146 On this point, my view is the opposite of Christine Korsgaard’s: she sees friendship as the area 
where we most fully hold people responsible. Korsgaard’s description strikes me as an inaccurate description of 
the experience of friendship in this respect. See Korsgaard, “Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and 
Responsibility in Personal Relations,” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 305-332. 
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First Conclusion: The Basic, Versatile, and Therefore Impersonal Value of 
Relationships 
 
In sum, I have described three broad categories in which close personal relationships 
can help us develop and improve ourselves as valuers. They can help us improve the 
coherence or systematicity of our value systems, which will mean that we have an improved 
understanding of our own values. They can help us incorporate new values into our value 
systems, which can be a way of improving our value systems and therefore our characters, 
and they can help us better manifest our own values in our decisions and actions. Succinctly 
put, relating with others enables deeper self-understanding, development of one’s character, 
and enhanced agency. It is because personal relationships provide this simultaneously safe 
but very significant arena for developing ourselves and exercising our agency that they have 
an impersonal value of a sort that might be compared with pleasure and pain on Nagel’s 
view. 
Like the subjective character of our experience (whether it is pleasant or painful), and 
like basic rights and liberties, it is plausible that the development of our characters is 
something we all have reason to care about, whatever else we may or may not care about. 
This is because having a character that is in good shape, so to speak, is extremely versatile in 
its usefulness and also absolutely necessary for attaining a wide range of further goods. What 
good is the right to make decisions regarding one’s own body, for example, without a 
reasonably good character through which to exercise this right? Why should I care if I have 
the freedom to act on my own decisions unless these decisions are going to be informed by 
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values that I actually hold, values that are somewhat consistent with one another, and that 
are plausibly good values to hold? 
The point here is that bare autonomy, along with a decent arena within which to 
exercise it, seems rather unimportant unless it is connected in a particular way with what an 
individual values. This point is general because it does not matter which particular elements 
are constituents of any particular person’s value system; rather, what matters is that the 
person’s character is in such a condition as to be able to make the right connection between that 
person’s particular value system and their exercising of their autonomy. My claim is that 
close personal relationships are distinctively valuable because they are uniquely suited to 
facilitating our development of this capacity. Having one’s character in good shape in the 
sense I have been describing here is a basic good for human beings, no matter what particular 
preferences, values, or projects they may have. It is in this way that close personal 
relationships bear value that is general or impersonal in a way that someone’s project of 
climbing Mount Kilimanjaro might not be. We may not all have reasons to care about 
whether some person climbs Mount Kilimanjaro, but we do all have reasons to care about 
some person’s close personal relationships insofar as they constitute the basic good of a safe 
and significant space in which to develop one’s character. 
One may wonder, at this point, if I have really shown that relationships are so very 
different from personal projects or options. I’ve claimed that relationships are well suited to 
foster a valuable kind of character development that has many potential applications. But 
surely a personal project of climbing Mount Kilimanjaro does this too—it would certainly 
seem to be able to teach me self-discipline, perseverance, and courage, for example, all of 
which have many other valuable applications. And similar things might be said about many 
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other optional, personal projects and activities. Even engaging with fiction, as I noted above, 
goes some way to developing good character traits. But I think that relationships are to be 
distinguished for they are uniquely suited to a particular role in character development. 
Nothing but close personal relationships can provide the special arena for practicing other-
directed actions and exploring their meaning in relation to our values that I have been 
describing. The special aptness of close relationships to do this is explained by the 
combination of two of their features: the reciprocal context they provide, and the great 
personal value they have for us. The arena provided by such relationships allows us to 
actually practice with real people, and the fact that we care deeply for these people makes us 
care about what we are practicing. Climbing Mount Kilimanjaro can certainly help me 
develop versatile character traits, and engaging with fiction can certainly deepen my 
understanding of my own values and those that others might hold. But as I’ve argued above, 
the context of reciprocity with a loved one raises the stakes significantly.147 
Of course, it would be terribly naïve to claim that relationships always facilitate good 
character development; sometimes, a friendship may have a role in inculcating a bad habit, 
such as spiteful gossip.148 But my claim that the arena for character development is an 
important and basic good for human beings is not necessarily threatened by this. An 
individual’s liberty is not always good for him—i.e., it does not always lead to good results 
for him or for others. But his liberty itself is nevertheless certainly good for him insofar as it 
                                                     
147 The connection between personal projects and activities that plausibly play a role in character 
development with close relationships is interesting. It would seem that challenging projects (climbing Mount 
Kilimanjaro, for example) can be less daunting if faced with a friend, and it would also seem that sharing such 
experiences can strengthen or indeed ground a close relationship. I cannot say too much about this here, but I 
return to the value of shared experiences in Section 2.  
148 I am grateful to Richard Bett for prompting me to address the role relationships can have in the 
corruption of character, as well as its positive development. 
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is a versatile and necessary precondition for many other things that will be good for him and 
for others. I think the value of relationships is similar: though particular relationships may 
have a corrupting influence, the structure of a relationship in general provides us with a 
distinctively valuable arena in which to practice other-directed actions, and to learn about 
them in a practical way. They provide us with an arena in which we can figure out, in 
practice, what our values are and how best to live up to them. That things sometimes go 
wrong, in the sense that some friendships will encourage an agent to develop bad habits she 
otherwise would not have developed, does not detract from the value of relationships as a 
versatile, necessary precondition for practicing the expression of our values.149 
Let me address a final concern before I move on. It may look as if I am making an 
implausibly strong claim to the effect that there is a deeply important good for human beings 
that is unattainable without close relationships. But what about those who find it difficult—
for reasons beyond their control—to form and maintain close relationships? And what 
about those who prefer independence and privacy over the intimacy that often goes with 
close relationships? Am I claiming that these people are missing something without which 
they cannot lead good lives? 
My response to this concern has two parts. The first part is to some extent a bullet-
biting response. But there is an important insight to be gleaned here. That relationships 
constitute such a basic and versatile good for human beings in fact goes some way in 
explaining the pain of loneliness. The longing for a close relationship—or the grief one 
                                                     
149 Below, I argue that the relationship-specific good of reciprocity gives us all reasons to be more 
open-minded, or to try new things. When taken together with that claim, the worry about the corrupting 
influence of particular relationships may be allayed somewhat, since the recommendation would seem to be 




typically feels at the end of one—is an experience with which we can surely all identify. But 
my second point is to note the wide variety of forms that relationships can take. It need not 
be the case that everyone has very close or intimate relationships to escape loneliness. For 
some people, relatively distant kinds of relationships may be preferable to closer ones. 
Participants in those relationships would presumably enjoy the good I have described as 
distinctive of close relationships to a lesser degree than participants in closer relationships, but 
there may be countervailing considerations against very close relationships that make their 
lesser enjoyment of this good most reasonable for them. But to imagine a person without any 
such relationships is to imagine someone who is surely terribly lonely, someone whose life is 
devoid of a very important human good.150 The central role of some relationships in our lives, 
and indeed, in who we are, is universal. In what follows, I suggest that the value of 
relationship-specific goods is significant enough to give rise to reasons even for non-participants 
to take steps toward engaging with it. Doing so can be good for people even if they are not 
able or choose not to engage in actual close relationships. 
If my argument thus far has been successful, this means that existing relationships 
bear impersonal value, and so give rise to reasons for all. According to Nagel’s analysis, 
impersonal values generate “agent-neutral reasons.” Nagel defines an agent-neutral reason as 
a reason whose general form does not include an essential reference to the person whose 
reason it is, while an agent-relative reason does so include it.151 Since they are taken to be 
personally valuable, relationships are generally assumed to give rise to agent-relative reasons. 
                                                     
150 Compare the subjective character of experience (whether it is pleasant or painful) as a basic human 
good. Surely, someone whose every experience is painful rather than pleasant is missing an important human 
good. It is plausible that some amount of pleasantness is necessary for a decent human life. But there are often 
reasons to forgo a pleasant experience (or to suffer a painful one) that are more important to the agent than the 
value of pleasure and the absence of pain. 
151 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 152-153. 
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So since my relationship with my partner has special significance for me, I have reason to 
favor him over other people, and to celebrate our anniversary, where others do not. But if 
the value of relationships is partly impersonal as I have been arguing, then they presumably 
give rise to some agent-neutral reasons as well. This is the claim I take up in the next section. 
 
2. Reasons to Engage with Relationship-Specific Goods 
 
Before I discuss specific agent-neutral reasons that arise out of relationships, a closer 
look at Nagel’s position on the connection between impersonal value and agent-neutral 
reasons may be helpful. In short, Nagel’s view is that personal values, which are tied to a 
particular agent’s perspective, give rise to agent-relative reasons, whereas impersonal values, 
not being tied to a particular perspective, give rise to agent-neutral reasons. No matter what 
your particular perspective, you have reason to care about impersonal values. 
Nagel accepts that some contributors to wellbeing have impersonal value—he 
thinks, for example, that physical pain is plausibly construed as ‘objectively bad,’ meaning 
that no matter whose pain it is, any agent has reason to want it to stop. However, he does not 
think that people’s more individual interests and preferences have general practical 
importance in this way. One of his examples is of having an interest in climbing Mount 
Kilimanjaro: 
Though some human interests (and not only pleasure and pain) give rise to impersonal 
values, I now want to argue that not all of them do. If I have a bad headache, anyone has a 
reason to want it to stop. But if I badly want to climb to the top of Mount Kilimanjaro, not 
everyone has a reason to want me to succeed. I have a reason to try to get to the top, and it 
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may be much stronger than my reason for wanting a headache to go away, but other people 
have very little reason, if any, to care whether I climb the mountain or not.152 
Nagel’s argument for this claim is, roughly, that the value for a person in this kind of 
personal project is dependent on that person’s particular perspective, including her contingent 
preferences. Since the value is generated by facts about the particular person’s interests, it 
lacks general practical importance.153 If Nagel is right about this, then the challenge I face is 
to show that close personal relationships are relevantly dissimilar to personal projects like 
climbing Mount Kilimanjaro. A case must be made that relationships bear (positive) value 
that is more similar to the (negative) value of physical pain. The key is to show that close 
personal relationships have value beyond their value as optional, personal projects; this is the 
claim I have argued for in the previous section. I have been arguing that relationships (unlike 
other, individual personal projects in general) make possible goods that have a wider import, 
or a special status. This result suggests that relationships give rise to agent-neutral reasons as 
well as the more obvious agent-relative reasons. 
What is the content of relationship-generated agent-neutral reasons? I submit that the 
appropriate response is well captured by what Joseph Raz calls reasons of respect.154 While 
relationships don’t seem to be the sorts of things that we all have reason to promote, we do all 
have reason to recognize and acknowledge, in thought and in action, the value of close 
                                                     
152 Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 167. 
153 See Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 167-168. 
154 See Joseph Raz, “Respecting People,” Value, Respect, and Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 124-176. 
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personal relationships. Furthermore, we all have reason not to destroy, but rather to preserve 
and protect relationships that bear this value.155 
But it would seem that if my arguments thus far are successful, they go a bit further 
than this. It seems that they suggest that we in fact all have some reason to engage with the 
value of close personal relationships—to make ourselves available to them. Raz distinguishes 
three “stages” of responding to value: first is the mental recognition of something as 
valuable, second is the preservation of objects of value, and third is engagement with objects 
of value.156 The first two stages describe reasons of respect, while the third describes reasons 
for engagement. So far, I have been arguing that existing relationships give rise to reasons of 
the first two kinds, and that they do so for all agents. But, given the basic and versatile nature 
of the value I’ve argued characterizes close personal relationships, I don’t think Raz’s first 
two stages exhaust the reasons we all have with respect to close personal relationships; I 
think we in fact all have some reason to engage with the value specific to relationships. 
But here we need to be careful to distinguish between the reasons we all have with 
regard to existing close personal relationships in which we are not participants, and the value 
that potential relationships as such make possible, and so make them worth pursuing or 
engaging in for everyone. (It is certainly not the case that Barack and Michelle’s relationship 
gives us all reasons to engage in the value of that particular relationship. Raz’s reasons of 
respect are quite sufficient as ways to respond to that value.) Rather, I argue that 
                                                     
155 These two kinds of reasons are Raz’s reasons of respect. See “Respecting People,” pp. 161-164. 
While agent-neutral reasons are typically taken to be reasons to promote positive values and prevent or 
decrease negative ones, there is no reason why appropriate responses to impersonal value should be limited to 
promoting and preventing. On non-promoting responses to value, see Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and 
Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) and T. M. Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998). 
156 See Raz, “Respecting People,” 161-164. 
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relationship-specific goods give us all reasons to take certain actions and attitudes toward 
ourselves in the interests of making ourselves able participants in relationships, whether we 
already participate in such relationships or not. I argue for two broad classes of reasons that 
arise from relationships, not only for their participants, but for agents in general. These 
reasons would be agent-relative according to Nagel’s characterization in that they will be 
reasons for specific agents to take certain actions and attitudes toward themselves.157 But they are 
interesting in that they apply regardless of whether one is a participant in a particular 
relationship. In what follows, I use the term participant-relative to refer to reasons that apply 
specifically to participants in a relationship because of some facts about that relationship, 
and I use the term participant-neutral to refer to reasons that apply to one whether or not one 
is a participant in some particular relationship, or any relationship for that matter. 
Participant-relative reasons, being a sub-set of agent-relative reasons, will necessarily be 
agent-relative, but agent-relative reasons need not be participant-relative. 
 
2.1. Reasons to Take Care of One’s Capacity for Reciprocity 
 
Close personal relationships, insofar as they are valuable, give their participants 
reasons to take steps to ensure that they are good potential relatives158—that they are in good 
shape, so to speak, to be good participants in reciprocal relationships. Because we are 
                                                     
157 In this respect, they are similar to deontological constraints, as Nagel describes them: 
“[Deontological constraints] are not impersonal claims derived from the interests of others, but personal 
demands governing one’s relations with others. (The View From Nowhere, p. 176.) 
158 I use the term ‘relatives’ here in a rather technical sense here: one’s relatives are the people with 
whom one is in a loving or friendly relationship. I do not intend the ordinary connotation of biological 
relatedness that the term typically calls to mind. 
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valuable to our relatives, our relationships with them give rise to reasons to take good care of 
ourselves—additional reasons beyond those we might already have to take good care of 
ourselves. In the present chapter, I have been arguing that close personal relationships in 
fact provide a deeply, or basically, valuable space in which we can develop these skills of 
character, among others. I now want to argue that this relationship-specific good—that safe 
but significant space in which to develop our characters—in fact gives even non-participants 
reasons to become good potential relatives. The value of reciprocity that characterizes close 
personal relationships entails that part of properly recognizing it is to ensure that one is in 
good shape both to be beneficent and to be appropriately receptive to beneficence, for example. 
This point—that relationships give participants and non-participants alike reasons to take 
care of their characters for the sake of reciprocity—further distinguishes the value of relationships 
from the value of optional personal projects or preferences. 
The reader may be concerned at this point that I am leading myself in to a vicious 
circle. I have argued that relationships are deeply and basically valuable because they facilitate 
character development, but I am now claiming that the possibility of this relationship-
specific good gives us all reasons to develop our characters so that we can engage with the 
value of relationships, and so develop our characters… But I think this worry is misplaced; 
the circle is not vicious. It is more apt to think of this as a cyclical process of development, 
or perhaps a productive feedback loop. The reciprocity that relationships make possible 
gives us reasons to take certain steps to ensure that we can participate well in reciprocal 
relationships. To risk a sentence that is difficult to parse, there is a reciprocal relationship 
between what reciprocal relationships can do for us and what we should do for reciprocal 
relationships. This shouldn’t be too hard to swallow if one compares it to Aristotle’s view of 
virtue development: one practices performing the sort of actions a virtuous person would 
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perform and thereby makes some gains in practical wisdom, which enables the person to 
perform more virtuous actions, which leads to deeper understanding, and so on. The process 
I have in mind is similar to the way Aristotle describes the process of habituation, and the 
similarity is perhaps unsurprising, given that character development is what is at issue. 
Having already devoted a fair amount of attention to one side of this reciprocal 
process (what reciprocal relationships can do for us), I now wish to focus on the other (what 
we should do for reciprocal relationships). What steps do we have reason to take to make 
ourselves able participants in reciprocal relationships? Given the wide and varied range of 
potential relationships and individuals who may participate in them, I cannot hope to give a 
definite and general answer here. The form that the relationship-specific good of an ongoing 
context for reciprocity takes will vary widely, for example. What counts as a good expression 
of generosity in the context of a relationship with one’s regular friendly barista will differ 
substantially from a good expression of generosity in the context of a life-partnership, for 
example. I think I can, however, point to some broad types of skills we should aim for and 
some pitfalls we should strive to avoid in order to take care of our capacities for reciprocity. 
As I noted in the previous chapter, an extremely depressed participant in a 
relationship might be unable to respond appropriately to the value of the relationship, and so 
relationships give their participants some reason to take steps to guard against depression or 
to recover from depression if it occurs.159 One of the reasons why depression can be a 
                                                     
159 Once again, I want to emphasize that it is not my intention to claim that depressed individuals are 
to blame for their depression, or that they are letting their loved ones down. These are difficult and complex 
situations without an easy fix. It is simply my claim that depressed individuals have some reasons to work to 
overcome their depression—reasons that arise specifically from their relationships. They no doubt have other 
reasons to work to overcome their depression in addition to these, and may still be so debilitated by the 
depression so as not to be able to respond to any of them. Claiming that the reasons are there is not necessarily 
to find fault with a person who does not respond to them. 
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hindrance to appropriately responding to relatives is that it renders one unable to practice 
much beneficence. Furthermore, severely depressed individuals are likely not able to be 
appropriately receptive to beneficence. Depression can hinder one from recognizing acts of 
kindness or beneficence as what they are, for example. Here, I think, is the key to seeing 
what the content of the reasons we have to make ourselves able participants in reciprocal 
relationships will often look like.   
In general, it would seem that the relationship-specific good of reciprocity gives us 
all reasons to practice good self-care, including a kind of mental hygiene, so that we will be 
able to practice beneficence and be appropriately receptive to beneficence. What this means 
in practice will vary from person to person and situation to situation, but in general, bearing 
these goals in mind and attempting some steps in their furtherance would seem to be 
recommended by the value of reciprocity. Some likely appropriate responses would be to 
work on one’s listening and communication skills, and to remember that one’s perceptions 
of others’ behavior can be clouded by one’s own emotional vulnerabilities. I could, for 
example, make an effort to identify my own patterns of misperceiving social situations (being 
easily angered before my morning coffee, or feeling affronted after a trying day), and 
remember to take a step back from my emotional reactions in such situations. 
 
2.2. Reasons to Cultivate New Interests 
 
The relationship-specific good of reciprocity gives us all reasons to practice good 
mental hygiene and self-care, to do what we can to ensure that we are able to be beneficent 
and to be receptive to beneficence. But reciprocity is not the only relationship-specific good 
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that gives rise to reasons for us all to take steps toward engaging in relationships. Another is 
the value of shared experiences that relationships facilitate. The sharedness of an experience 
has the capacity to transform the character of the experience. The pleasantness of a shared 
meal, for example, is quite different from the pleasure of the meal itself. Valuable 
relationships give us reasons to open ourselves up to the possibility of a greater range of 
shared experiences by, for example, cultivating an interest in the interests of our loved ones. 
Now, if close personal relationships provide the arena for shared experiences, and shared 
experiences are generally valuable (at least insofar as they are good experiences), then we all 
have some reason to widen the range of potential shared experiences. This would mean that 
relationship-specific goods give us all reasons to cultivate new interests, or broaden the 
horizons of our experience to some extent. So, this is a second case in which a good that is 
made possible by relationships may constitute a reason for non-participants to make 
themselves available and able to be good participants in relationships. 
Cultivating wider interests will tend to make us better potential relatives, which might 
be good for us and good for others in general. There are of course all kinds of reasons for 
cultivating new interests and widening the range of our experiences. These reasons might 
include the general advantages Mill thought could be gained by ‘experiments in living,’ and 
the intrinsic value of, say, learning to appreciate classical music. But it is interesting that 
relationships might provide us with additional, independent, reasons to broaden our 
experiential horizons, regardless of whether the experiences in question have utility or 
intrinsic value. Simply put, the point here is that we have reasons to try new things, and these 
reasons are grounded in the value of relationship-specific goods. We have reason to try new things 
both because it makes us more likely to be able to partake in the relationship-specific good 
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of sharing, and also because it is good for others who might relate with us if we are better 
potential relatives. 
To be clear, my suggestion here is that close personal relationships give agents in 
general reasons to broaden the range of their experiences. My argument is as follows. Close 
personal relationships are valuable in part because they provide the arena for shared 
experiences. Shared experiences are sometimes distinctively and non-reducibly valuable.160 
This means that part of what it is to properly value close personal relationships is to broaden 
one’s own interests. As a participant in a particular relationship, I have participant-relative 
reasons to cultivate particular interests—those that I could share with my actual loved ones. 
But there is a more general reason that applies to me to cultivate wide interests and so 
increase my range of potential shared experiences. Part of what it is to properly value human 
relationships in general is to take some actions to ensure that one is a good potential relative. 
To put it another way, part of properly valuing human relationships is to be well prepared to 
be a participant in relationships. 
I do not mean to suggest that we do or should go about acquiring new hobbies and 
interests with the goal of relationships consciously motivating us. It is not as if I think to 
myself, ‘I think I need an extra friendship in my life, since friendships are so valuable. 
Perhaps I should take up skiing so that I can be a good friend to a skier, with whom I can 
enjoy the shared-skiing-experience.’ The point I intend to make can perhaps be seen more 
clearly if we consider a case of someone who is failing to properly value relationships in this 
particular way. Consider a person who has had the same circle of friends her whole adult life, 
                                                     
160 The “sometimes” qualifier here is meant to exclude experiences that are simply not valuable, 
whether shared or not, and experiences that are more valuable if private. 
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all of whom share her interests. Her relationships with these friends are indeed quite valuable 
to her and her friends, in all of the ways I described in the previous chapter. But she never 
forms new close friendships in part because she and her friends have a very limited range of 
experiences which they all share. It would not seem to be amiss to criticize this person 
somewhat, for failing to appreciate the full value of the good of sharing that is made possible 
by relationships. Admittedly, this would not be a very obvious criticism; we might say that 
she is narrow-minded or parochial. But it does not seem far-fetched to explain the problem with 
this kind of narrow-mindedness as being that it closes one off to potential relationships. In 
contrast, someone who properly appreciates the value of sharing will attempt to be open to 
new experiences, and will sometimes take action to cultivate new interests, in part for the 
sake of being able to relate with others in a meaningful way. She will at least take care not to 
close herself off to potential relationships by limiting her range of experiences. 
My claim here may strike some as implausibly strong. Is it really plausible, they may 
wonder, that the good of sharing experiences really gives me reasons to engage in new close 
personal relationships, rather than merely to respect those of others and value my already 
existing ones? In particular, given our limited time and emotional resources for close 
personal relationships, it would seem most reasonable to spend them on already existing 
relationships.161 In an attempt to allay this worry, let me explain my view more carefully. My 
view is that the relationship-specific good of shared experiences gives us all reasons to take 
some steps toward being a good potential relative (and so some steps toward engaging in the 
value of relationships). But it is important to bear in mind here that there are a multitude of 
                                                     
161 J. David Velleman suggests that it is because of our limited emotional resources that we love only 
some of the people we know. See “Love as a Moral Emotion,” 372. 
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different sorts of human relationships, with just as many variations in closeness between the 
participants. 
Moreover, unlike some of the other goods I have claimed characterize close 
relationships in particular, shared experiences are a good that does not require a very 
significant degree of closeness. There is value even in the shared-ness of the experience of 
seeing a protagonist succeed in a cinema full of strangers. This is perhaps a case not so much 
of a relationship enabling a shared experience (since it would seem strange to say that I have 
a relationship with the group of strangers in the cinema), but rather of what we might call a 
relating. A relating, I suggest, is a transitory connection with other people in response to some 
event. A relationship has an important temporal dimension, and as such will include many 
instances of relating.162 
Here I am moving beyond the realm of close relationships of love and friendship, on 
which I have hereto been primarily focusing, in order to make a more general point about 
relating with our fellow human beings. An insightful observation from Robert Nozick is 
worth taking note of here: 
People seek to engage in sharing beyond the domain of personal friendship also. One 
important reason we read newspapers, I think, is not the importance or intrinsic interest of 
the news; we rarely take action whose direction depends on what we read there, and if 
somehow we were shipwrecked for ten years on an isolated island, when we returned we 
would want a summary of what had happened meanwhile, but we certainly would not 
choose to peruse the back newspapers of the previous ten years. Rather, we read newspapers 
because we want to share information with our fellows, we want to have a range of 
                                                     




information in common with them, a common stock of mental contents. We already share 
with them a geography and a language, and also a common fate in the face of large-scale 
events. That we also desire to share the daily flow of information shows how very intense 
our desire to share is.163 
What Nozick says about reading newspapers here rings true, I think, for a number of human 
experiences, and possibly all the more so with the present ease of sharing of information. 
Even if close personal relationships (or new ones) don’t seem right for us, the value of 
sharing experiences with other human beings remains. And I think that the value of this 
relationship-specific (or relating-specific) good indeed provides us all with reasons to widen 
the scope of our potential shared experiences to some extent. To the extent, then, that 
relating with others through shared experiences is generally and universally valuable to 
human beings, we have reason to broaden our interests so as to make ourselves better 
potential relatives. 
The shared-ness of experiences with a very close friend—someone who seems to 
know all your values—can be especially valuable for some. And shared experiences that 
draw on a rich background of other shared experiences may often be more meaningful than 
isolated, transitory shared experiences. But as I noted above, for some, there may be reasons 
against this degree of closeness which override the reasons there are in favor of engaging in 
this sort of (very close) sharing. Fortunately, this is also a good that can be enjoyed without a 
great degree of closeness, and even to some extent without the context of a relationship, 
which means that doing so might go some way toward mitigating loneliness. To limit the 
range of potential shared experiences to those that might be shared with one’s current 
                                                     
163 Robert Nozick, “Love’s Bond,” 83-84. 
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relatives with their current values would be to stifle or limit a valuable human capacity to 
relate meaningfully with others. 
A final point of clarification is in order here. It is not as if the value of relationships 
gives me, in my capacity as a non-participant, reasons to cultivate or develop any specific 
interests. Whichever interests I choose to cultivate are up to me. Some may be better suited 
to the value of friendship than others, perhaps, but given the broad range of human 
interests, there is a lot of room for choice. All the more so if we could be satisfied with 
rather distant relatings of the news-reading sort. The point is that I have some reason to 
broaden my interests relative to what they are right now; I have reason to try something new 
and somewhat unfamiliar. In this respect, I find the point to be somewhat reminiscent of 
Kant’s positive duties to oneself—we have duties to develop our capacities, but exactly how 
we do so is up to us (within bounds, of course). The particular capacity that I imagine to be 
under development here is the capacity to relate meaningfully with others, particularly in the 




To sum up, I have claimed in this chapter that relationships and the goods specific to 
them give rise to reasons for us all, and we can consider these reasons as falling into three 
                                                     
164 Of course, some experiences may be valuable (in part) in virtue of not being shared; some 
experiences are especially valuable because they are just mine. That this is the case does not, as far as I can tell, 
detract at all from the claim that some experiences are particularly valuable (in part) in virtue of their being 
shared. It may simply mean that we all have some reason to pursue some solitary experiences in addition to 
pursuing some shared ones. I am grateful to Richard Bett for bringing this point to my attention. 
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groups. First, we all have reasons to respect existing close personal relationships as deep and 
basic goods for human beings. This is in virtue of their unique capacity to facilitate character 
development among imperfect persons—a capacity that I have argued bears impersonal 
value. Second, I have argued that the relationship-specific good of reciprocity gives us all 
reasons to take steps to ensure that we are able participants in reciprocal relationships, 
bearing in mind the broad range of forms such relationships can take. I have construed 
responding appropriately to these reasons as a kind of good mental hygiene practice, an 
important form of self-care. Third, I have argued that the good of shared experiences, which 
is most at home in relationships but can also be enjoyed in any instance of relating with 
other human beings, gives us all reasons to broaden our experiential horizons. I have 
claimed that this is likely to make us better potential relatives. The first group of reasons 
would seem to be agent-neutral and participant-neutral, while the second and third may be 
described as agent-relative but participant-neutral. 
Large and pressing questions remain about the relative importance of the reasons 
relationships generate when considered alongside other sorts of practical reasons. In 
particular, there is a worry about how the reasons I describe here may be accommodated 
along with impartial reasons of morality or justice. I have been drawing here on the goods that 
relationships provide for us as individuals and as agents in general. But relationships are also, 
of course, sometimes bad for their participants and for non-participants, and for many of the 
same sorts of reasons (their role in character formation, for example.) Nevertheless, I hope I 
have shown that the value of relationships is indeed deep, basic, and versatile, and as such 
generates reasons of respect and reasons to take steps toward engaging in them, for all of us. 
The challenge of accounting for these reasons in a wider context of practical reasons is the 










RELATIONSHIPS AND THE BIGGER PICTURE: 




Now that I have argued for the value—both personal and impersonal—of 
relationships, and the reasons—participant-relative and participant-neutral—that they give 
rise to, the question arises of the importance of these reasons in the bigger picture of 
practical reason. In particular, we need to think about how relationship-generated reasons 
measure up to impartial reasons—the reasons of morality. I have shown, I hope, that 
relationships do play an important role in our lives, and I have explained why. But just how 
much of a role should they play? If the reasons generated by relationships come into conflict 
with moral reasons, for example, which should take precedence, and why? 
As will become clear below, I believe that there is a real potential for conflict 
between seemingly partial and impartial reasons. As I have been arguing throughout this 
dissertation, the reasons that arise out of the value of relationships are genuine and 
significant. Responding to them is part of what it is to properly value a part of human life 
that is basically and non-reducibly valuable. Nevertheless, I take it that reasons of impartiality 
are extremely important to an adequate view of practical reason, as they represent values of 
justice, fairness, and rights that are indispensable to a plausible account of ethical life. That 
they can come into conflict with some of the reasons I have been arguing for in previous 
chapters requires careful consideration. 
I will suggest in this chapter that there is no apparent resolution to be found for the 
conflict between the two classes of reasons. I will show how extant attempts to resolve the 
conflict fail, before suggesting a diagnosis of the problem, and an explanation of its 
persistence. The conflict is unabating, I suggest, because the features of relationships that 
make them a deep and basic human good are exactly the same features of them that 
sometimes lead to a conflict with impartiality. It seems to me that we cannot give either one 
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of these values up, and so the conflict remains, and will continue to show itself in important 
moments in our lives. While this may seem to be a disappointing result, in that it fails to 
provide a clear solution that can be generally implemented, my diagnosis is an illuminating 
one. It explains why the problem is felt to be persistent (indeed, why it is persistent), and 
does justice to the importance of both partial and impartial concerns. 
That there is no general method of resolution for situations in which the reasons 
conflict is perhaps frustrating, but also, I think, an accurate reflection of the complexity of 
ethical life. And a deeper understanding of the value underlying reasons of partiality and 
reasons of impartiality (the former being the subject of this dissertation) will indeed be useful 
in resolving particular conflicts when they arise. Moreover, though the conflict is persistent, 
it is not ubiquitous, or inevitable in every case involving both partial and impartial reasons. 
Relationship-generated reasons are sometimes much more in sync with moral reasons than 
might be immediately obvious. This point—about the almost moral character of certain 
relationship-generated reasons—is my starting point for the argument of this chapter. 
 
1. The Moral Flavor of Some Relationship-Generated Reasons 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that relationships and the goods specific to them 
give rise to reasons for us all, and we can consider these reasons as falling into three groups. 
First, we all have reasons to respect existing close personal relationships as deep and basic 
goods for human beings. The explanation for this first group of reasons lies in the unique 
capacity of relationships to facilitate character development among imperfect persons. 
Second, I argued that the relationship-specific good of reciprocity gives us all reasons to take 
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steps to ensure that we are able participants in reciprocal relationships. I have construed 
responding appropriately to these reasons as a kind of good mental hygiene practice. Third, I 
argued that the good of shared experiences, which is most at home in relationships but can 
also be enjoyed in any instance of relating with other human beings, gives us all reasons to 
broaden our experiential horizons. I have claimed that this is likely to make us better 
potential relatives. Now, it seems to me that all three of these groups of reasons that we all 
have indeed have a rather moral ‘flavor,’ so to speak. Certainly, none of them seems to be 
deeply at odds with morality, understood as a class of reasons which apply to all for the sake 
of all.165 In fact, they seem to be reasons to be morally good, on most understandings of the 
phrase. 
Consider the reasons we have to respect existing relationships as basic human goods. 
These are reasons that are quite likely to be in harmony with the dictates of a moral system 
that prescribes respecting people’s rights. Indeed, one way to describe these reasons would 
be to say that we should respect people’s rights to pursue and maintain their personal 
projects, including relationships. But this is not a complete description of these reasons on 
my view. Recall that I have argued that relationships are importantly different from other 
personal options, projects, or activities. I have claimed that the reasons we have to respect 
the relationships of others are more significant than the reasons we may have to respect their 
hobbies, recreational activities, personal tastes, and the like.  
This point may be cause for concern. Am I claiming that the weight of reasons is 
always on the side of existing relationships, such that it is never appropriate to end a 
                                                     
165 I am purposely stating this as vaguely as possible, while retaining (I hope) some widely accepted 
content for the term (namely, that it involves a component of impartiality), so as not to have to get in to 
debates about the nature of morality. 
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relationship, or advise another to do so? In addition, respecting others’ relationships will 
often mean refraining from interfering in the relationships of others. But what if the 
relationship in question is an abusive one? Does the abused individual not have claims on us 
that override the reasons we have to respect (and so not interfere in) the relationship? This 
line of thought suggests that the value of relationships, and the claim that we have reasons to 
respect them, are in potentially significant conflict with morality, rather than having a moral 
‘flavor,’ as I am suggesting. However, I think the right way to understand this kind of 
conflict is to see it as a tension between two moral considerations. 
It may be tempting here to respond to the worry by pointing out that if the 
relationship in question is an abusive one, it is not a valuable one of the sort that facilitates 
positive development of character. However, this line of argument is not open to me, since I 
have claimed that we have reasons of respect toward existing relationships because they have 
the potential to provide a uniquely apt set of circumstances for positive character 
development.166 This means that we have reasons to respect all existing close relationships, 
whether or not they realize the valuable capacity I have pointed to. So the worry about the 
abusive relationships remains—this looks like a case in which respecting the relationship 
could indeed be in serious conflict with what morality prescribes. Surely, in such a case, the 
right thing to do is to interfere? 
                                                     
166 Another way to respond here would be to deny that the abusive relationship has the valuable 
potential that other relationships may have. Perhaps, given that it is abusive, it does not avail its participants of 
the opportunities for reciprocal beneficence and character development that I’ve argued characterizes valuable 
relationships. On such a view, there would be no reason (of the specific kind under discussion) to respect this 
relationship. This may be the best description of certain extreme cases, but I do not want to take this line about 
abusive relationships in general. It is an unfortunate fact that abusive and otherwise unhealthy relationships do 




My response to this case may be somewhat disappointing, but I think it is the 
reasonable one: the reasons we have to respect an existing relationship are not absolute; 
neither are our reasons to respect the autonomy of individuals. If one individual is torturing 
another, then we may well have reasons in that case to interfere with the first individual’s 
autonomy. There are times when some consideration calls more strongly for an action that 
fails to respect the rights of some individual, and there are times when some consideration 
calls more strongly for an action that interferes with someone else’s relationship. That this is 
true does not mean that there are not generally reasons to respect individual rights, nor does 
it mean that there are not generally reasons to refrain from interfering in others’ 
relationships. Similarly, there will be cases in which the weight of reasons falls on the side of 
ending a relationship of one’s own. The point to bear in mind is that the reasons to respect 
relationships are not in principle in conflict with the reasons of a moral system. Indeed, given 
that the reasons ultimately refer to something that is a basic and deeply versatile human 
good, they would seem to be likely to be in harmony with moral reasons. 
Similarly, the second class of reasons I have argued for—reasons to take steps to 
make ourselves able participants in close relationships characterized by reciprocity—are 
likely to be in harmony with moral reasons. Taking steps to ensure that we can participate 
well in reciprocal relationships—developing our listening and communication skills, taking 
care of our mental health, taking steps to identify counterproductive habits, etc.—is unlikely 
to be in serious conflict with what morality requires. In fact, it would seem that responding 
appropriately to these reasons would be to take steps to becoming a better person according 
to several standards. Taking these steps would be likely to make one a healthier person as 
well as a happier person, a more likeable person, and indeed a morally better person. In this 
way, relationships might constitute additional reasons to fulfil duties to oneself, assuming (as 
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I think is plausible) that there are such duties. In short, responding appropriately to these 
reasons would be to take steps to develop one’s virtue. While this is not conceptually identical 
with acting in accordance with what morality requires, the two are surely not in deep 
conflict. 
The third class of reasons I argued for in the previous chapter is the class of reasons 
to broaden one’s experiential horizons. In fact, I think that widening the range of potential 
shared experiences that I have developed is another way that relationship-specific goods give 
people reasons to take care of their characters. To see why, notice that broadening my 
interests is a step in the direction of developing my system of values. Given the account of 
character I have offered as an expression of a particular person’s system of values, one way 
to understand broadening my interests is as part of a process of developing, or taking care 
of, my character. And once again, I think that this group of reasons is likely to in fact have a 
rather moral flavor. Taking steps to broaden one’s interests, or range of potential shared 
experiences, is to take steps to become more open-minded. In particular, it is to take steps to 
be better equipped to appreciate things from other perspectives, and so is a matter of 
becoming less prejudiced and perhaps even more empathetic. Of course, certain interests 
may be more conducive to a morally better outlook than others, and some may even be in 
conflict with morality. (Cultivating an interest in torture or stalking would presumably not be 
very conducive to becoming a more empathetic person, for example.) But in principle, taking 





2. The Conflict Between Impartial Morality and Some Relationship-
Generated Reasons 
 
I have been suggesting, so far, that the reasons generated by relationships are of a 
sort that is quite comfortably compatible with what are likely to be the reasons of morality. 
In fact, they would seem to often be importantly complementary to morality insofar as they 
are reasons for positive moral development (as well as positive development by standards 
other than the moral one.) Indeed, I think this is the case for the reasons that relationships 
generate for people generally (and so for the reasons treated in the immediately previous 
chapter—participant-neutral reasons.) But it would be a mistake to overlook the very real 
possibility of conflict between the participant-relative reasons treated in the second chapter and 
impartial reasons. Recall that in the second chapter, two of the classes of agent-relative 
reasons I discussed were (1) reasons to favor loved ones in case of need, and (2) reasons to 
favor loved ones in case of no particular need.167 Now, if moral reasons are by their nature 
reasons of impartiality—a feature that moral reasons will have on most, if not all, 
understandings of the term—and relationships give rise to genuine reasons to favor our loved 
ones, there is a genuine potential for conflict here. 
The worry is perhaps most familiar from Bernard Williams’s charge of “one thought 
too many.” Having described an example from Charles Fried in which a person is so situated 
that he is able to save only one of several people who are drowning, one of whom is his 
wife, Williams draws attention to the apparent inappropriateness of impartial considerations 
                                                     
167 The third and fourth classes of reasons addressed there—to increase the range of potential shared 
experiences and to take care of ourselves—are similar for participants as for non-participants.  As such, I do 
not see them as posing a serious threat of conflict with morality, and will not treat them in detail here. 
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featuring in the imagined man's deliberation. Though it is no doubt possible for various 
moral theories to reach the conclusion that it is permissible for the man in this example to 
save his wife, the point Williams is driving at is that there seems to be something perverse in 
the mere fact that the question of permissibility arises in deliberation at all. He says: 
But this construction provides the agent with one thought too many: it might be hoped by 
some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the 
thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is 
permissible to save one's wife.168 
The scenario Williams considers here illustrates the way partial reasons and impartial 
reasons can conflict in a deep and troubling way. Williams’s suggestion would seem to be 
that bringing an impartial standard to bear on a decision in this kind of case would be to fail 
to properly value one’s wife, or one’s relationship with one’s wife.169 His criticism rings true; 
it requires a response. And it requires a response from me, because two important classes of 
reasons that I have claimed arise for participants in close relationships are reasons to favor 
loved ones (i) in cases of need, and (ii) in cases of no particular need.170 The case described 
by Williams is a good illustration of (i), while gift-giving is a good illustration of (ii). If 
relationships generate reasons to favor our loved ones over others, as I have claimed they 
                                                     
168 Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” 18. 
169 I note here that Williams would presumably consider relationships as similar to other personal 
attachments or “categorical desires.” His larger claim is that morality is self-undermining in that it may require 
one to give up one’s categorical desires, which are necessary if an agent is to care about anything at all, 
including morality. I will not pursue this argument further here. Instead, I take Williams’s criticism to illustrate 
specifically the importance of partial attachments and how they may conflict with impartial reasons, a 
significant problem in itself. 
170 See Chapter 2 above. 
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do, what can we say about cases where these reasons are in serious conflict with 
considerations of impartiality? 
There are several ways of responding to the problem of conflict I’ve been describing. 
In the following three sub-sections, I consider, respectively, three ways of responding, and 
suggest that each fails in its own way. This will lead me back to the problem, and a suggested 
diagnosis of its recalcitrance. While I think the three approaches to resolving the conflict fail, 
seeing why they fail will be instructive. The three approaches can be briefly described as 
follows. One is to provide a defense of non-moral motivations from within a particular 
moral system. This approach sees acting for the sake of one's relationship with one's spouse 
(for example) as an instance of acting on a non-moral motive, but explains that morality 
permits (and perhaps might sometimes even require) acting on non-moral motives in some 
circumstances. The second approach, too, sees a distinction between moral and non-moral 
motives and reasons, but places relationship-based motives (or some of them, anyway) 
within the class of moral motivations. This approach attempts to explain how relationships 
can be sources of distinctively moral reasons. The third approach is to downplay the 
importance of morality.171 This approach sees acting for the sake of one's relationship with 
one's spouse as an instance of a non-moral (and possibly but not necessarily an immoral) 
action, but makes the case for taking certain non-moral motivations to be more important 
than moral motivations in at least some circumstances. In other words, this approach 
maintains the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons, but rejects the claim that 
moral reasons are always overriding. 
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2.1. Non-Moral Motives Within a Moral System 
 
The first way of attempting to resolve the conflict is well exemplified by Peter 
Railton in “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” where he argues, 
on consequentialist grounds, that morality permits acting for non-moral reasons.172 Railton 
describes a “sophisticated consequentialist” who, while having the overall, or perhaps 
higher-order, goal of maximizing good consequences, is immediately motivated by non-
consequentialist concerns. He argues that a good consequentialist agent would often act for 
the sake of his or her commitments, including relationships in particular.173 The idea here is 
that the best consequences are probably to be brought about if people are motivated by 
something other than consequentialism most of the time, and so the solution would seem to 
be to draw a distinction between the motive and the justification of the action. The moral 
action is justified in terms of maximizing the good (or because it issues from a disposition that 
generally does so), but it is motivated by, for example, love.174 The application to the case 
Williams describes, then, would be that the man should act out of love for his wife, and 
should probably do this without thinking about it, because overall, good consequences will 
be best promoted if people have these sorts of dispositions and commitments. The ultimate 
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173 Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” 151. 




justification for the action, though, is impartial morality—on this view, maximization of the 
good. 
Railton’s strategy in particular is a form of indirect consequentialism, but the general 
strategy of separating the motive of an action from its justification, and making room for 
non-moral motives within a moral system, is not limited to consequentialism. Another 
version of this general kind of approach comes from Barbara Herman, a Kantian.175 As the 
consequentialist might distinguish the justification of an action from its motive, Herman 
explicates acting from the motive of duty by distinguishing the object of the action from its 
motive.176 Herman's point in drawing this distinction is to show that, in order to act morally—
that is, in accordance with what duty requires—it need not be the case either that the object 
of one's action is the fulfillment of a duty or that one is never motivated by anything other 
than duty. The role of duty in motivation is as a “limiting condition”—it ensures that 
whatever one does on the basis of non-moral motivations is not forbidden.177 When the man 
in the example Williams describes chooses to save his wife, the object of the action is to save 
his wife—that is the answer to the question of what he is trying to do. The motive of his 
action, on this view, may well be over-determined.178 That is, it may be that the motive of 
duty (speaking loosely, the motive to do the right thing) is present as well as a more personal 
motive (such as one's love for one's spouse). Addressing Williams's example directly, 
Herman has the following to say: “what the Kantian requires is only that he not view his 
                                                     
175 See Barbara Herman, “Integrity and Impartiality,” in The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 23-44.  See also Herman, “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,” 
1-22 and “Agency, Attachment, and Difference,” 184-207 both in The Practice of Moral Judgment. 
176 Herman, “Integrity and Impartiality,” 26. 
177 Herman, “Integrity and Impartiality,” 31. 
178 See Herman, “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty,” 21 
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desire to save his wife as an unconditionally valid reason. This does not stand in the way of the 
direct expression of attachments in action.”179 The upshot of Herman's response to the 
example, I take it, is that the thought about the permissibility of saving his wife need not be in 
the man's mind at the time of action; it presumably functions as a limiting condition in the 
background.180 
Both Railton's and Herman's proposed solutions to Williams's apparent problem are, 
I think, interesting and promising in their own ways. They both pay serious attention to the 
complexity of motivation and justification in ethical life, and in so doing make significant 
strides in the direction of rendering their respective moral theories recognizable as 
something that could actually play an important role in most people's lives. Instead of being 
some kind of impossible, almost saintly, ideal, the good moral agent is rendered more 
recognizably human by these sorts of account. In Railton's sophisticated consequentialist, we 
can see human nature expressed in admirable ways through character traits and dispositions 
that it is fairly natural for us to develop, given the kind of creature we are and the sort of 
world in which we live. In Herman's agent, we recognize the complex ways in which a 
variety of considerations populate the ‘deliberative field,’ where it is not always possible to 
isolate the influence of the motive of duty from motives of attachment, for example. 
Though they come from different theoretical backgrounds (consequentialism and 
Kantianism respectively), Railton and Herman exhibit some similarity in their approaches. 
One similarity is that they both assume that in acting out of love for his wife, Williams’s man 
                                                     
179 Herman, “Integrity and Impartiality,” 42. 
180 See Herman, “Integrity and Impartiality,” footnote 25 on p. 42: “We do not want to forget that a 
normal moral agent knows things: he does not have to figure out whether it is permissible to save his wife. He 
knows it is, and that partly explains why he can act spontaneously, from feeling, and yet according to principle.” 
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is acting for a non-moral reason. For Railton, to act for a moral reason would be to act for 
the sake of maximizing the good. For Herman, it would be to act as duty requires in 
providing morally called-for help.181 Furthermore, for Herman at least (and perhaps for 
Railton as well, though in his case, the two reasons would presumably not both be operative 
at the same level), the man could have been acting on the basis of a moral reason and on the 
basis of love for his wife. As I understand them, it need not be the case, for these theories to 
be true, that the agent is always aware of whether his reason for acting is moral or non-
moral, and it is certainly possible for both sorts of reasons to be present simultaneously. This 
approach, then, allows for interpersonal relationships to play an important role in people's 
lives, and can construe this role as permissible, and even praiseworthy, but it still sees 
reasons that arise out of these relationships as being reasons that, in virtue of the fact that 
they arise out of relationships, lie outside of the domain of morality. This leads me to the 
second similarity in Railton’s and Herman’s approaches. 
For both Railton and Herman, moral considerations, as opposed to non-moral 
reasons (of, for example, love or attachment) are ultimately decisive.182 We see this in 
Railton’s “counterfactual conditional,” which he says should be satisfied by a good 
sophisticated consequentialist.183 A sophisticated consequentialist, upon recognizing a 
serious, deep conflict between a particular commitment and promoting the overall good, 
would give that commitment up. Similarly, Herman’s ideal moral agent must be guided (even 
                                                     
181 See Herman's “dutiful case” in “Integrity and Impartiality,” 26. 
182 Susan Wolf groups these approaches together in what she calls the “Standard View,” because they 
share an “unconditional commitment” to morality. (See Susan Wolf, “‘One Thought Too Many’: Love, 
Morality, and the Ordering of Commitment,” in U. Heuer and G. Lang (eds) Luck, Value and Commitment: 
Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 71-92.) More on Wolf’s 
response below. 
183 Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” 151. 
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if only in the background of her motivations) by morality.184 Morality, recall, should act as a 
‘limiting condition,’ ensuring that none of the agent’s other motivations are ruled out. In 
both accounts, then, if a serious conflict were to arise, impartial morality would have the 
final say. 
Though these accounts go some way towards allaying worries about the conflict 
between morality and acting for the sake of relationships by showing the demands of 
morality to be less austere than they may at first seem, they do not ultimately answer the 
challenge that Williams raises. In effect, they simply push the challenge back a step. These 
accounts allow the agent to act to save his wife without thinking about whether or not it is 
permissible in the moment, but they still demand a justification of the action if it is indeed to 
be acceptable. Morality is assumed to have overriding force. This means that no matter what 
else may be the case, there is always most reason to do what morality requires. It may well be 
that, as Railton suggests, morality requires that we develop dispositions to act for non-
consequentialist reasons, and that this may require that Williams's man saves his wife simply 
because she is his wife. So far so good. But Williams’s concern goes deeper than that. His 
“one thought too many” charge has as its target the assumed appropriateness of bringing an 
impartial, rational, moral point of view to bear on matters of this kind at all—not only at the 
time of action. 
Similarly, in Herman’s case, the moral agent need not be acting for the sake of 
morality, or from a strictly impartial point of view at the time of action. Morality need not 
constitute, in the agent, an entirely separate motivation that competes with (and hopefully 
defeats) other motivations. Rather, various considerations may be relevant, and may be 
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modified by one another in complex ways, so that motives of love and attachment (for 
example) are present and operative. However, and this is the important point, Herman's 
moral agent's interests and motives must be normalized to morality—the end of treating 
other people as ends must have what she calls “regulative priority.”185 She describes the way 
morality functions as a regulative principle in her response to Williams’s concern as follows: 
[I]n acting from a motive of connection I must also recognize that I am in circumstances in 
which action is morally required, be willing and able to act even if connection wavers, and 
act only on the condition that the particular action I am moved to take is permissible.186 
 What this means is that, though what there is most reason to do for Herman will often no 
doubt involve relationships and motives of attachment, what there is most reason to do will 
always be such that it is justifiable by distinctively moral reasons. So, while Williams's man 
can save his wife without asking himself in that moment whether his maxim satisfies the 
Categorical Imperative test, his saving his wife must be susceptible of an impartial 
justification if it is to be acceptable. And as I noted above, Williams's challenge goes deeper 
than simply what is in the mind of the agent at the time of action. 
The problem is that insofar as morality constitutes a set of reasons that are of a 
distinctive kind, impartial and overriding, there is in principle the possibility of a deep and 
troubling conflict between morality and certain relationships. In essence, what Williams is 
suggesting is that sometimes, what there is most reason to do can be in conflict with morality, 
                                                     
185 See Herman, “Agency, Attachment, and Difference,” 188. For Herman’s explanation of how non-
moral motives would be normalized to morality in the “deliberative field,” see “Agency, Attachment, and 
Difference 193-200. 
186 Herman, “Agency, Attachment, and Difference,” 186. Immediately after the quoted sentence, 
Herman acknowledges the limitations of this sort of response: it may not satisfy objectors who would imbue 
motives of connection (or attachment) with moral value. The persisting worry that I am addressing is not that 
such a view denies attachment moral value, but rather that moral value may not be supremely regulative. 
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and his use of this particular example shows that he thinks relationships can be sources of 
such reasons.187 It may be that a response like Railton’s or Herman’s would be satisfactory 
for cases of conflict between morality and personal commitments and projects in general.188 
If continuing to produce my art comes into conflict with what morality requires of me, 
allowing morality the final say seems reasonable. But given the account of the value of 
relationships I have been building, this potential conflict between reasons of love and 
reasons of morality is more troubling, and allowing morality to always settle the matter is not 
a satisfactory response. If relationships are as deeply and basically valuable as I have been 
arguing, the reasons they give rise to are more significant than the reasons generated by 
many other personal interests and projects.  
This means that more needs to be said about these particular reasons of partiality 
and reasons of impartiality; the general solution of accommodating non-moral commitments 
in a morally decent life fails to address the particular puzzle about close relationships and 
reasons of impartiality. Relationships, as bearers of distinctive and basic value for human 
beings, pose their own, deeper challenge for the impartial perspective of morality. So, it 
seems that this approach does not provide the resolution we might have hoped for. 
                                                     
187 In the article being considered, Williams suggests that certain ground projects and categorical desires may 
be necessary to ground an agent’s interest in anything at all, including morality and life itself. But such ground 
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after the example and the remark about ‘one thought too many,’ Williams says that relationships are at risk of 
conflicting with impartiality. He then continues: 
“They run that risk if they exist at all; yet unless such things exist, there will not be enough substance 
or conviction in a man’s life to compel his allegiance to life itself. Life has to have substance if anything is to 
have sense, including adherence to the impartial system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme 
importance to the impartial system, and that system’s hold on it will be, at the limit, insecure.” (Williams, 
“Persons, Character, and Morality,” 18.) 
188 I mention this because Williams seems to see relationships as on a par with other personal 
commitments and projects—they might all constitute what he calls ‘categorical desires.’ I am suggesting that 
what works for commitments and projects generally may not work for relationships, because the value of 




2.2. Relationships as Bearers of Moral Value 
 
Whereas the approach just considered seems to merely push the conflict back a step, 
perhaps a more fruitful solution can be found in attempts to bring loving relationships 
wholly within the realm of the moral. I suggested above that some relationship-generated 
reasons have a distinctively moral ‘flavor.’ Some have gone further, to construe love or 
loving relationships as themselves moral phenomena. In this section, I consider two such 
accounts. The first is J. David Velleman’s account, already partially addressed in an earlier 
chapter. The second is an African ethical approach that I will refer to as Ubuntu.189 
 
2.2.1. Velleman’s Account of Love 
 
Velleman addresses the apparent tension between love and impartial morality by 
providing an account of love on which love is both selective (partial) and consistent with the 
impartiality requirement of morality.190 Though Velleman, like Herman, identifies his view as 
Kantian, there are some important differences between the two. Whereas Herman's response 
to Williams takes it that there is a difference between acting out of love and having a 
distinctively moral motive, Velleman is instead concerned to bring love within the domain of 
                                                     
189 Ubuntu is the Nguni word used in South Africa for the worldview and ideal that is influential in the 
approach I consider, but the view I am exploring should be taken to be one that is largely common to many 
African cultures. More on this later. 
190 Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” 338-374. 
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morality. As Velleman says, “love is a moral emotion. So if we find ourselves segregating 
love and morality in order to keep the peace, then we have already made a mistake.”191 He 
goes on to argue that the proper analysis of love will construe it as something that has more 
in common with the attitude of respect than with the Freudian reduction of love to a 
drive—a view of love which Velleman thinks has been very influential for many 
philosophers who have written on the subject.192 In essence, Velleman characterizes love for 
a person as a rational response to the very same feature of a person that respect for persons 
is responsive to.193 Love is selective (partial) because we can only get to know some persons 
well enough to feel that we are justified in giving up our emotional defenses against them, 
but it does not pose a problem for impartial morality because the basis of love is a feature 
that all persons share.194 
In an earlier chapter, I argued that Velleman’s analysis of love was not entirely 
accurate. If my arguments there were successful, and Velleman’s account does not accurately 
capture the phenomenon of love, then he has not successfully shown that the love we care 
about has a home within morality. But there is a separate problem with Velleman’s 
attempted resolution that does not depend on my account of the nature of love being 
correct. This problem is that Velleman’s own account of love in fact leaves relationships 
wholly unaccounted for. Love is construed as essentially a one-directional attitude that one 
has toward another person. Velleman himself seems to be aware of this limitation; in relation 
to Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ case he says: 
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Of course the man in Williams's story should save his wife in preference to strangers. But 
the reasons why he should save her have nothing essentially to do with love. 
The grounds for preference in this case include, to begin with, the mutual dependencies and 
commitments of a loving relationship… That is, she should invoke their partnership or 
shared history rather than the value placed on her by his love. Invoking her individual value 
in the eyes of his love would merely remind him that she was no more worthy of survival 
than the other potential victims, each of whom can ask “What about me?”195 
The important thing to note about this passage is that whatever the justification is for the 
man's saving his wife, it is something distinct from the kind of love that Velleman has been 
explicating in the rest of the paper. So, it is not clear that Velleman has given us an account 
of love as a moral emotion that can help with the type of problem we had hoped it might. 
He has shown that it is permissible, even morally valuable, to have this feeling or attitude 
towards another person, but not that that feeling or attitude can constitute a legitimate 
reason for action of the relevant preferential kind. 
It may be responded at this point that the problem I have just raised is not all that 
serious, because in the passage just quoted, Velleman has told us what the legitimate reason 
for acting in this case is—it is the commitment the couple have made to one another. The 
ultimate justification, this line of thought goes, has something very much in common with 
the reasons that arise out of promises. But if this is the case, we might well wonder what it is 
that Velleman's account of love is doing in relation to the problem. Perhaps love, as 
Velleman construes it, forms the basis of the commitment between the couple—perhaps it is 
the fact that they love each other in the sense Velleman has laid out that led to their 
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commitment in the first place. Perhaps it is, but the important point is that it need not be—the 
basis of the commitment could be something else entirely. Again, the relationship 
(commitment) and love (a one-directional attitude or emotion) are distinct considerations. 
This, it seems to me, leaves something important out. Surely it is a relevant feature of 
the situation that Williams describes that the man loves his wife (and presumably that she 
loves him back), even if the commitment on its own is sufficient to justify his saving her. 
The point is perhaps seen more clearly if we change the example slightly so that it is not the 
man's wife that he saves, but a close friend to whom he has made no explicit commitment or 
promise. Surely it would be enough of a justification of the man's saving his friend if he were 
to say, “she is my dear friend.” In fact, Velleman’s account of love cannot be used to resolve 
the conflict Williams’s case calls to mind, because it intentionally separates ‘love’ from its 
associated inclinations and emotions, such as attachment and affection.196 The kind of love 
that Velleman describes seems too detached from precisely those aspects of love that make a 
case like Williams’s troubling: we are strongly attached to our loved ones, we are partial to 
them, and we have a strong inclination to favor them. And these emotions and inclinations 
are likely to strike us as reasonable. Indeed, failing to favor our loved ones in these ways 
would seem to be an indication that we are failing to respond appropriately to the fact of our 
love for them. 
So, Velleman’s account does not seem to be able to give us a satisfying solution to 
the conflict, because it gives up too much of what seems most familiar and important about 
love. Before abandoning this general type of approach, however, it’s worth examining an 
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148 
 
African approach, according to which human relationships are absolutely central to ethics. 
Whereas Velleman construes love as a moral emotion, we might think of Ubuntu as 
construing love as the moral emotion. Because the approach is less well-known, and is 
relatively under-explored in academia, I will give a relatively detailed exposition and 
discussion of the approach before assessing it as a potential solution to the problem of 
conflict. 
 
2.2.2. An African Ethical Approach 
 
The idea that humanity consists in a valuable sort of relatedness is arguably at the 
root of much of what is distinctive about sub-Saharan African philosophy. It shows itself in 
the metaphysics, epistemology, and, of course, in the ethics of the continent. In South 
Africa, the idea is signified by the Nguni word, Ubuntu, but a similar idea is apparent in much 
of the philosophical literature originating in Africa. While I will often refer to the ethical 
approach under consideration as Ubuntu, the view should be taken as one that will be largely 
common to many African cultures.197 Ubuntu as a normative account would have it that good 
actions and practices will be those that are expressive of the human capacity for communal 
relationships. Since relationships are so central to ethical thought on this view, we might 
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expect that African ethics can secure a central role for love. So, African ethics may have the 
resources for a more satisfying solution to the apparent conflict between love and morality. 
In contrast to familiar western ethical approaches, an African ethical approach will 
construe human relations to be of primary ethical importance. There is a widespread 
commitment, among various sub-Saharan African cultures, to the value of community. As 
already noted, one version of the view is signified by the Nguni word Ubuntu. Ubuntu has no 
straightforward translation in English, but it signifies a concept of the essence of humanity 
being in relationships. The idea of Ubuntu is conveyed by the oft-quoted ‘a person is a 
person through other persons’ or ‘I am because we are.’ There is a growing body of 
philosophical literature interpreting, and applying, this idea as a normative ethical theory 
which might compete with established consequentialist or deontological theories. According 
to this kind of theory, the right way to act would be modeled on a certain kind of 
relationship. While there are many different interpretations of Ubuntu and related ethical 
views, they largely share the central tenet that the value of human relationships is essential to 
ethics, and indeed, to the concept of humanity itself. Here are some examples of the way this 
kind of view has been described by various philosophers: 
For Black Africa, it is not the Cartesian cogito ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am”) but an 
existential cognatus sum, ergo sumus (“I am known, therefore we are”) that is decisive.198 
Unlike Hobbesian subjects, who stand in isolation to define themselves as solitary, 
unattached thinkers, the human being in African thought defines the self with respect to the 
quality of his or her participation in a community of similarly constituted selves. Therefore, 
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personhood is defined in relation to the community. … A sense of community exists if 
people are mutually responsive to one another’s needs.199 
Ubuntu is the name for the acquired quality of humanity that is the characteristic of a fully 
developed person and the community with others that results. It thus comprises values, 
attitudes, feelings, relationships and activities, the full range of expressions of the human 
spirit.200 
African ethics imply that morality is possible only through interaction with others. A person 
who is utterly alone might be more or less happy but not more or less dutiful. Morality, from 
a resolutely African perspective, arises only from relationships.201 
[According to an African ethical theory] an action is wrong insofar as it fails to honor 
relationships in which people share a way of life and care for one another’s quality of life, 
and especially to the extent that it esteems division and ill will.202 
What all of these characterizations of an African approach to ethics have in common is their 
emphasis of community, and the value of relationships between human beings. The core of an 
African ethical theory, then, will be the idea that basic moral value is borne by relationships of 
a certain kind, namely, harmonious, communal, or loving relationships. 
Rooted as it is in the value of relations between individuals, perhaps Ubuntu would 
capture the importance of attachments like the one Williams calls to mind, and would do so 
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by bringing it squarely within the realm of moral reasons. Thaddeus Metz has done 
significant work in constructing an explicit, principled moral theory out of the beliefs that 
constitute the core of a distinctively African ethical theory, and so it will be useful to 
consider his formulation in particular. The justification from a view like his would be 
something like the following: Morality requires that we act in such a way as to honor loving 
or friendly relationships.203 It goes without saying that it would dishonor our man’s loving 
relationship with his wife if he were to toss a coin in order to decide which person to save. 
From this perspective, there is only one thing for the man to do: save his wife without a 
thought, since that is the best way to honor loving relationships. If he stops to deliberate 
about what to do, perhaps he is morally immature, or has some work to do in cultivating 
good moral dispositions. But the entire explanation, unlike in the western approaches 
discussed, lies in the realm of moral reasons. So perhaps an African moral theory like Ubuntu 
can gracefully avoid Williams’s charge by assigning basic moral value to loving relationships. 
However, it is not clear that Ubuntu, so understood, can do justice to the importance 
of impartial considerations, and one may wonder if it can still be called a moral theory 
without them. Consider, for example, the role of impartiality in contexts of justice—an 
important area of life that a moral system should be able to inform. Justice would seem to 
require some kind of impartiality, and we may wonder whether an African ethical theory can 
make any sense of impartiality, rooted as it is in relationships. If giving up individual rights to 
equality before the law, for example, is the cost of adopting an ethical theory that assigns 
                                                     
203 See Metz, “Toward an African Moral Theory,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 15:3 (2007), 338: 
“An action is right just insofar as it promotes shared identity among people grounded on good will; an act is 
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basic moral value to relationships, that is a serious cost indeed. A person without 
attachments might not be protected by such a moral system, and his interests would not be 
given much priority in moral deliberation. A related worry is that such a theory would have 
nothing to say in condemnation of corrupt government officials favoring their family 
members and political party members—a very serious problem in many African 
governments.204 
There is indeed an interpretation of Ubuntu which leads to this unwelcome 
conclusion, but as I will show, there is a better interpretation of the theory that does not. 
Properly understood, an African moral theory like Ubuntu would in fact protect innocent 
outsiders, and would in fact condemn the sort of corruption I’ve just described. It can do 
this because on this interpretation, it in fact turns out to be an impartialist theory. The key is 
to reconsider the notion of relationship on which moral conduct should be modeled. Recall 
that Metz characterizes the basically valuable relationship as a friendly or loving one, one 
that consists in solidarity and goodwill. Let’s have a closer look at his evidence for this 
understanding. Here it is worth quoting Metz at length: 
To construe morality as the proper valuing of friendly relationships aptly reflects how many 
people south of the Sahara think and behave. For example, sub-Saharan Africans often think 
society should be akin to family. They tend to believe in the importance of greeting 
strangers. They typically refer to people beyond the nuclear family with titles such as sister 
and mama. They frequently believe that ritual and tradition have moral significance. They 
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tend to think there is some obligation to wed and procreate. They usually do not believe that 
retribution is a proper aim of criminal justice, inclining toward reconciliation. They 
commonly think there is a strong duty for the rich to aid the poor. And, finally, they often 
value consensus in decision making, seeking unanimous agreement and not resting content 
with majority rule.205 
Now, Metz at various points in his considerable number of papers on the topic, 
refers to the kind of relationship that captures these values as loving, friendly, communal, 
and as resembling that of an extended family. He is also not alone in these characterizations; 
they are frequent in the African ethical literature, as is shown by the quotes I provided 
above. It is my contention that running these descriptions together is problematic, and 
obscures the nature of the value at the basis of African ethical theories like Ubuntu.206 In 
particular, I want to suggest that describing the relationship that serves as the model for 
relationships exhibiting Ubuntu as ‘friendly’ and ‘loving’ is potentially misleading, particularly 
to readers with a western background. More specifically, the relationships that exhibit Ubuntu 
would seem not to be the sort of close personal relationships that are at issue in cases like 
the one Williams describes. Here I draw on some excellent analysis of African ethics by 
Bénézet Bujo in his book Foundations of an African Ethic. 
Bujo argues that African ethics “unlike Western models of thought, sees relatedness 
as the decisive issue; it is, however, impossible to categorize this as biological, since 
relatedness signifies merely an openness that goes beyond what is present and what is visible in a 
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statement of the value that is at the basis of a theory like Ubuntu is needed. 
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given situation.”207 He emphasizes the idea that in African thought, “one becomes a human 
being only in a fellowship of life with others.”208 Importantly, however, Bujo points out that 
the relatedness that is the basis of humanity and of human value is not only not restricted to 
a biological, or familial, relation, it is also not restricted to the boundaries of a community or 
particular social group: “One who is not a member of my own group is ultimately also the 
“property of the other,” just as I myself am, and this means that I owe him respect and 
esteem. Thus one is ultimately related to all human beings.”209 The phrase “the other” here 
can be understood to refer to God. This is something of a simplification of the metaphysical 
view that Bujo presents, but I think it is a harmless simplification for the purpose of my 
argument. The important point is that all human beings are ultimately related through a 
divine being. 
Bujo supplies some examples that clarify the distinctiveness of this kind of view very 
well. He considers some aspects of sexuality that have historically been taboo in African 
cultures, and contrasts their rationales with their western counterparts: The first is 
homosexuality. Without himself condemning same-sex relationships, Bujo notes that they 
are notably infrequent (or at least do not enjoy public recognition) and are generally 
denounced in African traditional societies. Where a similar taboo has existed in the west, the 
rationale has usually been via the concept of ‘natural law.’ In contrast, the African rationale is 
as follows: 
One is a human being only in the duality of man and woman, and this bipolarity generates 
the triad man-woman-child, which leads to full community. Against this background, a man-
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man or woman-woman relationship would not only be looked on as an egotistic isolationism 
which dares not take the step to full human existence; it also leads to a sexist discrimination 
against part of the human race and shows an unwillingness to accept the enrichment that 
comes from heterogeneity.210 
The second example is the taboo against incest. Once again, the standard western rationale 
for this taboo (before scientific evidence) has been in the natural law tradition. In contrast, 
here is Bujo’s characterization of the African rationale: 
Something similar must be said about the question of incest. The prohibition of incest has 
deep roots in the concept of community and is thus not to be legitimated (as in the West) on 
the grounds that incest is contrary to nature. … The gravity of [the incestuous person’s] 
action consists in the fact that both partners are unwilling to approach others outside their 
own familial or ethnic group in order to exchange or share their blood with them.211 
One final example is important to mention. As we saw in a quote from Metz earlier, there is 
a widespread conviction in sub-Saharan Africa that there is some duty to get married and 
produce offspring. Once again, Bujo’s explanation is illuminating: 
Africans urge against lifelong celibacy along precisely these lines: one who remains 
unmarried for life withdraws from solidarity with other human persons, offending against 
the law of life. He is like a magician who ruthlessly destroys life, since a celibate is unwilling 
to take a share in the growth of life on the biological level and refuses to take his place in the 
duality of man and woman, which alone constitutes full humanity.212 
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The point of these examples is not to justify the convictions they explain—as Bujo 
notes, there is work to be done in questioning whether the foundational values have been 
correctly interpreted in these cases and others. Rather, the point is simply to highlight the 
distinctive kinds of arguments that would be offered from an African ethical perspective: 
these explanations all have to do with a notion of relatedness that is best understood as 
open, inclusive, and very broad. 
It should not be difficult to see how this sort of understanding of relatedness can 
underscore just practices and institutions, how it can protect outsiders and condemn 
corruption in government. Unjust practices and institutions will have the effect of closing 
individuals off to relating as widely and inclusively as possible with others. For individuals to 
receive unequal treatment before the law would be antithetical to the ideal of openness that 
Bujo describes. Corrupt government officials, similarly, in favoring those nearest to them 
would be closing themselves off to wider relations of solidarity. 
One may wonder whether this shows that the African approach under discussion 
actually grounds just institutions, or merely institutions that have many of the same 
outcomes as just institutions.213 To some extent, this may depend on an analysis of justice. 
Justice certainly involves some kind of impartiality, and so if the African approach doesn’t 
include impartiality, it presumably doesn’t ground just institutions. In fact, however, I think 
that the notion of relatedness that Bujo describes is precisely a form of impartiality. The 
difference between it and the impartiality we find in dominant western theories is that the 
African view does not begin with individuals. Rather, the starting point is the broadest level 
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of relatedness—the human community.214 Furthermore, an individualistic starting point does 
not seem to be essential to justice, as long as rights for individuals are somehow secured. So, 
it seems we do have here a kind of impartiality that can ground just practices and 
institutions, which is rooted in the concept of valuable relatedness, rather than in the 
concept of valuable individuals. 
But let us return to the idea with which we began: strong partial attachments of the 
kind we typically have to romantic partners and close friends. It looks like we can have an 
African moral theory that gives us what we want in terms of impartiality, but can it still give 
Williams what he wants in terms of partiality? As it turns out, I don’t think it can. This is 
because the kind of relationship that is basically valuable in this kind of theory is very 
different from the kind of relationship Williams’s charge calls to mind. The attachments we 
have to our partners and friends have certain distinctive features that attachments to family, 
for example, may not have. These relationships are in a sense exclusive, selective, or 
discriminatory. The sort of attachment to which Williams alludes is one that is deeply rooted in 
individualism. These relationships are typically chosen, or entered into voluntarily by 
individuals, in part on the basis of features of other individuals that are seen as distinctive, 
and special. It is crucial to relationships of this kind that we favor our loved ones over others; 
this is precisely why Williams thinks even considering the reasons one might have to save the 
stranger would be ‘one thought too many.’ The idea is that to bring considerations of 
impartiality to bear on cases like this betrays an inappropriate attitude to close relationships; 
it is to fail to value close relationships as one should. The point is that the value of these 
relationships lies wholly outside whatever reasons make up an impartial system. Insofar as an 
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African moral theory can satisfy the impartiality requirement, it seems it might face the same 
problem as its western counterparts regarding close partial attachments of the sort Williams 
has in mind. The sort of relationship that lies at the foundation of an African moral theory is 
not selective in the way modern western friendships and love relationships are. 
It is not my claim that these sorts of relationships do not exist in non-western 
societies; rather, my point is that this sort of relationship is very far from being the ideal that 
does foundational work in African ethics. To see that this is the case, consider some remarks 
from Bujo on the ideals of marriage and sexuality in African ethical life: 
While Western marriage is primarily something brought about by a contract between two 
persons, African marriage is understood as a covenant between two families, each embracing 
a community of several generations.215 
The African understanding of marriage questions the Western understanding, where 
marriage [is] lived individualistically and considered as nothing more than a private contract 
between two persons, without consideration for the community….216 
African communities are interested in the sexual lives of all their members, since sexuality is 
not a private matter. The goal of sexuality is to keep together the community entrusted to us 
by our ancestors and to bestow ever new life on this community.217 
We can see here that even marriage and sexuality are understood in a much more open, 
broadly inclusive, and almost public way in African ethics than in the western liberal 
tradition. Recall again the rationale for the taboo on same-sex relationships and incest 
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articulated by Bujo: in both cases, the primary reason against these expressions of sexuality 
are that they supposedly represent a withdrawing from community—closing oneself and 
one’s partner off from wider relatedness. Now notice that it is precisely these features of 
close personal relationships prized in western societies that characterize romantic 
relationships and close friendships. Robert Nozick, for example, describes a romantic 
relationship as two individual spheres partially overlapping one another—a clear image of 
two people partially open to one another but quite separate from the rest of the world.218 
Such a relationship would not be very highly esteemed from an African ethical perspective. 
It would seem that the African view I’ve been describing would reverse the order of 
accounts of normativity that begin with the individual and move outwards, such as the 
cosmopolitanism of the Stoics, and C.D. Broad’s “self-referential altruism.” According to 
this sort of view, one has special obligations to various others depending on their relation to 
oneself, with the closer circles being the most important. In contrast, the view suggested by 
Bujo’s analysis is one where normativity comes from social relatedness, but the broadest 
circle of relatedness is the ethically primary one.219 A further difference between the African 
account and that of the Stoics, for example, is in the latter’s emphasis on reason as a basis 
for world citizenship. The view Bujo suggests is seemingly less interested in universal reason 
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than with a shared, or common, good for community members.220 In other words, according 
to a distinctively African view, the human community, and the common good for its 
members, is more important than one’s immediate community, such as one’s village, family, 
or culture. 
So, where does this leave us? I have argued that the kind of relationship at the 
foundation of these theories is a very broad and open one—it is a communal relationship 
potentially between all human beings. It is inclusive and non-discriminatory. One implication 
is that, like western impartialist theories, African ethical theories are likely to protect 
innocent outsiders and condemn corruption, though for quite different reasons. Another 
implication is that, like western impartialist theories, African ethical theories are liable to be 
in conflict with close partial attachments of the sort that we prize in our personal lives in the 
west (at least). Again, though, the explanations will be different in the two cases. 
So we have seen that two strategies for dealing with the conflict between partial and 
impartial reasons do not work. Justifying non-moral motives within a moral system would 
not sufficiently account for the importance of relationships in our lives, and construing 
partial reasons as themselves moral reasons only works if we give up much of what we care 
about in close personal relationships. There remains the less conciliatory strategy of 
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2.3. Downplaying the Importance of Morality 
 
Susan Wolf suggests an interpretation of Williams's point according to which the 
“one thought too many” is a problem with a considerably wider scope than it is often taken 
to be. She describes various responses to the point (including Railton's and Herman's) as 
variations of the “Standard View,” according to which the apparent problem that Williams is 
pointing out has merely to do with the thoughts that might be present in the man's mind at 
the time of deliberation and action.221 Proponents of the Standard View then deal with the 
problem by explaining that an agent need not be thinking about morality at the time of 
action in order to be acting morally. Wolf disagrees with this interpretation; according to her 
(and, she thinks, Williams), the thought about moral permissibility might be one too many 
not only when it occurs at the time of action, but also if it occurs to an agent counterfactually in 
certain situations.222 
Specifically, Wolf claims that she is troubled by the idea of a man who might ask 
himself hypothetically or counterfactually what he should do in such a case as a way of 
preparing himself to do the (morally) right thing if such a situation or one like it should 
occur.223 This imagined man is troubling to Wolf because he seems to be too committed to 
doing the right thing—she describes his attitude as seeming to her to be somewhat 
obsessive.224 On Wolf's interpretation, the “one thought too many” charge has as its target 
what seems to be an excessive concern with morality, and this concern does not show itself 
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at the moment of action (at least, it need not), but in calm, reflective moments when the 
agent is free to consider what, all things considered, would be the best thing to do. In Wolf's 
words, the passage from Williams “should lead us to question the model of moral agency 
that would require unconditional commitment to acting within the bounds of what morality 
permits.”225 Wolf thinks that it is unreasonable to expect people to be unconditionally 
committed to morality (or to anything else, for that matter).226 
The friend of impartial and overriding morality may respond at this point by 
admitting the possibility of conflict, and stating that in such cases, the commitment to 
morality should win out. The accounts given by Railton and Herman have shown, the 
response will say, that the cases in which morality conflicts with our personal commitments 
to one another are more rare and less of a cause for concern than it might have at first 
seemed, and so allowing morality to be the decider in truly difficult cases should not be such 
a great cause for concern. Indeed, it might come as a kind of relief to know that there is a 
decider in truly difficult cases. But still, Wolf and Williams will want to say, there is 
something troubling about giving morality this role, and they do indeed seem to be on to 
something. It will be useful here to look more carefully at what the point Wolf is making 
about the hypothetical scenario tester is. 
The hypothetical scenario tester who runs through various counterfactual situations 
in order to draw conclusions about the boundaries of the realm of morally permissible 
actions is described by Wolf as putting her off. She does not intend to claim that the 
hypothetical scenario tester is doing something wrong; certainly, he would not seem to be 
                                                     
225 Wolf, “Love, Morality, and the Ordering of Commitment,” 75. 
226 Wolf, “Love, Morality, and the Ordering of Commitment,” 87-88. 
163 
 
doing anything morally wrong. But, as Wolf puts it, “there is nothing especially right about 
him either.”227 Rather, her point is that it is too strong a claim to say that having this level of 
commitment to morality is the only acceptable ideal. She gestures toward a different ideal—
an agent who would have impartial morality as one among several important commitments 
in his or her life but who would not be unconditionally committed to anything, morality 
included. The claim is that giving morality an all-important status as the final decider in 
difficult cases is not the only legitimate ideal, and there is the suggestion if not the explicit 
claim that giving it this role may in fact be unreasonable.228 So, the conclusion would seem to 
be that there is something wrong with the idea of morality as an always overriding set of 
reasons. Impartial morality may be important (indeed, for Wolf, it is important), but it does 
not have the absolutely authoritative status that it is often taken to have.229 
At this point, we face a problem. The problem is what sense to make of the idea of 
distinctively moral reasons if they are not absolutely authoritative and always overriding as 
Wolf suggests. What is the category of the moral, if not the category of absolutely binding 
reasons or all-things-considered most important reasons?230 Without a special authoritative 
status, can reasons properly be referred to as moral? If they are one set of concerns among 
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others, with which they can compete (and not always successfully), we need an account of 
how it is that they constitute a separate class of reasons. I return to this problem in more 
detail below, but for now it is worth pointing out that this point is not lost on Wolf. As she 
says: 
[T]he further one goes in specifying one's conception of morality in such a way as to assure 
that one's questions about what is morally permissible have determinate answers, the more 
difficult it becomes to defend the view that morality has supreme authority. If we define 
morality in a certain way, in other words, we might know what morality requires us to do, 
but we shall not know whether to give morality precedence over other important values, 
such as love.231 
Despite these remarks which acknowledge the difficulty of making sense of the category of 
distinctively moral reasons, Wolf does seem to think that there is a meaningful distinction 
between moral and non-moral reasons insofar as she argues that moral reasons do not have 
the absolutely overriding status that they are sometimes taken to have. That is, though her 
response differs decidedly from those that she groups together as the Standard View, her 
response seems to share with them the recognition of a distinction between moral and non-
moral reasons, and like the Standard View, she places reasons that arise out of relationships 
in the latter category. 
Wolf does not clearly state her view of the content of morality in the chapter being 
considered, but she does seem to assume that the category of the moral is a category of 
reasons that are grounded in an impartial perspective.232 Though she does make a few 
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remarks that suggest she may be more inclined to accept a view of morality that identifies 
values such as love as themselves moral values,233 she also expresses doubts about the ability 
of the latter view to serve as a guide to action.234 And action-guidingness is a function she 
seems to want to preserve for morality: 
If morality is to be of any use as a guide to live by and a guide by which to judge, advise, and 
apply pressure to others, then it must consist of relatively substantive rules and principles 
that can be knowable in advance of the particular situations in which the question of moral 
permission is raised. … I have been arguing in this chapter that at least one reasonable and 
attractive kind of person, having one reasonable and attractive kind of love, will not commit 
herself unconditionally to constraining her behavior to what morality, so conceived, 
permits.235 
Though she criticizes the ideal of an agent who is unconditionally committed to morality, her 
own preferred ideal does include a commitment to morality—just not an unconditional 
one.236 She says nothing more to spell out how this could all work together, and without 
more detail, I have doubts about its coherence. One remaining strategy to consider is to 
reject the assumption of a sharp distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. I briefly 
consider this strategy, and suggest its promise, below. 
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3. The Difficulty of Separating Impartial and Partial Reasons 
 
While all of the strategies pursued thus far seem unable to resolve the conflict 
between the reasons of relationships and the reasons of impartial morality, there may be a 
way out of the trouble if we give up the assumption that there are two distinct classes of 
reasons at issue. If there is no deep distinction between the reasons of relationships and the 
reasons of impartial morality, then the conception of conflict between them may rest on a 
mistake. If this is the case, the ‘conflict’ may show itself just as much in practical life—there 
will still be cases where difficult decisions need to be made between acting for the sake of 
one’s close relationships and acting for the sake of (for example) humanity in general—but 
the difficulty will be no different from other practical dilemmas, from a theoretical 
perspective. This will mean that any attempt to find a principled way of resolving these 
conflicts would be wrongheaded, and could explain the lack of a successful resolution thus 
far. 
Joseph Raz has argued against the idea that there is a deep distinction between the 
moral and the non-moral.237 Specifically, he offers reasons to think that there is no deep 
difference in kind between moral and non-moral reasons. As one consideration against the 
distinction, Raz argues that attempts to account for the supposed special stringency of moral 
as opposed to non-moral reasons do not work: 
The question is whether moral considerations must be a special class, for otherwise one 
cannot explain their stringency. The answer is that they are not specially stringent, for 
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example, some of them are supererogatory. To say that moral duties override non-moral 
considerations does not help support the suggestion that morality as a whole constitutes a 
special point of view.238 
Similarly, in “The Amoralist,” Raz argues that it is impossible to coherently draw a 
sharp distinction between two views that people may hold: he calls these people the moralist 
and the amoralist.239 The difference between these two characters is that the former believes 
that persons are valuable in themselves, while the latter denies this.240 Interestingly, in this 
paper, Raz uses the example of friendship, which as we have seen is most often taken to be a 
non-moral good, to argue that there is no real distinction between the moralist and the 
amoralist. He does this by suggesting that we consider an amoralist who lives a full and 
rewarding life, and as part of this full life, values friendship.241 What becomes apparent, when 
we consider this kind of amoralist, is that actual friendship of the kind that forms part of a 
rich, full, and rewarding life presupposes acceptance of the moralist's principle—that 
persons have value in themselves.242 Ultimately, Raz's point is that his imagined characters—
the moralist and the amoralist—are in fact impossible fictions, because there is no real 
distinction between morality and all other practical matters.243 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to fully answer the question of whether 
there is a meaningful category of moral reasons that is deeply different from non-moral 
reasons. But Raz’s arguments provide a clue, I think, to a structural feature of the reasons of 
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relationships that can at least help to explain the apparent tension they give rise to. Going 
forward, I will assume that there often are important considerations of impartiality, while not 
committing to the claim that they constitute a distinct class of reasons. These impartial 
considerations will sometimes be more important than more partial considerations, but they 
may also sometimes be less important. In other words, I am considering the possibility of 
practical conflict to be a real and significant one, without taking a stance on the theoretical 
depth of the conflict. But the arguments of this dissertation provide some enlightening 
insight into the nature of these practical conflicts, and the sense we have that a principled 
resolution is troublingly elusive. 
If my arguments throughout this dissertation have been successful, they show that 
close personal relationships give rise to genuine, important reasons and they are deeply, 
basically, and in part impersonally valuable as they constitute basic, versatile goods for 
human beings. Some of the reasons such relationships give rise to (especially reasons to 
favor one’s relatives over others) would seem to be in conflict with reasons of impartiality. 
But, as I see it, it is impossible to divorce those reasons from the deep and basic value of 
close personal relationships, which explains the more morally flavored reasons that arise out 
of relationships. That is, it would be impossible to retain the impersonal value of 
relationships, and respond to the more morally flavored reasons they generate, while 
downplaying the personal value of relationships, and not responding to the strongly partial 
reasons they generate. This is because the impersonal value, and thus the morally flavored 
reasons, depends on the personal value of relationships, which in turn is inseparable from 
their strongly partial reasons. The impersonal value of relationships is dependent on their 
personal value so that the morally flavored reasons do not operate unless the more strongly 
partial reasons do. 
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As an illustration, we might consider the class of reasons to take care of one’s 
capacity for reciprocity—one of the classes of reasons that I’ve suggested is in harmony with 
morality. Most immediately, the value that supports these reasons is impersonal—it is the 
value of the relationship-specific good of reciprocity that provides a unique and important 
arena for character development. But recall that, ultimately, the explanation for why this kind 
of reciprocity is especially valuable refers to aspects of relationships that are clearly 
personally valuable. It is because of our intimate acquaintance with, and affection for, our 
close relatives that relationships with them avail us of this good. It is because I love my 
friends that the stakes of my interactions with them are especially high, and it is because I 
trust them that I have room to explore other-directed actions and dispositions. It is because 
these particular relationships have such significant personal value to me that they provide the 
distinctive opportunity for me to practically explore my values—most especially those values 
that have implications for how I treat other people. So, our reasons to take special care of 
our capacities for reciprocity ultimately have their source and explanation in personal value, 
which gives rise to strongly partial reasons. 
To sum up, the reasons of relationships that I have described as having a rather 
moral flavor—reasons to respect existing relationships as basic human goods, reasons to 
take care of our capacities for reciprocity, and reasons to become somewhat more open-
minded—derive from the following features of relationships. Close relationships are 
basically valuable because of their versatile capacity to foster an important kind of character 
development. Specifically, relationships respond to our imperfections and vulnerabilities in a 
unique way—they allow us to better understand, to develop, and to practice our 
commitments to values. They are able to do this because our close relatives are uniquely well 
positioned in relation to our value systems—they are intimately acquainted with them, but 
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they do not fully share them, meaning that our close relatives occupy what I have called a 
doubly privileged perspective in relation to our value systems. Furthermore, and crucially, 
the fact that we have strong affection for our loved ones makes it more likely that we will 
care about their perspectives on our value systems. It is the combination of this doubly 
privileged perspective and the motivational force provided by the fact of our affection for 
our relatives that enables them to play the versatile, basically valuable role they do in our 
character development. And it is this role—the role of an impersonally valuable, basic 
human good—that explains the moral ‘flavor’ of the reasons we have to respect 
relationships, to take care of our relational capacities, and to broaden our experiential 
horizons. 
Note that the dependence as I’ve described it is one-directional. The personal value 
of my relationships and the reasons they generate for me simply as a participant in them 
need not depend on any corresponding impersonal value or participant-neutral reasons. My 
relationships can be good for me just in case they contribute to a pleasant and fulfilling life 
for me. Insofar as they are genuinely, personally valuable, however, they generate reasons for 
me to favor my loved ones over others; this is part of what it is to respond to their value. 
And this is perhaps where the explanation for the recalcitrance of the tension between 
partiality and impartiality lies: the personal value of relationships can eventually ground 
significant participant-neutral reasons that are in harmony with morality, but they need not. 
Relationships have the potential (a significant and interesting one) to be good for morality, 
but they need not be good for morality to be good for individuals. In contrast, their 
goodness for individuals is essential if they are to have any practical import in our lives. 
171 
 
The apparent priority of strongly partial reasons in the foregoing discussion should 
not be too concerning if we resist the assumption that partial and impartial reasons are 
deeply different in kind. That assumption may lead us to imagine that relationships pull us in 
two different directions, but more strongly toward our loved ones. Rather, if we reject the 
sharp dichotomy between partiality and impartiality, we can see that relationships are bearers 
of value for human beings, and as such, they generate practical reasons that are complex and 
varied. A particular friendship may urge me to favor my friend over a group of strangers, but 
the value of my relationships in general urges me to develop my capacity for reciprocity by 
taking steps to be more open-minded. In particular cases, it may be that the latter reason 
cancels out the former. In other cases, the converse may be true. It is also important to 
remember that the reasons of relationships do not operate in isolation. Though I have 
argued for a rather modest role for relationship-generated reasons in relation to impartiality, 
there are also independent considerations of impartiality that operate together with 
relationship-generated reasons. One plausible example, as Raz has argued, is that properly 
appreciating and participating in friendship presumably requires a commitment to the idea 
that human beings are valuable in themselves.244 
I do not mean to deny that relationships and their strongly partial reasons can and do 
threaten morality in particular cases. The motivational force provided by our love and 
affection for our relatives makes this a real concern. But I am suggesting that the problem 
does not run as deep as it may seem, precisely because it is mistaken to think of partiality and 
impartiality as two distinct forces that are essentially opposed. As I’ve been trying to show, 
when the full value of relationships is most fully appreciated, it reveals reasons that are 
                                                     
244 See Raz, “The Amoralist,” 273-302. 
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strongly connected to both partial and impartial concerns. My relationships give me reasons 
to favor my loved ones, but they also give me reasons to take care of my capacity for 
reciprocity, which effectively makes me a better person—better in my treatment of human 
beings in general. And they awaken me to much of value that would otherwise not have 
affected me much. These are, I think, essential aspects of living a good human life, including 
specifically the moral dimension of such a life. That particular relationships lead particular 
participants to make morally problematic decisions is cause for concern, certainly, but it is 
cause for concern about particular relationships and their effect on us rather than for 
concern about the value of relationships in general. 
One may wonder if I have been too quick to tie the personal value of relationships to 
the reasons that pose a potential problem for acting morally. Perhaps we can in fact 
recognize and appreciate the personal value of relationships without acting on the potentially 
troubling reasons. I can appreciate and indeed cherish my relationship with Joe as something 
very deeply important to me, while acting only on reasons that I believe to be consistent 
with the requirements of morality, on this sort of view.245 This strategy will not work, 
however, as long as one thinks (as I do) that part of what it is to properly value something is 
to respond to it as reason-giving. This surely means that to not be prepared to act on reasons 
of partiality generated by relationships is to some extent to fail to properly appreciate their 
value.246 It would simply not be true to say that I would value Joe as I in fact do if I were not 
                                                     
245 Depending on the details when fully spelled out, such a view might amount to something like 
Railton’s, Herman’s, or Velleman’s view. Indeed, I suspect something like this strategy lies behind Velleman’s 
separation of love as an attitude (appreciation of rational nature) from the various motives he says that it 
‘unleashes.’ Velleman seems to be of the view that there are reasons for love, but that love itself is not a reason 
(unless it is a reason only to drop our emotional defenses.) Though I have addressed these sorts of views 
above, I think it is worth briefly addressing here again, specifically in ‘value’ and ‘reason’ terms. 
246 In this, I am in agreement with Scheffler, among others. 
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disposed to favor him over others in cases of need (such as in lifeboat scenarios) and in 
cases of no particular need (such as in contexts of gift-giving and other cases of optional 
beneficence.) Moreover, if I were not so disposed, criticism of me—in particular, of my 
attitude toward Joe and our relationship—would be appropriate. Such criticism would not be 
of the moral variety, of course, but it would nevertheless be appropriate and warranted. 
In the end, my position turns out to share much with Susan Wolf’s, except that I do 
not share her assumption that the conflict is one between deeply different kinds of reasons. I 
share Wolf’s resistance to the idea that we should have any absolutely unconditional 
commitments, and her view of ethical life as something that cannot be figured out in 
advance (and nor should we attempt to do so.) But whereas her view becomes puzzling in its 
details—specifically, the details of what the category of the moral might be if not overriding 
or especially authoritative—I suggest that it is best to talk about the conflicts without 
invoking deeply different categories of reasons. The labels ‘partial’ and ‘impartial’ are useful 
in that they identify tendencies, but I think it is counterproductive to read much more into 
the terms than that. Some evidence that the difference is not extremely deep is that (strongly 
partial) relationships can give rise to independent reasons to make ourselves morally better 
by urging us to be more open minded and empathetic, for example. Similarly, as Raz has 










So, where does this leave us? Is there something general and enlightening to be said 
about relationship-generated reasons of partiality and impartial reasons on the basis of the 
foregoing arguments? Well, perhaps it is just this: we cannot legitimately ignore either, even 
if they conflict (as they sometimes will.) As Raz has argued that an ‘amoralist’s’ position 
would be incoherent without a commitment to the ‘moralist’s’ position, I have suggested 
that the value of relationships is such that it recommends partiality but also very likely serves 
impartial concerns. This is less puzzling, I think, if we give up the view of the two concerns 
as deeply distinct and opposed. When some particular reason of partiality conflicts with 
some particular reason of impartiality, a judgment will have to be made about which of them 
is more pressing. My position on the matter, as well as my attitude toward my position is 
very similar to Scheffler’s on the closely related but broader issue of the relation between 
morality and personal interests generally: 
As I have indicated, [mine] is a view that stands intermediate between two more extreme 
positions: between the view that morality and self-interest ultimately coincide, and the view 
that they are diametrically opposed. The very structure of an intermediate position can make 
it difficult to defend. For since such a position compromises between two extremes, it in 
effect concedes some merit to each, thereby undermining its ability to employ certain of the 
arguments that the extremes use against each other. And since it commits itself fully to 
neither extreme, it in effect concedes some weakness in each, thereby undermining its ability 
to employ certain of the arguments that the extreme positions rely on for support. At worst 
an intermediate position may seem vulnerable to a charge of inconsistency or theoretical 
instability. At best it may seem incapable either of defending itself or of criticizing the 
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extreme alternatives with anything like the kind of force and conviction that each of them 
can muster. On the other hand, intermediate positions sometimes have the most important 
virtue of all—the virtue of being correct.247 
Ethical life is complicated and difficult, and admits of few hard and fast distinctions and 
unambiguous principles. I believe this is because human beings are complex, imperfect, and 
vulnerable. A true account of practical reasons must be sensitive to these facts of human 
nature. But it would certainly be disappointing if there were no more to say about partiality 
and impartiality than this. 
Fortunately, I think there is more to say, and I have tried to say some of it in this 
dissertation. While there may be no clear, general, and principled solution to the conflict 
between partial and impartial reasons, by better understanding the content and explanations 
of various ‘partial’ and ‘impartial’ reasons, we can better understand particular situations in 
which the conflict shows itself. And we can be better prepared to make the difficult 
decisions. By understanding why close relationships give rise to reasons to favor loved ones, 
and by understanding that those reasons are importantly connected with certain impersonal 
values and, indeed, basic human goods, we can approach difficult dilemmas with a more 
nuanced appreciation for what is actually at stake. With this understanding in hand, we can 
respond to the reasons generated, which will include taking good care of ourselves in 
particular ways that may indeed help us better understand the value to which we are 
responding. Of course, a more complete preparation would also involve a deep 
understanding of the reasons that seem more clearly to concern impartiality—something I 
have not taken up in the present work, though something that has been and continues to be 
                                                     
247 Scheffler, Human Morality, 4-5. 
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explored extensively in philosophy. But I think some significant progress has been made 
here in understanding the value of close personal relationships and the reasons to which they 
give rise. This is one component, I believe, of navigating the dense and complicated reality 
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